


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NEWMAN, PASCAL, LOISY

AND THE

CATHOLIC CHURCH



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Newman, Pascal, Loisy and the Catholic Church

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GENERAL INTRODUCTION.

It is not a little surprising to those who are familiar with the political and religious controversies of some fifty years ago, to observe how seldom what used to be so peremptorily set forth as the right of private judgment is defended, or even mentioned. Indeed, whatever may be our own belief on the subject, this at least must be conceded: that, in some cases without a battle, though after a strenuous and feverish contest in others, the word and the thing have slowly but gradually been pushed out of almost every sphere of thought. Nay more: those entirely personal opinions, those private and particular judgments,—for which the “right” to hold them and insist on them used to be so loudly claimed,—have a tendency to vanish from public discussion, more or less rapidly, in proportion as the persons addressed are more or less educated; and a suspense of judgment which does not venture on an opinion never appears to cease, until it can pass into that scientific certitude which can no longer be counted as opinion at all.

But it is not supposed that the peculiar energy of the intelligence implied in the phrase “to hold an opinion” is now never exercised, or that there is now no room in thought for conclusions which

are only partially formed. No! but as in many other matters, so notably in this, the precision of scientific expression has substituted a clear, limited idea for a loose and indeterminate one, and private opinion can now only be expressed in the modest and intelligible form of an hypothesis. "Nothing can be done," said M. Pasteur, "without preconceived ideas, only there must be the wisdom not to accept their deductions beyond what experience confirms. Preconceived ideas, subject to the severe control of experimentation, are the vivifying flame of scientific observation, while fixed ideas are its danger." What is this but to proclaim that among all thinking men, scientific hypothesis should be substituted for vague opinion? For the element of vagueness and the element of fixity which make it impossible to submit opinions to the test of experiment are precisely the elements in which the difference between hypothesis and opinion consists. Subtract, then, from opinion the element of vagueness and the element of fixity, and opinion must shrink into its true proportions, as hypothesis; as such it must henceforth submit to the rules which scientific thought demands for all hypotheses alike—be they good, bad or indifferent, and must be given up without a murmur so soon as one undoubted fact is logically adduced against it.

It is not difficult to understand, then, how it happens that a right of private judgment has come to be recognized as little better than a right of personal taste or private fancy; and that scientists

and theologians alike have succeeded in convincing so many, that mere personal opinion is little better than a consequence—fortuitous from one point of view, and inevitable from another—of the environment, physical or mental, hereditary or social, of what are called “units in humanity.”

Nor has it been only in science and theology that a tendency of this kind has been observable, but even in matters of art the proverb “every man to his taste” has been felt to be as superficial and anarchical as would be a similar rule in morality or religion. Realism in art and Positivism in history have (no doubt in an exaggerated manner) been insisting ever more and more on the removal of romantic preconception, and purely subjective sentiment or emotion, from pictures and novels and history alike, so that we may know as little as possible of the author’s opinions and as much as possible of the facts he intends to portray.

And, though all this has been pressed to such an extent as to become ridiculous and in reality to defeat itself, yet the tendency is but an illustration of the great axiom in all spiritual and intellectual life that “man must die to live”—that individuality must perish in order that personality may survive. “By such self-abnegation,” it is urged, “nothing would, in fact, be lost, for the personality of the author or the artist will express itself, if it be a great one, sufficiently for the purposes of art, or the attainment of truth, when his whole energy is employed in conveying to mankind whatever is true and important in accordance with

the ascertained laws—which are necessary to lucid expression—the laws of order, symmetry and balance.”

But if such criticism is felt barren and pernicious in matters of art, far more obvious is the danger in morality, and as the state insists upon certain laws necessary to the well-being of society, so men have begun to feel that there must be, however difficult it may be to attain them, ascertainable and universal laws for the higher degrees of morality and what has been called “perfection.” The vague rhetoric of Sallust, the austere moral of Tacitus, as well as the brilliant special pleading of Macaulay, are felt to be unscientific, and, in some sense, arbitrary and personal, as giving a false value to important elements in life short of that law—truly universal—which should become clear from a mere adherence to facts. If morality, for instance, is, indeed, the important element in life we think it, a strict relation of the facts will sufficiently prove it to be so; but, on the other hand, if it is not, an impartial account of things as they are is the only means we have of discovering what in fact the due place of morality is. And it will scarcely be denied that the arrangement of facts in such a form as “to point a moral” has begun by bringing discredit upon history and ended by bringing doubt upon what the historian considered to be morality.

The first tendency, therefore, of scientific historians has been to ignore “all moral land-

marks"—as Lord Acton observes was done in the latest history of the French Revolution. And it is not too much to say that we have already left behind a history such as that of Carlyle, while the immense empire of scientific criticism is slowly beginning to enclose the whole domain of history as but one of its more important departments.

If we cannot bring ourselves to see things as they are—it is urged—so much the worse for us. Nothing for us should be good or bad, beautiful or hideous—on any *a priori* basis of old fashioned metaphysic or in accordance with some physical accident of heredity. We should but take things as we find them; unlearn our arbitrary likings and disgusts, and attempt no more to measure them by an absolute ideal—the result and the cause alike of misconception and personal bias. In other words, scientific thought insists that we should allow no further weight to our private judgment than may justly be assigned, by the logic of facts, to a unit in humanity.

But it is clear that if such reasoning as this may be applied to history and to art it must be applied to thought likewise, and, therefore, to conduct. And to a certain extent this has been attempted and has been accomplished. Men have taken the law of the state as simply a physical fact, obeyed it, and cut off completely all the more delicate and interesting parts of morality as belonging to what possibly might turn out to be the mere dreams of former ages. They have taken from life all variety and richness, and reduced it to

its barest possible expression in order to begin again or start fair, as they would express it. And, in a certain sense, they had a logical right to do so. The only question was this: whether they did not merely lose the habits which would come by acting in accordance with the more delicate and interesting conceptions of morality which came from former ages, while they gained nothing but a void? It was quite clear, indeed, that private judgment and personal bias had been extended too far, and ought to be limited; but the question remained—limited by what? And if yielded up to whom should they be yielded? It was plain that there must be, at least, a provisional morality beyond the mere orderings of the state; but what was there in the world to provide it?

But if the demand for an objective criticism has been made in such subjects as history, literature and art, much more is it required where science, which has been the cause of the whole movement, has been practically concerned. In the middle ages science was considered and was called the hand-maiden of Theology, Theology the Queen of the sciences: and science came to be treated often as if it existed but to illustrate and enforce religious truths.

No one can say that it is thus treated now. It is perceived, at last, that the progress of science requires for its rapidity and completeness total independence of assumption and dictation from without and especially the assumptions or dictation of theology. And this conviction has arisen not

because theology is considered false or doubtful (though that consideration has of course influenced many) but because the inter-weaving of two lines of thought so diverse is a process which gives too many opportunities for the play of prejudice and personal opinion, fixed interpretations of texts, and mis-representations of facts, for the security either of science or religion. But even now scientific men are continually causing a shock to those religious minds which hear of their conclusions without having followed their process. The scientific man has long ago perceived, and, therefore, in season and out of season insists, that it is his duty, in the department of research that he has selected, to account for things as they are, only by means of facts to which he can relate them. He cannot allow to supersede his investigations any account of them which appeals, for its validity, to some principle which he is unable scientifically to recognise. When he cannot account for a fact or an event (whether it be the origin of the world or the appearance of miracle) to give up the attempt to account for it would, he considers, be nothing else but to forsake his post. Why should he, as a scientific man, suddenly set aside the inductive method which, by its very nature, renews its strength and increases its bulk every day, for some final axiom or dogma which would shut up the subject for ever? Why should he be compelled to express his belief in a proposition while it is still possible for him, on scientific grounds, to suspend his judgment and thereby to leave open the path to

future discovery? To do anything else, he argues, would be to outrun the facts with which it is his business, as a man of science, accurately and steadily to keep pace. He must not pretend that he has found a solution until he can demonstrate it, and he is bound always to be searching for a solution in terms of the science to which the problem intrinsically belongs. He has no right, he contends, to close a question in science, or to assert to the scientists of the future that *his* investigation is final or that he has arrived at the miraculous.

When a learned scientist, then, is quoted by Lord Salisbury (to take a well-known instance) as acquiescing for the time in a theory which he admits to be inadequate, on the ground that, should he not do so, he would be compelled to have recourse to the theological or miraculous account of creation, he was but saying what, after all, a scientific man as such is bound to say—what, in another context the Schoolmen, centuries ago, regarded as axiomatic—what, indeed, before the Schoolmen, St. Augustine had implied in his letter to Faustus, that we are bound to remain within the limits of the natural until we are ejected, as it were, by force; that we should examine every cause conceivable before we admit a final cause and acknowledge every secondary cause until we are thrown, of necessity, upon a first. But never, by science, can we be compelled to admit a first or final cause; for such a cause is beyond the ken of science, as it is beyond the scope of induction.

You cannot get the infinite from any number of finites, nor can man by searching find out God.

“But how is it,” one may naturally enquire, “that a principle admitted in the days of St. Thomas and St. Augustine has only become the practice now, and that even in our own days the practice should to some extent become a scandal?” It is because the consequences of the principle were not fully understood nor generally expected until they actually arrived. It has been with induction and the scientific method (which is something far more complete than induction) as with all great principles and modes of thought, whether they concern political liberty or social advancement or scientific progress. It has needed opposition to give it precision and circumstances to show its importance, and time to exhibit the width of its sphere. It has been the accumulation of facts and the progress of events which have added, as it were while men slept, to the volume of its evidence and the scope of its energy. It has slowly undermined authoritative statement and ancient tradition by no purposed onset, by no premeditated attack, but by the inevitable progress of discovery—perhaps in departments of thought apparently diverse altogether from those in which its distinctive qualities are ultimately most remarked. The scientific method in great part existed and was worked long before Christendom was formed; and then lay embedded in the philosophy of Aristotle side by side with propositions which the least learned and the least capable of scientists can now

refute by the simplest of its applications. It is now not only a method which can be used, it has created an atmosphere which can be felt; and facts almost seem to suggest their own classification as discovery slowly increases their number, and carefully sets forth their qualities. No longer marshalled under arbitrary titles given them by some philosopher who finds them natural or unnatural, præternatural or supernatural, according to the length of his experience or the amount of his learning,—or, on a basis no more secure, divides them into genera and species—they have forced upon the modern mind the suspicion that generalization can be but provisional and classification temporary.

Now the principle of induction not only existed long ago in the philosophy of Aristotle, but has been constantly inculcated and implicitly followed by the Christian religion wherever it has been in contact with actual conduct (its main and true concern) and the spiritual life. The minding of small things, the condescension to detail; “the falling in love,” as St. Paul literally expresses it “with little” facts, the taking things one by one; the very practice of humility: these are, after all, but the method of induction carried into ethics*. That the laborious and indefatigable study of detail will be more successful in the attainment of the truth than the confident assertion and abstract discussion of principles is an axiom that answers so clearly to the teaching of Christianity upon conduct that it needs but the comparison to make

us feel that it is the same law in a different guise. In each case the evil to be got rid of is the "*Ego*," which with its preconceptions and self-sufficiency does what is right in its own eyes, judges itself by its own laws and makes itself the centre of the universe.

So again, Lord Bacon in speaking of the freedom necessary for science from all the old idolatries, is consciously using language analogous to that of the old spiritual books, when he bids us, in effect, become fools that we may be wise; become little that we may be great; and put away the self-made idols of our pride, the idol of the market-place, the idol of the theatre, the idol of the tribe.

But modern philosophy does not allow us to stop here, or, on the part of science, to plead for the complete overthrow of preconception and philosophical hypothesis—preconception which is the very life of scientific enquiry "without which," says Pasteur, "nothing can be done." And, indeed, no fact is more widely admitted by philosophers of every school as well as by men of science than that induction alone has never led to any discovery at all. It is, surely significant that the notion of private judgment should find its profoundest condemnation here and that those writers (whether Bacon or his shallower admirers) who have wished to give the freest scope to honest enquiry should find themselves compelled to give to self, to the "*ego*," to the private judgment, an ever smaller scope till it has reached the point at

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which Catholic theologians consider it to be necessary in the acceptance of any authority whatever; and the Apostolic saying that no Scripture is of private interpretation is felt to be true not only of sacred books but of all history, literature, and science; of all facts, indeed, with which it is possible for the mind of man to become acquainted.

And consequently modern thought has very generally come to recognize the necessity for the attitude of the church of the Middle Ages towards science. "The sense of the whole," as we hear repeated so often, "must come first"; and with philosophy as a whole, with the moral and religious basis of life the church of the Middle Ages was obliged to concern itself. It is not necessary to say that such an attitude was justifiable: the limitations of the energy of man rendered some such attitude inevitable. It was inevitable (and Positivists now generally not only admit but contend that it was so) that, in an age in which men felt the first, the deepest, and the immediate necessity to be some uniform ethical and religious ideal, science should remain in the background. Who can tell how perilous to civilization, as a whole, might not have been the possession of scientific knowledge, independent of any fixed religion or code of morals, by a half barbarous community of all kinds of races: with a social life scarcely begun, with the anti-social forces scarcely subdued, with a general character as wild, fierce and ungovernable as that of a modern anarchist?

What might not have happened to society, if a kind of knowledge which certainly means power, but, as certainly, need not mean social virtue or self-restraint, had given to large masses of men the self-sufficiency and independence which belong, and to some extent rightly belong, to scientific authority now? There can be little doubt, indeed, that science might, for a time, have progressed with greater rapidity; but civilization, on its humane and social side, could hardly have been reached at all; nor, as time went on, could science itself have progressed in security without the aid and protection of that general culture which could not have been obtained apart from the influence, and even the conservative bias, of religion.

Few, probably, will deny that the Catholic Church in the Middle Ages was the sole, as she was the inevitable, representative of human solidarity in Europe. But it is to some such living representative of human solidarity that all these tendencies away from merely individual judgments, tastes, and fancies to which we have alluded, are already pointing. To the acknowledged conclusions of mankind as a whole, so far as these conclusions can be represented, is the allegiance of man felt to be logically due; with these he must start; to these he must, even though it be long after his work on earth has been accomplished, ultimately yield. He himself does but come as a single tone in a vast harmony of which he forms a part; and the matured judgment of mankind is the sole criterion left him not only for the validity of the methods

which he uses, but of his sanity in the conduct of life; not only of the conclusions which he draws or the premisses from which he argues, or the language (certainly not invented by himself) in which he thinks, but even of his physical construction in brain and body; for by that alone can he be judged to be human at all. It was because this human solidarity can alone give authority to final judgments or become an ultimate court of appeal that the Church was forced to attempt its realization on such a scale as was then possible. She came forward (little as she realized what she did) not as the representative of fixed ideas but as the representative of great religious preconceptions and, all unconsciously submitted them to the severe control of experimentation in the life of the world and of action. She came forward as the representative for man, for the individual, of the vast ethical and religious process which had slowly been growing up in the human family for so long. She came forward as representing (so far as she could gather it) the sum of the religious idea in humanity, for the unit. She became the organism, so far as was possible, in which the religious process was to be carried out. She gave to man "preconceptions" which, as they are "the life of science"—so are they the life of religion, of thought, of conduct and of art. She gave the rules by which man destroys his selfish individuality, but creates the personality which survives.

That the general movement of thought in Europe is favourable to some such ultimate

tribunal as the Catholic Church would be, could men be convinced that some such ideal as that which is suggested by the name, is, in the Catholic Church, actually realized, has been acknowledged by some, who feel the danger of living without at least a provisional representative of solidarity, in morals and religion. Such persons have acknowledged that (whatever its defects) the Catholic Church does provide for the individual such a basis for morality and religion; and this, not on some private view of things, but in the name and on the authority of as large a body of men in all nations as she has been able to concentrate upon the task. Her Catholicism is felt to be even more than what she herself has claimed. It has come in the process of time, and by contact with every kind of national tradition—in morals, in religion and even in philosophy—to be a Catholicism not only of Christian tradition but, to some extent, of the whole great religious tradition in the human family. To such persons it has sometimes occurred that the Church may be not only “heir by default” to the great councils of the fourth century, but “heir by default” to all former representatives of the religious principle in whatever nation or century such representatives are to be found. And if, on the one hand, some such authority exists in the world at all, there is, on the other, little doubt that some such authority has become an elementary necessity in an age which hopes or seems to hope, while resolving into its component parts the ground on which the human

race is standing, that the time is about to arrive in which it will be possible for every man to stand without difficulty on nothing at all.

Nor is it a long step for those who have come to regard the individual as a unit in humanity to go on to regard humanity itself as a unit in that universe whose limits are unknown. The isolation of the unit in humanity throws him upon the larger unit of which he feels himself a part, and hence the desire for an authority objective, cosmopolitan, catholic; a centre of unity and a common ground for thought. The latitudinarian, the liberalistic, and individualist view of truth as something dependent upon our subjective conception of it has disappeared as completely as the notion that truth can be said to be something lying, as it were, outside the human race, as something "sole and unapproachable."

Thus it was that Newman's opposition to latitudinarianism and his subjective idealism drove him from opposite sides into the line which he ultimately took. Truth cannot be considered as simply dependent upon the individual nor yet can it be set outside the only possible instrument of its expression: revelation was not made simply from outside, but grew up also from within. The truth which makes us free and which causes a religion to prevail is not a something without ourselves alone, but is only to be recognized as something objective because it is immanent in the human race as a whole, and is inherent in all things from the first. And thus, truth being something which is

as it were born with the human race, it may be said "to live" in it and have its habitation with the sons of men. If it lives, it grows; and growth is the test of its life. A particular kind of truth admits of being represented by a particular kind of process; and, as the cosmic process may be said in one sense to give birth to truth, so truth—still acting within the same laws but on a new plane—may be said to live and grow in a process ethical or religious, in such sense that you cannot appeal to any "truth" outside to condemn it.

If, then, we find that the old bases for the ethical idea and the religious idea are slowly being set on one side—not as simply untrue but as impossible to the present conditions of thought (because a question having once been scientifically opened cannot be theologically shut)—is it not of some importance to consider whether we may not be able to get rid of these question begging bases for society and religion, and substitute for them a basis which can be recognised by mankind in the present state of its consciousness as the philosophy of the schools was recognised by Europe in a past state of its consciousness? Can we not express in terms of the thought of our day what the schoolmen considered it their duty to express in terms of the thought of theirs? If the scholastic philosophy represented one aspect of the solidarity of Christendom, and the transition which this age is accomplishing is a transition to a newer and a wider, the time has certainly now arrived in which the transition must be fully realized. For such a transition

can never be completed unless it is consciously undergone and carried out both by the religious and scientific thought of the day: for this purpose there must be a solidarity in time as well as in space; there must be continuity or else there will be no growth. Now a preliminary necessity for meeting this continuity is clearly some Catholic organisation; but, whatever claim Catholics may make for the Catholic Church, it is certain that in humanity at large this break in continuity has occurred. It is useless to attempt to bridge over the past by some artificial arrangement. How is it possible to make use of the Catholic Church even if this be the use to which it should be put? How is it possible for those who hold that the existence of God, for instance, can never be proved, to belong to a Church whose fundamental article of belief is His existence? How can those who reject the miraculous as an absurdity believe in the existence of a miraculous Church? Does not the Church compel us to receive all the question-begging bases for Society which Society has rejected?

These questions show only too clearly into what a state of confusion the whole religious question has been flung by the ignorance of well-meaning persons, both on the side of religion and against it. The dogmas of the Church even on the existence of God and the nature of miracle have come to be represented as fixed ideas—the bane of science and an obstacle to progress, rather than testimonies to the exigencies of man's nature and fruitful preconceptions essential to his growth.

In this manner such declarations as that of the Vatican Council on the existence of God (where it is laid down that this can be proved by the natural reason alone) have been so interpreted as to make the conversion of modern society to the Church simply impossible. Whereas the article in question was clearly intended to be consistent with the fact that belief in the existence of God in the Church's sense is very difficult outside the Church; that many of the early Christians, before they entered the Church, were in precisely the same condition of mind as modern society, and that to the majority of converts in many ages the idea of God as a Person and as one who rewards and punishes was revealed for the first time by the Christian Church.

If it be asked, then, "How can modern society, which rejects the existence of a Personal God, accept the authority of a Church the first article of whose creed proclaims His existence?" We may ask in turn, "How did ancient society, in a similar condition, accept that authority?" What converts to Christianity were in search of then, was probably what all men who think, are in search of now: not some abstractly perfect proof, not some mathematical or scholastic demonstration, not some truth *behind* phenomena, not some fixed idea; but life—life of a kind so central to the nature of man as to give life to all the spheres of his thought and action. If he has found this life for himself, he has found God and the absolute; the ultimately real—that which really makes to

live; he has found the truth—not as an abstraction nor even as an abstract ideal—but as something that lives with his own life and grows with his own energies.

Now it is religion and morality which are concerned with the sources of life. Where, then, is he to look for such life? Is he to find it without or within? He is to find it both within and without, in whatever has life or contributes to life. He must derive his moral and religious life from the moral and religious process as he derived his physical life from the cosmic process.

In looking for that religion which is to contribute to his religious life from without, how is he to choose?

On the grounds on which we have been discussing the subject hitherto, he may reject every religion whose essential characteristic fails of the notion of universal solidarity and organic unity; which is not an organism and which is not, in any sense alive; which performs none of the functions of an organism; because, as humanity becomes conscious of itself as a unit in the universe, all religions that are merely national or are connected with any basis not universal become impossible. No religion whose characteristic mark is not the endeavour to get a universal basis of all religious truth can be admitted into his enquiry, and no religion which sets any insuperable obstacle to the gaining such a basis can be admitted.

A brilliant opponent of the Catholic Church complains that Cardinal Newman deals only with

the Christian religion and leaves out altogether the great religions, for instance, of the East; and he conceives Newman's answer to have been that the superior civilization of the West may fairly be considered a sufficient reason for so doing. But Newman's real answer is far deeper than that. The very basis and mode of development of those religions has always tended to obscure that kind of Catholicity which, in the Christian religion, has enabled it to absorb such elements from other religions as it needs. But, according to Newman, that first thing that man requires of the religion of which he is in search, is that its basis should be of such a kind as to enable it to assimilate all the moral and spiritual truths that are found in other religions. Such a basis he considered he had found in a Church whose chief characteristic and essential note is its Catholicity. Though that Catholicity at first did but mean the Catholicity of its own traditions, Newman found in the Church's capacity for assimilation a proof of the very kind of Catholicity we now require; for it has even been made a reproach to the Catholic Church that she absorbed the traditions of all the nations with which she came in contact, and that she continues to assimilate both truth and method from without.

If there be a great religious tradition in the world, whencesoever it arose, it must have its part in the development of man. Whether we choose to consider it as having arisen out of the great cosmic process and, therefore, as forming a part of that process still; or whether it be supposed to be

in some unknown manner broken off from the cosmic process; anyhow, a religious process there is, nor can any sophistry convince us that what has once made a part and an essential part of the whole man can be taken from him without an essential loss, unless it is, in some manner replaced by what is better.

But if the religious tradition of humanity becomes a mere matter of individual opinion that loss has occurred; for, to man, as such, religion would then have become a mass of confusion, arbitrary theory and personal caprice, in short, not only a mystery but a mystery without any real relation to his life. Religion would, in this case, have sunk into a mere enigma, a hopeless puzzle. And we know that men of equal capacity and of equal piety (so far as we can allow ourselves to be their judge) have come to completely opposite conclusions with regard to its significance; have belonged to opposing sects, parties, and religions; or, even have given up religion altogether in consequence of its divisions. The break in continuity, then, to which we have made reference, has issued in complete anarchy of opinion.

We cannot get at the significance of the religious tradition, for the religious tradition itself, if held at all, is held not only in contention, but in contradiction.

At this point in the argument, however, we are sometimes reassured by being told that "*in essentials* the religious tradition remains signifi-

cant for man." He can, it is supposed, pierce through and eliminate the differences and arrive at the bed-rock beneath by the use of his intellectual powers or his spiritual discernment. Now this might be simply denied (as it often has been), for it is clear that those who have thus used their intellect have differed as to what the *essential part of religion* is as often as religions differ from one another: some bringing "what is essential" down to conceptions so vague that others can find in them no meaning at all.

If again, somebody asserts that his particular view is the true one, and that what he conceives to be essential to religion is alone essential, whether he is a philosopher or a sectary, he lays himself open to the absurdity of attempting to found religious truth on personal opinion; and all other philosophers and sectaries may speak of their own views with the same confidence and in the same manner. And yet even to this day persons who consider themselves philosophers, without even the excuse of the fanatic, who conceives himself personally guided by God, will often set to work to divide the "precious from the base" in religion; as if some standard of what is precious in religion set up in a few years by themselves were of equal validity with the natural process of evolution and survival of the fittest. This is about as wise as to affirm that we can know by instinct or by inspiration something which is hidden from the rest of mankind; nor have philosophers been a whit wider minded or less arbitrary

and provincial than the most insular of English Protestants in condemning what they do not happen to like or judging by the kind of instinct that is simply the product of their environment. Every man in these matters does and will always answer according to his personal opinions, his race-feelings, his temperament, the philosophic system he knows best, his particular hopes, aspirations, and knowledge. Up to a certain point he is bound to do so, and ought to do so. Here, however, if anything in the world is clear, it is clear that he needs an answer which will be universal in its significance, because he himself cannot now believe in a religion which is really his own invention and can, in no sense, stand above him, a religion judged by personal instinct and opinion alone, a religion of individual eclecticism.

No certain answer, then, will be given to this question at all, except in the points where purely scientific knowledge will slowly force consent on the whole of mankind, and upon Catholics as well as others. Where the answer from philosophy is merely hypothetical, it may justly be advanced; but, in the meantime, the religious tradition must persist or perish, and mere hypothesis is not sufficient to kill it; nor, on the other hand (apart from the confirmation of ages of conscious practical working) sufficient to keep it alive.

In those cases of dogma in which philosophy cannot advance further than opinion, or, indeed, as generally happens, mere arbitrary like or dislike, an answer such as we require is impossible.

In those cases of dogma in which scientific facts have made the philosophic answer scientifically certain the answer is of profound moment to the Church and must, at last, be absorbed by her. But, in the meantime, for the individual who seeks a religion such an answer, in a particular case, may be interesting and enlightening, but it will not give him the religion he seeks; it will not bring him at once to the deeper sources of the religious life of humanity; it will not put him into direct contact with the religious process in man.

But, after all, the answer to the question: "What is essential to religion?" is, surely, itself essential. And yet it is clear that individuals differ as much on this point as on any other, as much as they differ on questions such as that of justification, or the Divinity of Christ, or the existence of God, or the necessity for religion at all. Nevertheless, so long as this question is not answered it is plain that a religion of what people call "essentials" is no religion.

As necessary, then, as religion is to man, so necessary to religion is such an organism as will gather together into one, express and report progress upon, the development of whatever is inevitably religious in man's nature.

Now to that solution of the problem which would find in some actual Church such an organism and such a mode of expression and development as we have shown to be desirable, there are made many preliminary objections which we shall now endeavour to meet.

It is said, then, that when such a Church demands the submission of mankind to her definitions of what is essential, she does but make one essential doctrine instead of many to which it is, at least, as difficult to assent as to the others. It is as difficult to believe in the authority of the Church as to believe in any of the doctrines laid down as essential by the sects. It is as difficult to believe in the Church as in Baptismal Regeneration. It does but put the difficulty further back to ask us to believe by one act of the will, instead of asking us to believe, by many acts, one by one.

Such an objection is intended to cut away the root idea of authority in religion; but even those philosophers who trust most to the individual reason are obliged to trust first in the general; and those who have gone furthest into the region of pure thought have been compelled to begin with a language and a brain; while those sectaries who imagine that they believe in certain Christian mysteries, on the direct authority of God, will acknowledge that those mysteries have never been, and, from their very nature, never could be, proved, as mysteries, to their private judgment, one by one. They accept them, as they think, on the authority of God.

Religious mysteries and religious truths may be ideas on their way to realization; half revealed and half concealed in the instinctive language of symbol and metaphor. Such truths, I say, may be on their way to a clearer expression and may some day admit of proof; but as they stand, they are

dim, difficult, and remote. It has been owing to this fact that Christianity has been regarded always by the majority of Christians as a "revelation." It was regarded as a "revelation" because, while it made an appeal on external grounds to human reason, it internally transcended human reason. And so, in some sense, religion always must be regarded; because its origin, from a simply natural point of view, is exceedingly difficult to trace. Those who find its origin in fetish worship forget that things must be judged by what they become; they do not make religion as it is any less important, but show that fetish worship was more important than we are asked to suppose it.

Externally, however, the authority of the Church rests upon a fact in nature. As such it may be regarded, nor is it necessary to the proof of the basis on which the Church stands to prove it to have any supernatural character at all. If a religion is essential to man's full development; if, when he comes to realise that there are different religions, he perceives that one must be better than the others; if, in order to find out the best, he essentially needs some exterior sign or notes of its qualities and some interior criterion of what is essential *to itself*; then an objective religion, "a proponent" of religious doctrine, here and now and ever present, is essential to religion. Again, if a religious tradition exists in humanity, and separated religions such as those of the nations before Christianity, have become conscious that

they cannot each be simply the universal religion; then an authority to define what is essential to such a religion as *shall* be universal, is essential to religion itself and to the carrying on of the religious process in the world. The authority, then, of such a church as really carries out this ideal, would rest on the same foundation as religion itself; and the necessity of religion itself to man can only be established by arguments which are, at the same time, establishing hers.

So that to say that the doctrine of the authority of the Church is as difficult to believe in as the particular religious doctrines proposed to our belief is to mistake the nature of the problem. The authority of the Church, as it first comes to us, is a perfectly natural phenomenon, founded on reasons which appeal to us on perfectly natural grounds, so long as we believe that we have no right to make a break in the continuity of a developing idea and tradition on which man has hitherto set a high value; whereas the religious doctrines, which are proposed to our belief by a religion professing to be revealed, come to us, as each of them beyond the power of our reason to prove, as is clear from the fact that they are supposed to demand faith.

And here it is necessary to observe what I have already shown must be granted, that the Church so conceived does not put an end to the use of the speculative intelligence: it does but lay down those laws for its exercise which are necessary to the very existence of the religious idea. It

does not forbid analysis, explanation or the philosophic account of the history of religion, or the mode of acceptance of its dogmas inevitable in philosophic enquiry. It does not remove the right of scientific doubt. It does but involve the demand that this religious tradition shall be dealt with as a fact, which must be acknowledged as existing in humanity as truly as the passion of love exists in humanity and with the same sort of right to be there; and that consequently to attempt its removal without substitute is as absurd as to attempt the removal of the passion of love.

But if such an authority as that which has been described be essential to the survival and development of religion, the question remains: Where is that authority to be found? It is clear that a tribunal which is to exercise such authority must have the means of exercising it, must have some organ of expression: must have a voice. If the voice or power of expressing or modifying religious ideas or traditions were in abeyance, the very function of such a tribunal could no longer be exercised.

Now the only substitute for a living tribunal of the kind, which is proposed in modern Europe, by High Church Anglicans in one sense and by German critics in another, is what is called the Primitive Church. It is considered that the Christian Church in the days of its early purity (variously defined as a period of from twenty years to six centuries) is sufficiently clear in its teaching and, at the same time, sufficiently deep and broad

to be appealed to as an arbiter in all disputes, while it has, at the same time, those characteristics of Catholic religion essential to the requirements of the modern mind. But apart from the fact that it is not Catholic in time, and therefore cannot absorb new ideas, the Primitive Church, taken as an authority in the present has not sufficient objective clearness for such a purpose; for it is admitted, on all hands, that it is impossible that any modern Church should be simply a facsimile of the Primitive. A man brought up with Roman Catholic proclivities will say that the Primitive Church, though not exactly like the modern Catholic Church, yet was implicitly and virtually what that Church is now. Had the Fathers lived to see how simply necessary to the Church is infallibility in its Head they would, such persons contend, have been ready explicitly to declare what even in their own day they seem sometimes to imply or, at least, to anticipate. Another, brought up in Anglican surroundings, will say that though the Primitive Church cannot be called simply Anglican, yet it was implicitly and virtually far more like the Anglican Church than any other; and, if the Fathers had lived to see the disastrous effects of Papal usurpation, there cannot be any doubt what Church in Europe they would consider in doctrine nearest their own. And, moreover, if one is ready to set back the Primitiveness and purity of the Christian Church a little further—Calvinists, Methodists, Congregationalists, Quakers and all the rest are ready to make the

same claim for their respective communions. One will hold that the form of government, in the early Church, was implicitly an aristocracy, another that it was democratic; others that it was (implicitly) monarchical, and some that it was (implicitly) all three.

And even, when writers belonging to any Christian communion become scientific historians, they are inclined to believe that it is of the very genius and essence of the Church that what it was once in form, *that* it must ever remain, or that any difference found to exist between it and a modern form of Christianity ought to be considered fatal to the modern *form*, unless it is in a matter "non-essential!" Having come to this conclusion, they go on to show that it is impossible to say *what* is non-essential, if the point happens to be one in which they are interested. If, however, the point is one which does *not* interest them, then they pronounce it non-essential at once, as if *ex cathedra* and on the concurrent authority of a thousand streams of tradition. We must endeavour, at least, to find an authority which does not labour under the preliminary difficulty of not being an authority at all, or of being an authority only *in posse* and by implication and with the "*due use*" of "the private judgment," and then only in what we choose to consider "essentials."

What is called the Branch Theory labours under the similar difficulty that it is impossible, at the very outset, to gain the required authority for believing that any one branch of the Church is

what it pretends to be. It is nothing but the Catholic Church, taken as a whole, which can pronounce which are its parts and which are not parts of it, and those who hold the theory are among the strongest exponents and upholders of the fact. The Branch Theory requires a living authority to pronounce whether it is in agreement with the whole tradition of the Church with regard to what is essential to the *form* of the Church as much as any other Theory or doctrine.

Thus, if there be anything essential in religion at all (essential, I mean, to man's full development) we must, at least, know what religion is. And if we cannot define it; if it seems to be something which is still in the process of realising itself, it is essential for us that we should put ourselves in communication with its living representative and the real sources of its life.

Some such Church as the Catholic Church claims to be is, then, "heir by default" to that authority which belonged once to national religions (so far forth as a merely national religion can ever be an authority), but can now no longer belong to religions merely national, however valuable the separated truths found in various nations.

When the ideal or religious element in man had once come to be expressed in men, it became a process, and this, again, became slowly but more and more definitely an organism in which the process was carried on. Man summed up in it, and expressed by it what he had found, by

experience, to be his inevitable attitude towards religion, towards the infinite, towards all that he calls God and worships. He summed up in it, and he expressed by it a particular sort of truth—truth of experience—in which he related his religious conceptions to the different stages of his growth in thought. Add, then, to the notion of a particular kind of *truth*, its development and life in a particular kind of organism (becoming ever more clearly one and conscious of itself), and you will see that if once we have gained the only possible organism, that organism by selecting what is food for it, and rejecting what is poison (as other organisms do) is, in this case, selecting what is *religiously true* and rejecting what is *religiously false*. Not only, therefore, does the religious individual find it necessary to recognise a sort of provisional and relative infallibility in his moral sense (as it is called) if he is to have any character at all, but a religious organism must have had, if it has continued to live, this relative infallibility in selecting what was food for it and rejecting what was poison.

But as it is a conscious organism, an organism consciously one, it must know, and imply by its acts the knowledge that it has this power, inasmuch as it knows that it lives and continues to grow. The claim to this relative infallibility, therefore, becomes one of the essential notes or marks of the religious organism of which we are in search. In other words, as we saw before, it is the first essential of religious authority that it should

be able to answer with religious infallibility the question: What is essential to religion?

Though we cannot trust the religious element in man outside its sphere, any more than we should trust our physical senses outside their sphere, yet there is as much reason to trust the religious element within a sphere which it has built up and made for itself, as to trust the physical senses in a sphere which is clearly their own. "Let us make for the truth," then, "with the whole man," and not arbitrarily leave out of sight so positive an element in his history as his religion. Let us make ourselves one with the only representative of the religious process in the world which has at once a potential universality and a claim to continuity with the past. Such is the external or traditionalistic argument for the Catholic religion which lies implicitly indeed, in the works of Cardinal Newman—but whose nature has been misunderstood because it is supposed to exclude, as well as to prescind from, all rational metaphysic and to substitute authority for the use of the reason. How far it does so and in what sense it is modified by Newman himself we shall see hereafter.

NEWMAN, PASCAL, LOISY
AND THE CATHOLIC CHURCH.

PART I

NEWMAN.

It was the fortune of Cardinal Newman all through his life that he was compelled by the position which he occupied, to address himself, for the most part, to men without any philosophic training, or with a very narrow one, on subjects which require a philosophic terminology and systematic treatment. He was attempting to do the work at the same time of a statesman and a philosopher, a man of action and a theologian. He desired to waken once more to life, in the Church of England, the vigorous theology of Bull, of Hooker, of Jeremy Taylor, of Laud, and to induce Churchmen to throw themselves back upon what he regarded as the only position which could be logically and consistently defended. But he desired to do more. He desired to set forth the whole of that theology in a manner at once so luminous and so lucid that there would be henceforth little chance of its falling into that neglect and confusion in which he found it. And for this purpose it was necessary to go back to the sources from which it professed to have been derived, to the great Fathers of the earlier centuries and to the history of the early Church. In addition, therefore, to his regular labours on essays and sermons, he translated St. Athanasius as well as writing the "Prophetical Office of the Church," while he

joined, with indomitable energy, in the effort that was then being made, to bring the Church of the Fathers clearly before English readers. The amount of energy and labour expended in this part of the work which he had set himself would have been enough to fill the life of many an able and energetic writer.

But this was by no means all that he attempted or all that he accomplished. He wrote on philosophical subjects also, and attempted to build for his theory a philosophical, as well as a theological, foundation. It is with these philosophical opinions that I shall be, for the most part, concerned in the pages I am about to write.

Such a task as that which Newman had attempted, under the conditions which modern life imposes, was, from the first, sufficiently difficult: but when it is realized how narrow and unsatisfactory was the philosophic training at Oxford in those days, and how strangely antiquated was the philosophical training of the majority of those with whom, in his later years, he was compelled to contend, it is not to be wondered at if philosophers are apt to regard him as little better than an ecclesiastical advocate with a dash of poetic mysticism, and ecclesiastics (both Catholic and Protestant) as a dangerous sceptic and an over subtle philosopher.

On the other hand, the time seems at last to have arrived when the unfairness of reaction in that later Oxford school in which "the star of Newman" was said to have set "the sun of Mill

to have arisen " has itself slowly died away or is, at any rate, in the process of dying. Men have gradually come to acknowledge that the narrowness of training and a certain almost Puritanic gloom from which Newman suffered throughout his life, yet did not prevent him from reaching nearer than others that bed rock on which alone stand all the " tower'd cities " of man's passionate aspiration, and, among them, the city of God. We might, indeed, well afford to forget the unfairness had it not, here and there, been given a plausibility and a chance of permanence by the inevitable looseness and apparent inconsistency of writings so various and so frequently " occasional " as those of Newman. It must then, be our endeavour to find what is the origin of the unfairness with which he has sometimes been treated: what is the nature of the misrepresentation to which he has been subjected; in what the permanent value of his philosophical opinions consists.

It would be impossible for any man living to go through all that has been written, or answer all the objections that have been raised, against works dealing with subjects so difficult, so complex and so numerous. While the unfairness and bias of reaction lasted (and it is only just beginning to fade away) it was of a kind unmatched in the history of even religious controversy. Anecdotes, intended to undermine Newman's reputation, at one time formed the stock-in-trade of certain of his enemies; his personality, his style, his convictions,

his dialectic, his character and fortunes have formed the subject of every sort of attack and innuendo and pedantic aspersion. His defects and his qualities, his limitations and his powers have been alternately exaggerated and depreciated to such an extent that the majority of men must find him a complete enigma. Here, however, we are concerned with his philosophical opinions alone, and our task will further be simplified if we arrange what we have to say under the names by which those who have written about him, as a philosopher, have attempted to describe him.

He has been described, then, as a sceptic, an empiricist, an intuitionist, an idealist, a traditionalist, and a mystic. Nobody who is well acquainted with the works of Cardinal Newman will deny that he himself would have protested against being placed in any such category and on one occasion and another he has defended himself, though not at any great length, against the charge of scepticism.

He had, at all times, an instinctive dislike for throwing men into this class or that as resulting, of necessity, in views shallow, incomplete and unjust: but the attempt to describe Newman himself in this manner has been singularly unfortunate. Such classing and defining has probably become inevitable in a day when there is so much to be read, and conscientious critics so seldom have time to read the books which they review, but it is strange, to say the least, that Newman should have been called an intuitionist after he had

denounced intuitionism and explained in the "Grammar of Assent" why he was not an intuitionist. Had he been, indeed, the architect of some great system, or the author of any one treatise strictly metaphysical, or a writer who employed technical phrases and scientific method it would have been no wonder that he should have been thus peremptorily docketed and labelled and set in his place; even though he had been writing with the purpose of showing that philosophy had nowhere reached so distinct a conclusion that a clear minded man could sufficiently describe himself or be sufficiently described in such terms as those we have selected. But Newman's writings were, as has already been said, "for the most part occasional." Nothing was further from his mind than the ambition to construct a system, nor was his intellect of a nature which would have excelled in such an undertaking. He had, in a high degree, the peculiar insight of genius, and an inexhaustible patience, subtlety and caution in the expression of what men call its intuitions; and it is no paradox to assert that he probably arrived at something far more like a system than he, at any time, consciously aimed at constructing, partly from the very fact that he thus limited his aspirations.

But a system he certainly did not construct: and his clear apprehension of the fact that philosophy is itself "on journey" and in a state of transition: his continual insistence on the impossibility of completing, at present, any

satisfactory basis in metaphysics or any basis that it would be wise to regard as *final*, afford a sufficient reason why it would seem premature to blame him (as he has been blamed) for not constructing a system which he gives reasons for considering it impossible at present to construct, or to set him down as belonging to some distinct school of philosophers when he has given reasons, which at least require an answer, why he considers it impossible at present to belong to any.

Nevertheless these names are not without their use as we shall probably see, for they will show us, taken one by one, what he was not, and will help, when taken together, to show us what he was.

He formed what will probably turn out to be a basis for a system and has given some sort of plan for a route in a new region of philosophy. He was the last of one order of minds and the first of another. He cast aside, late in life, the whole set of statical arguments in which he had been brought up and fought his way to that dynamic conception of truth which has caused so much terror to the orthodox, not only in religion, but in every department of thought. He entered boldly into the stronghold of subjectivism in philosophy, but found nothing to discourage him in the fact that truth is not something "abstract and detached," but lies, as it were, in the bosom of Humanity, "clinging to her and lost in her embrace."

But this is to anticipate and to express loosely what must be shown hereafter.

At present, I am but attempting such a general description of his position and the peculiar character of his mind as will form an introduction to a more exact and accurate account of his opinions than that which has been commonly given.

What it is necessary to keep before us, then, if we desire to be fair in our interpretation, is that he was ever concerned in direct and immediate matter of controversy: that he was as keen in dialectic as he was sympathetic and imaginative in character: that it was his habit in dispute to grant to his adversary all that his adversary required, for the sake of argument. He therefore frequently starts with supposing that all that scepticism begins with demanding may be granted and all that empiricism requires may be allowed; and yet insists that still there remains as good an argument for man's belonging to, and making himself one with the religious process, (which is, if you will, but a huge experiment made by humanity) as for his belonging to and making himself one with the ethical process—because he will find it as difficult to make a start for himself and keep outside them, as he would to jump out of the cosmic process—whence alone the others are assumed to have arisen, and parts of which they must therefore remain. “Newman sets authority,” says Dr. Fairbairn, “where Hume sets association, and the rest of his theory of life is simply Hume's.” Newman, however, is but demanding, as necessary

to his argument, the admission of two facts, (1) that a religious element in humanity there is, though men differ in describing its nature, and (2) that the only test of its actual existence and of its being an objective fact in humanity is the test which Kant and Comte alike apply universally, namely, the testimony of the human race, or the largest number of men we can consult. If we have a sound ringing in our ears, in order to find out whether the ringing exists objectively, we ask somebody else; and if he says he hears it too, we think we are probably right in supposing the sound to be outside and not only within the ear; and if we suspect him, we ask others. This is all the objectivity we at first can attain: this is the first objectivity possible to man, though the object thus gained still lies within the consciousness of humanity. So also in religion, what Dr. Fairbairn calls Newman's "authority" is but this "objectivizing" of religion so far as is possible in the nature of things, and so far as essential to the continued existence of any thought or conduct at all.

This peculiarity in his method, resulting in a certain philosophic isolation: this cautions, tentative movement in the direction of a synthesis which he never completed, and this bold analysis and (as some thought) reckless destructiveness of arguments for religion which he believed to be incomplete or sophistical or false or unreal, were facts, incidental to his time and position, of which he had, in his own way, a sufficiently clear

apprehension. And so it happened that in his "*Apologia*" he found it necessary to make a protest against those who, seeming to regard the Christian religion as if it were something which could be cut into squares, tabulated and stereotyped, would have had him rush into opposition to certain modern developments in science. He warned such persons that it would be far better and more in accordance with the dignity of religion to stand still: and that, as in the days of Moses, so now, it would be found that the Lord would fight for them.

It seemed to him very undignified for a Catholic to commit himself to the work of chasing what might turn out to be phantoms, and in behalf of some special objections to be devising some new theory which, before it was completed might have to give place to some newer theory still. . . .

So, too, in speaking of the relations of science and religion, he had said that whereas science is, of necessity, precise and exact in its expression, religion, on the other hand, is often vague, always symbolic, never exhaustive of the subject of which it treats: and this from the very nature of the case and the insufficiency of language itself.

He considered, therefore, that, in an age of transition such as ours, it might often be our duty to destroy without hesitation or remorse what we had found to be false in logic or misleading; even though we could, on the other hand, but doubtfully and tentatively adumbrate the whereabouts of what was true. And when he was himself engaged

in an attack upon prejudice or bigotry or when he was attempting to expose the fallacy of arguments, used in support of propositions which he nevertheless believed to be true—arguments which assumed too much or which seemed unfair to those against whom they were directed—he by no means spared the guilty: he slashed and cut in pieces with a brilliancy and high spirit which gained for him, among some, the reputation of being a mere controversialist; while, on the other hand, in his “*Essay on Development*” and in the “*Grammar of Assent*” he does but give in outline—and that sometimes dim and indistinct—a theory whose consequences he leaves to the inference of the reader.

But such a criticism of him as that he was a mere controversialist, though, speaking of his writings as they stand he makes it himself, would be an error of the first magnitude, if it meant that his intelligence was capable of dialectic and nothing more.

Far otherwise! He turned to controversy because he was compelled to do so: he turned to controversy because he perceived, with a clearness which itself betokened powers beyond those of a mere dialectician, how long the struggle must be before constructive effort could be of any avail and that if he was to succeed at all in his ultimate intent, a whole campaign would be necessary in the country of his enemies. The error, then, that I shall attempt to expose is not that his controversial works were his best, for all his most serious

writing is, in some sort, controversial: but the error which attributes this fact to the limitations of his intellect or the narrowness of his philosophy, and not rather to the exigencies of the times.

Man never knows how anthropomorphic he is, nor have Englishmen yet fully discovered how deep seated is their bias against Rome. When they have learnt it, they will cease to blame Newman for doing what they will then perceive to have been a work which could neither be hurried nor delayed.

In order to make clear the position which Newman adopted in philosophy, it may be well at once to sum up and describe in outline the general argument, which was, in his view, preliminary to all discussions concerning the relations of philosophy and religion; and it is impossible to do this more satisfactorily than in the form of an answer to the following questions.

“If,” it has been said, “Cardinal Newman held—as every one must hold—that it is right reason which ultimately shows us that certain things are true and others false, how does he show what is right reason? If he contends that human reason is always fallible and that there is “no criterion of truth beyond the witness borne to truth by the mind itself,” how can he ascertain the validity of those processes of the reason which discriminate the true from the less true and from the false? If he considers that conscience and reason have, in the concrete, “no necessary connection,” how can he conceive them to imply a common

source, a common subject, and a common goal? If, in short, he admits the premisses of scepticism, how does he come to the conclusions of faith: and if he allows, as he seems to have done, that the conclusion he deduces is but a hypothesis, how does he lead us to act upon it as certain?"

Now much of the misapprehension disclosed in these questions has arisen from a false interpretation of the terms which Newman commonly employs. He uses the word "reason," for instance, as it was usually employed in his earlier years as meaning simply "the reasoning faculty," the faculty which deduces from premisses. Those who use the word "reason" as meaning "the whole man" in the sense in which Plato says "we must make for the truth with the whole man," or, again, those who use "reason" as distinguished from the understanding, have often argued as if Newman denied, that man taken as a whole, or reason taken in this larger sense, could ever arrive at a religion. Hence such persons accuse Newman of falling into a dualism with an "impotent, instrumental reason" on one hand and "an authoritative conscience on the other." But there is no more dualism in this conception than there is in the fact that the premisses in a particular syllogism may be given, not by the special faculty which syllogizes, but by the memory alone. No one denies that there is a sense in which we may speak of the mathematical powers or the power of ratiocination as each of them implying a special

faculty, nor does Newman deny, on the contrary he contends, that such a faculty can only be rightly used when it is regarded as but one "aspect" among others of our manifold nature and our actual method of reaching conclusions. The faculties must be separated in order that we may define their special functions, but by that very definition, we discover that they are essentially inherent in man as one continuous whole, and, therefore, dependent on each other. Now it is the attempt to separate the reason from the religious or moral element in man which Newman condemns throughout his sermon on "Faith as contrasted with Bigotry." If in the "Grammar of Assent" he appears to keep the faculties apart it is from that ever increasing analytical tendency to which I have already referred: but it does not follow that he fell into the dualism of which he is accused; nay, the aim of his writing is, from the first, precisely the opposite—namely, to show that the two elements in man are so essentially necessary to each other that they may rather be regarded as the aspects of one than as separate powers at all. The misapprehension is, however, a natural one, and it arises from the fact that Newman was using the words of opponents who divide some powers and deny the existence of others—whose reality can only be proved by analysis—while the part of his writings in which he is saying what is peculiar to himself, and not anticipating the objections of his opponents is that in which he shows that "philosophy" *can have no meaning and could*

not exist apart from the nature of man which is its subject." (Sermon on Faith as contrasted with Bigotry), etc., etc. All he begins by requiring is that it should be man's whole nature, and not only a part of it, which is studied.

Again, in speaking of the religious element in man Newman sometimes speaks of it as conscience, sometimes as the religious sense, and those who, for this reason, accuse him of begging the question, accustomed to read only small extracts from his works in which these expressions occur, do not understand what his argument is. From this misapprehension alone two opposite accusations have arisen: those scholastics, who have read the passages in which he explains that he is not dealing with conscience "*in fieri*" but simply "*de facto esse*," and that he is using the word "conscience," not as implying what he wants to prove, but as having reference to something which mankind have found it necessary to describe by a separate name, accuse him of falling into subjective scepticism.

That school of writers against religions of all kinds who sometimes speak as if the whole religious view of things (wherever found) had not grown up out of human nature, but had come from some unknown source, whose existence they, nevertheless, totally deny, find in the use of any separate word for the religious element in man a "*petitio principii*."

Now the explanation is not very far to seek. Newman did not indeed divide the history of

mankind, neatly and conveniently into those periods, the theological, the metaphysical and the positive: but he did divide it into periods in which one of those elements (always present in man) becomes, of necessity, the predominant one. The religious element in the history of man is the primary element and first also in order of time: and this because "the sense of the whole comes first," nor have we a scientific or a logical right to displace such words as "conscience" (so long as they are used strictly within terms of experience and not made to imply an intuition, a power of seeing through phenomena), until we have found a scientific definition which is their real equivalent and really accounts for the whole of the religious or moral notions conveyed by such terms. That we never can do so completely follows from the fact (if it be a fact) that man will always be not only a metaphysical and scientific animal but a progressively religious animal: and such a writer as Comte not only allows that it is a fact but took it as his motto, "that man tends to become ever more and more religious."

There is then, one set of philosophers who would cut off religion altogether as something whose purpose is fulfilled and whose work is done.

There is another class of philosophers (often the very leaders whom the first class pretend to follow) who say that man is a permanently religious animal, and contend that religion is a permanent element in man, but reject it as it, in fact, exists, reject all its developments in man;

refuse to accompany its advance and look for it in the clouds or in themselves.

And there is a third class, who, with Newman, contend that if we perceive religion to be an element in ourselves, we must objectivise that element: if we acknowledge that it is an element in society, at large, and in humanity, we have no more valid reason to stand outside of it and to refuse to take our part in it, *whether by defending it or by improving it*: we have no more valid reason for considering ourselves simply superior to it, for refusing to act as from within it and insisting on acting as from above it, than we have to assume ourselves to be superior to humanity itself. The process of religious development in humanity requires the analytical mind and the synthetical mind as much as any other process: and to abandon to one set of minds alone so important a part of the life of humanity: or to act towards it the part, not of a friendly reformer or an ardent protector, but a contemptuous, bitter, irreconcilable foe—however great the temporary excuse—is an evil not only relatively to religion, but to humanity. For it is causing dissensions worse than civil wars: it assumes the great religious process to be founded in illusion and the cosmic process to be simply irreconcilable, ultimately as well as now, with the ethical. And yet the very men who take up this position are sometimes the boldest in affirming that the ethical process and the religious process are but aspects and results of the cosmic process itself.

That very often religious bodies appear to tolerate within them only a certain class of minds, while the very notion of reform is scouted as impertinence, is undoubtedly true. The blame of heresy does not always attach to him who is called a heretic: it rises frequently from the misrepresentation and tyranny of those who seize a position in a religious body for which they are intellectually incompetent. But how far such a state of affairs excuses, how far it justifies, how far it necessitates a protest against the whole religious idea, its institution, its organizations, its character, its influence and its destiny, common sense will inform us at once, if we do but compare our conduct in such a case as this with the conduct which we should hold towards the country to which we belong, or the State in which we are units. To destroy, instead of modifying, any characteristic development in authority or representation, can never be the action of true statesmanship. It were as wise to begin the sum by blotting out the figures.

There is a famous argument of Pascal's addressed to a sceptic, which illustrates so clearly the position of Newman that I shall find it useful here to quote it, and to explain what I consider its real meaning. Most men have found that they are bound to make certain positive assumptions in moral and social life, if they are to govern or to act, or, indeed, to live at all. By an inevitable sequence of events, he that attempts to stand in the way of the ethical process (as rushing forth

to the fulfilment of its destiny in human society) finds that he soon comes into contact with the cosmic process, too; and that, after all, will never do; for, do what he will, he cannot jump out of that except by ceasing to live.

“To act we must assume and that assumption is faith,” says Newman. And for any modern philosopher, who admits that to think is to act, and that to live (in the case of those properly called men) is to think, if what Newman says is true, then the following proposition is true likewise. “To live we must assume, and that assumption is faith.” What have we to assume if we are to live? What do we assume (if we assume anything) in continuing to think, to act and to live? We assume that life is not an illusion. The very notion of final cause (however unscientifically it may have been treated) has arisen from this necessity of life, of act, of thought. In thinking for a moment we act for a future, which we assume, though it is a future which may never come. As long as we think, then, we must assume, nor can speculation set itself altogether outside the necessities which result from existing in time.

Let us now turn to Pascal's much-disputed argument with a sceptical friend. Keeping in mind the two questions:—(1) Do we practically assume life to be an illusion? (2) Have we a right speculatively to assume life to be an illusion? We shall probably see a meaning in Pascal's

argument which its critics have not been accustomed to find there.

Pascal, then, argues that if there is a God, you suffer an infinite loss by not believing in Him. If there is not a God, but you believe that there is, you lose nothing. "Wager, then, that he exists!" he cries, "for you cannot sit aside, in this game, and refuse to play. You must wager one way or the other."

Voltaire replies that he does not see the necessity, and Matthew Arnold says contemptuously: "Did ever great reasoner reason so wildly?" And the argument appears at first flippant and inconclusive enough. "Wager that God exists!" The demand seems a little unscrupulous: and in using so soon the word "God" Pascal is perhaps speaking a little loosely.

But his meaning, if we take his argument as a whole, may perhaps be this:—"Assume that life is an illusion and you suffer an infinite loss: if it turns out, after all, that life can be made a reality. Assume that an illusion life is not, and you may make it a reality, while it is certain you can suffer no loss."

Nor is this all. You cannot stand aside from life and view it as a whole. This is a game in which all must play, or if they choose not to play it, the only alternative is to take away also the power to judge of it, for not to play this game at all is simply not to live.

If, then, you cannot stand aside and watch the game in such a sense as to be able to judge

whether it is an illusion or not, what logical right have you to assume that an illusion it is? We only know anything to be an illusion by comparing it with reality. But our life and what is within it is all that we know. To take from the midst of life, then, what we call an illusion and then call the whole of life an illusion, to take from the midst of life what we recognize as a jest, and then call life itself a jest, is but to play with words. Nor have we a right to say that life as a whole may or may not be an illusion, for such a condition of mind assumes a point of view of which we are incapable, inasmuch as we have no right to assume, to begin with, a reality more real than the only thing we know. Assume, then, that an illusion life is not! Throw yourself into it and into all the great processes of life, political, religious, scientific, as having a goal which makes worth while the process! Nobody denies that the state of doubt is thinkable: not the greatest dogmatist on earth denies that ultimate inconclusiveness is a conceivable state of mind: but, if you have no right to assume that your own life is an illusion, a life which is but a point in the great process of things, much less right have you to assume that the great processes in which you find yourself are simply illusory, or have no end that is answerable to their activity, or a sufficiency in themselves. So, therefore, Pascal goes on to argue that though you begin by imagining the religion in which you find yourself stupid and absurd, yet "be stupid, take holy water," accus-

tom yourself to the point of view, throw yourself into it. For in so doing, he means, you put yourself into the same sort of relation to the race of which you form a part as you find yourself to be in, of necessity, towards the great order and process of the world of which you form a part; and to assume it to be "stupid" is as inexcusable as to assume yourself to be a judge in a matter of experience, before you have entered into experience at all. This is a preliminary argument for religion in general—and applies to any one form of religion until we have come into contact with some other. It is an external argument, and the mistake about it has been the supposition that it is a substitute for the internal arguments. Now let us sum up Newman's argument on the same subject and consider whether the two do not supplement and explain each other.

First, then, he attempted to show that there was nothing wonderful in the fact that in religion we must begin with assumption, for in every department of life—religious, social and moral—we are equally bound to assume, nay in living at all we may be said, in a certain sense, to start with an hypothesis. And, though these assumptions may rightly enough be described as hypotheses looked at analytically, yet we are justified in acting upon them as synthetically certain: for, as we are justified in acting morally on the assumption that our fellow-men have an existence independent of our own (though this too is a point which it may be beyond our powers to prove) so

are we justified in acting religiously in accordance with the religious element in life—at what point soever we come into contact with it—because that religious element has a positive, undeniable existence, and those who act as if it had no separate existence or could be resolved, straight off, into emotions which required no separate treatment, are ignoring a fact in human nature.

We act in general and we reason in general, for immediate and necessary purposes, in a similar manner and on reasons which, at first, may appear as little satisfactory or profound. What we commonly call the “knowledge” conveyed to us through our physical senses or brought to us by social, moral and religious media, though it is “defective”—(inasmuch as it lies within a certain defined sphere)—nevertheless is reckoned by us as enough, for the simple reason that “we have no more.” For the only antecedent presumption or criterion of the truth of any theory or hypothesis which regards man and his affairs is, in the words of Burke, its suitableness to the *whole nature* of man, and his nature as modified by his habits: and we are thrown upon this because the universe offers us no other. Accordingly, Newman insists that true Catholicity is founded in the system of nature and is characterized by its answering to, or allowing for whatever may be shown, now or in the future, to be its *needs* or its *powers*.

It is a mark, then, rather of bigotry than of scepticism, he contends, to leave out of account the religious element in life; as, on the other hand, it

is a mark of bigotry rather than religiousness to pretend to find a purely speculative argument—apart from the actual religious element in man—for religion: as if philosophy could exist apart from the nature of man which is its subject. (University Sermons.)

Among other proofs of the existence of a necessary religious element in man, one may be found in the arguments which have been used to throw doubt upon the ethical dictates of his “moral sense,” because those who doubt its ethical trustworthiness do not question the fact that such dictates there are, but force upon us the inference that what is commonly called “conscience” implies “primarily a religious notion and only in the second place an ethical”—that is, it begins with the sense of law and only, at last, finds out what the laws are.

So, then, the dictates of such a supposed law and the “principles of faith” are axioms of action before they can be regarded as axioms of truth (Tamworth Read: Room): but the life of man being a series of acts, and thought itself being, in a real sense, action, such axioms are justly regarded as *true*, for truth is not to be sought as something isolated and apart from the life of man, but as lying within it—one with it and lost in it and only to be found in it.

And thus we come at last to the great test of religious truth, which, in his theory on Development, Newman elaborated in a manner so strangely accurate as to have surprised both its

scientific and its historical critics, namely, the vitality consequent on its answering in every generation to the necessities of man. The existence of this vitality becomes historically a test and, in the final resort, the only test, of religious truth: in spite of the fact, considered side by side with the test of development, that mere popularity or "acceptance with the multitude" is sometimes a sign of falsehood or corruption. And of this vitality and its real value the only test is its steady growth or development—*i.e.*, its movement in one direction rather than another—its consistent advance; its constant survival in spite of attacks; *its power to assimilate from what is without; in short all the tests of growth which can be applied to an organism.* Of this religious element in man the Catholic Church claims to be the natural medium—the only possible protectress and guardian; in every age relating its past to the present and the present to the future, mediating, as it were, between the last man in humanity and the first, so as to curb the self-sufficiency of the one and modify the superstition of the other, "in accordance with the advance of the scientific temper."

In short, taking the works of Cardinal Newman in their result (whatever they may prove and whatever they may not succeed in proving) they seem, at any rate, to show in this preliminary argument for the reasonableness of religion, that, as there is an ethical and a cosmic process going on in the world, so also there is a religious,

and that the last is the necessary medium of adjustment between the other two, as well as their inevitable corrective and restraint.

In what manner these three are one and in what manner it is true to say that the cosmic process can be modified by the other two, and, again, in what sense, and on what authority, the Church has been able to make this claim and act upon it—all these questions are proposed and discussed by Newman in his study of the Church as an organism. If it lives at all it lives because it has been able to select and reject, with the relative infallibility of other organisms, what is food for it and what is poison.

(I) NEWMAN AS SCEPTIC AND IDEALIST.

It may seem to some a strange and difficult fact that two great apologists such as Pascal and Newman should each in his own way have been characterised by that sad earnestness and almost wistfulness which gives to their writings a peculiar undertone of gravity and pathos. It seems as if the question to which Butler could attempt no reply—the question in its own nature unanswerable why so frail a creature as man should be set in the midst of so many and so grievous sorrows and temptations, were ever ringing in their ears.

They would not be satisfied with the easy solutions of “an ideal optimism,” or cover up the sacred mystery of life with the verbiage of dogmatists. Both of them, therefore, dwelt as men apart: as men who have seen some vision, or as strangers from some far city. They dwelt among men, but with another destiny, and their gaze was set upon the term of a solitary journey.

For each of them seems, in his own time, a solitary figure:—Pascal, wandering with pensive tread from church to church in the older streets of Paris, and Newman, in his latter years, as one

who sits in some darkened theatre alone, watching with intent and wistful eyes, while, in long procession, there pass before him "all the days of the years of his pilgrimage."

Nor should it be astonishing if shallow and complacent minds or little, hurried souls—who have never learned to look into the face of life—have been impatient of this tone of sadness and this isolation of thought, and imputed them to some hidden scepticism or morbid credulity or to both.

Thus it happened that the versatile Brougham and that master of persiflage, Voltaire, could impute Pascal's piety, its intensity and earnestness, to the sad effects of that accident—one of the miracles of materialism—which has played so large a part in the literature of sceptical flippancy.

Nor have the lesser wits of neo-scholasticism failed to contribute their quota of contemptuous criticism to the restless hubbub of censure poured forth from every direction by all sorts and conditions of men—those who despair of philosophy and those who believe in a philosophy mechanically complete but completely empty, alike join in the condemnation of writers who were neither school-men in philosophy nor sceptics in religion. "Alas!" they cry, "that men of such capacity should have wasted their lives in attempting the solution of problems which are insoluble. Why did they not rather turn their attention to social questions, to politics, to scientific research? Or, at any rate, if they must

have written about philosophy, why did they not give themselves to some system—neat and rounded off—such as can be readily described in a Dictionary of Biography, and such as we find in the text books of the schools? Such a course would have acted as a tonic, pulled them together, and made men of them. Instead of which they must ever keep returning to questions of whence and whither—‘the greatness and misery of man’—topics which have busied the wisest heads in humanity for ages, but have never yet received satisfactory treatment or given birth to a tolerable hypothesis!”

Among the mob of pedants, on one side, and practical men on the other, it has become the fashion to charge both Pascal and Newman with a fatal incoherence and inconsistency of thought, and, hence there has arisen an attempt to substantiate the charge of scepticism and credulity against them both. And indeed the charge of scepticism as it has been preferred against Newman is, in some cases, of a precisely similar nature to that which has been preferred against Pascal. For Newman, like Pascal, was not satisfied with making a general and easy admission—such as we read at the beginning of text books in Philosophy—that scepticism cannot be refuted on its own grounds; he pursued and described the consequences of this admission: he attempted to show that it involves a fact in the constitution of man’s mind and therefore sets a necessary limit to his thought, not in one question

alone, but in all questions in which we desire finality or look for some absolute reply. And it is from the proof of these limitations themselves that both Pascal and Newman have drawn one of their proofs for the necessity of religion, a necessity which is therefore no mere exaggeration of the significance of man's religious aspirations, but a necessity inherent in the very nature of man and such that it is impossible for him ever to be rid of it.

It is not, therefore, altogether consistent in teachers of neo-scholasticism, to consider Newman a sceptic because he admits in particulars what every philosopher has admitted in general; nor, on the other hand, is it permissible to consider Newman credulous, because after he has completed the argument by which he attained the religious position he ultimately held, he can look back over the process and history of religious faith in the minds of men and find there vague tokens as of some Divine purpose or marks as of some but half-revealed design. In these conclusions he may use the poetry of religion or the rhetoric of the Fathers of the Church; but the conclusion he reached he founded on scientific and philosophical grounds.

The argument must be answered first or the conclusion shown to reach too far before his enemies have a right to claim that his faith had become credulity or his idealism merely mystical.

(1) It has been said of Pascal's defence of Christianity that he makes it all to turn on the

literal truth of the story of the fall, and that, inasmuch as modern criticism cannot receive that story, his argument must perish with it. But there could not be a misrepresentation more complete. With whom, then, is Pascal supposed to be arguing? With men who already believed in the fall? No, for he is addressing those who do not even believe in a God. All that Pascal attempts is to show that man's greatness and his misery point to a fact which may be summed up in a conception like that conveyed in the history of the Fall. He makes use, that is, of an argument for accepting the history of the Fall and considering it as a dogmatic fact. And then he proceeds to show that for man, in the condition thus described, Christianity is so completely the sort of remedy required that we may, without violence, assume it to be the true one—in spite of the difficulties which it suggests, the questions it fails to answer, the mysteries which it proposes to our faith.

Here Pascal, like Newman, is using the language of complete argument and the language of ordinary Christians. But to assume him to be a historical dogmatist, to be taking the story of the Fall as crudely and literally true, is as little just as it would be to assume that he is a speculative dogmatist because he found reason for believing the dogmas of the Catholic Church. All men know, on the contrary, that the reasons which he found were not those of the dogmatists in philosophy, to whom he is as often opposed as he

is to the sceptics. The dogmas of the church were to Pascal what they were to Newman—the inevitable language of religion, often vague, always symbolic, never exhaustive of the subject of which they treat; but the exactest expression possible to man, in his changing existence, of the sure and certain hope that lay within him—ever growing more consistent and mature. It was the actual state of man, then, which he found described in the Fall—not so much the historical event which accounts for it; and the dogma, involved in the conception of the Fall, shows, in his mind, that the Christian and Jewish religions had adequately diagnosed and truly appreciated that disease of human nature which it calls “sin.” That the closeness of the fact to the account so given of it proves some such fact as the Fall to be true; that it proves “original sin” to represent a fact, he certainly contends: not, that the Fall took place in a certain manner, time and place. His argument, therefore, stands, without the necessity of introducing an historical dogmatism, foreign to Pascal’s nature and mode of thought and plausibly imputed rather on account of the fragmentary nature of his writing than from a careful consideration of his method. Nor is it only his clear apprehension of the fact that “nature itself is, perhaps, but a first habit,” the only point where so wooden an interpretation of his argument would seem to break down, for his thesis—so clear to those familiar with his writings—proves at last to be, not, as superficial expressions

sometimes seem to indicate, the supernatural value of Christianity (though that he believed) but the depth of it—the fact that it touches human nature at its base. This, for him, came at last to constitute, rather than to prove, the supernatural value of Christianity.

(2) I have described this misapprehension of Pascal's argument on the Fall in order to shed some light on what I conceive to have been the manner in which Pascal and Newman alike regarded dogma. It is ever to them symbolic, and not to be taken as crude, literal fact even when, as in the case of the Fall, they themselves, no doubt, took the fact as historical. The confusion which attributes to Pascal an argument entirely hinging upon the Fall as an historical fact has, however, a long history, and may be said to have attached to Christianity, in some sense or other, even since it began to exist—and the confusion is owing to an apparent ambiguity in the method of great Christian writers themselves.

“St. Augustine, from the very richness of his great nature,” says Harnack, “while he attacked the Biblicists with Tertullian and set the creed above the Bible, yet could not rid himself of the notion that, in the Bible, every word is revelation.”

In like manner Pascal and Newman are afraid suddenly to let drop a fixed historical conception, though the arguments they use do, in fact, reach below it and will stand without it. And this

apparent inconsistency, for apparent rather than real it is, has not been altogether without its value. It has been a reasonable attitude toward the Bible to stand out against its disruption and the tendency to explain it away in accordance with every new theory in criticism, inasmuch as such interpretations have, again and again, turned out to be false; and, had they been used, the true meaning of the Bible (sometimes not historical at all, but an allegory, and sometimes strictly in accordance with the history known to Jews but conveying an impression completely false—if not corrected by other historical evidence)—would have been lost more completely and for a longer time than can now be the case. What is truly deplorable is an attitude for which Newman and Pascal are not responsible, the attitude of contempt towards inductive criticism, a sort of labour which Pascal commended as of great value, and in which Newman has himself, in some degree, taken part. But such an attitude as that I have drawn is, without doubt, the attitude of Pascal and of Newman towards actual doctrine, and it is this attitude which has so widely created the tradition that Newman was both sceptical and credulous and suffered from a consequent incoherency which he never fully faced.

And as St. Augustine is the explanation, to some extent, of a common error, so is he the explanation of the deeper source of that error, namely, the notion that Newman and Pascal were altogether sceptics, philosophically. In this sense

they were, that is, they could admit the whole case for scepticism and yet believe.

“Not unfamiliar,” says Harnack, “with the realm of knowledge of the objective world, St. Augustine yet wished to know but two things, *God* and the *soul*; for his scepticism had dissolved the world of external phenomena, but in the flight of these phenomena the facts of the inner life had, after painful struggles, remained to him as *facts*. Even if there exists no evil and no God, there still exists unquestionably the fear of evil. Out of this, i.e., through psychological analysis, one can find the soul and God and sketch a picture of the world. Hence the sceptic can arrive at the knowledge of truth, for which the marrow of the soul cries.”

These words may be used with almost equal truth of Pascal and Newman, if we do but add the explanation which arises out of the exigencies of controversy with Jesuits, Protestants and readers of Montaigne in France, with disciples of Hume and the sceptics of the 18th century in England.

(3) With regard to the sense in which Newman has been considered a sceptic, and the manner in which this view of him has arisen, something ought to be said, because here, too, an ambiguity has arisen which ought not to exist. The word sceptic is popularly supposed to mean one who does not believe in the popular religion. It is also supposed to mean one who has no philosophical principles at all. In these senses

very few would be inclined to call Newman a sceptic.

But the meaning which is given to the word by philosophers is very different. Thus certain dogmatic philosophers call idealists (whether objective or subjectivè) sceptical, because it is supposed that all those, who disbelieve in the ordinary doctrines about matter, question the veracity of the senses. Such a use of the word is misleading because Idealists of every description are just as ready as anyone else to trust the senses, in their own sphere. They only deny that they can be trusted in another sphere than their own or that they can solve a problem which is concerned with that upon which the senses themselves are dependent, namely, in what manner it may be said that material objects exist, whether "per se" or "a se," etc. Those, too, have been called sceptics who doubt the objective reality of space, motion and time, and this from a similar confusion of mind.

So, again, there are those who consider there is something sceptical in the avowal that the mind has no criterion of truth beyond the witness borne to truth by the mind itself. And in all these senses Newman was liable to the charge of scepticism, though, as all men know, he objected to the name as misleading—and that even in his limited philosophical sense—as applied to St. Augustine, Pascal or himself. The attempt to confuse the two meanings and then apply them to him, in order to create a prejudice against him as

not believing in religion, would constitute what theologians call "grave matter," for it would amount to slander, but it is doubtful whether any such attempt has been made altogether consciously. The confusion of men's minds on these subjects is all but universal and will account for much which Newman himself believed to be malignant misrepresentation, though it is to be feared that this stupidity has now and then been found exceedingly convenient.

From the very first, then, and even as a boy, Newman tells us, in the "Apologia," he held the unreality of material phenomena. Later on he made the usual distinction between matter and its phenomena and, at last, began a line of thought which ceases to look out for a reality wholly *behind* phenomena, but finds in phenomena the sacrament of reality and all that is possible to thought within the ever widening consciousness of man—in the past as experienced, in the present as experience, in the future as being the completed idea to which these tend. But this view of things he hinted at rather than explained and was slowly approaching when he wrote the book on "Development." The difficulties in which he was placed by the teaching of the schools threw him back and he was obliged to go over familiar ground, once more, in the "Grammar of Assent" without ever completing the conception of truth which he had started so early.

He does not, he says, disbelieve in eternal truths, but does not see how men in general are to

be made to act on them so as consciously to realise them. He sees that it is eternal truths which necessarily make themselves a place, throw men into societies, create the organisms by which they become known, develop and thus survive, while error, of its own nature, decays inasmuch as those eternal truths are the reality by which man lives and in accordance with his growing knowledge of which he grows. Nevertheless, it remains true that men see these things as "afar off" and need to have them "in their heart and in their mind,"—if "the Kingdom of God is to be within them.

Again, in a pamphlet which he published in 1838 the fundamental idea, he says, is consonant to that to which he had been so long attached: "It was the denial of the existence of space except as a subjective idea of our own minds." Again, taking the demonstrated fact that the earth moves round the sun and the opposed notion that the sun moves round the earth—he says, "If our idea of motion be but an accidental result of our present senses neither proposition is true and both are true: neither true philosophically, both true for certain practical purposes in the system in which they are respectively found: and physical science will have no better meaning when it says that the earth moves than plane astronomy when it says that the earth is still."

In like manner, the words which we mentioned above, denying that the mind can gain any criterion of truth beyond the witness borne to truth

by the mind itself, are to be found in the "Grammar of Assent."

And the words "Bigotry is distinguished from faith in that it presumes beyond the proper ground of religion. It persists not in abandoning argument, but in arguing only in one way. It takes up not a religious but a philosophical position—" have been taken to mean, not that religion is something *sui generis* and has its own evidence and its own mode of growth, development and life, but that we must have recourse to faith in such a manner as to do without any kind of argument at all.

In like manner the following words have been misrepresented as meaning that the intellect has nothing to do with religion. "No one can deny to the intellect," he says in the University Sermons, "its own excellence or deprive it of its due honours; the question is merely this, whether it be not limited in its turn as regards its range, so as not without intrusion to exercise itself as *an independent authority* in the field of morals and religion."

Here he is speaking of that Liberalistic and Benthamite mode of using the reason, which, with a perfectly logical method, but on the assumption that nothing vague or incomplete or inchoate can be regarded as, in any sense, true, empties morals and religion of their content and calls such a procedure progressive. As the object of the intellect is truth and that object is considered by such persons to belong to the intellect exclusively—they

have considered that Newman here implies that moral and religious truth as such is unattainable and consequently that these words contain an avowal of philosophic scepticism.

Goethe, who was but little in sympathy with the strident Liberalism of his day, saw how important it is to regard the religious element in man as something sacred—as a sense of the fitness of things, as a sense of what true culture consists in, as a sense of man's true relation to the universe. All men know what he said of its conception of purity and its view of marriage as a sacrament—they are triumphs of the religious sense for the general culture of mankind. And on what are really similar grounds, "proofs of religion," "*from evidences*," Newman pronounces "to some extent a usurpation of the reason, the reason taking the place of the religious sense." Nevertheless, he will not allow the religious sense to be regarded as an intuition carrying us beyond the bounds of experience, nay, it is in its nature weaker than the senses generally so called "in proportion to the excellence of the good it confers." It is, however, an element in the history of man—distinct—*sui generis*—and must, at last, be tested as all other elements in man are tested, by its general efficacy in the development of man himself. And lest the impossibility of gaining any stronger foothold than this should seem to lead us to a barren and dreary scepticism, he says—"If our senses support the media by which we are brought together and hold intercourse with one another,

are disciplined and enabled to benefit others—it is enough.”

Such a remark has been considered—when added to his peremptory rejection of intuitionism—to land us in pure positivism—as making the ultimate appeal to the religious and social element in man each in its own sphere,—and finding the proof for such objectivity as is required simply in the consent of large masses of men in the history of the world. “It may be that the dogmas we have are the best representations of truth”—the best possible, he means, to man in his present stage of development, and therefore not to be destroyed, but interpreted, and the meaning implicit in them developed. “The knowledge belonging to the religious sense, though defective, is not insufficient for the purpose for which it uses it—for the plain reason that it has no more.” And yet even this knowledge is itself but inchoate. It is employed on things scarcely within the proper range of evidence. “Philosophy,” he says, “is reason exercised upon knowledge.”

“But,” on the other hand, “faith cannot be called knowledge,” for “we are commonly supposed to *know* things when we have ascertained them by the natural methods for ascertaining them, viz.:—by means of evidence, but faith proceeds far more on antecedent grounds than on evidence.” “Reason is instrumental and faith creative”—but the informations of faith have not as they stand become what we commonly call knowledge.

Reason then, he seems to say, depends for a right conclusion on right premisses and strict logic, but what in this complicated scene of falsehood and truth, right and wrong, is to supply us with right premisses? Nay—who is to say what is the right use of reason? Out of the thousand paths that run into the darkness from beneath our feet who is to set us in the right one or warn us against the wrong?

And thus, like St. Augustine, having dissolved the world of external phenomena, he turns, like St. Augustine, to other difficulties presented by the arguments for the existence of God.

“Such works on Natural Theology as treat of marks of design in the creation which are beautiful and interesting to a believer in God” are often, “when men have not recognised the voice of God within them, ineffective, and this moreover possibly from some unsoundness in the intellectual basis of the argument.” “Evidences,” he observes, “often do little to turn man to a religious life.” For God, in an argument for His existence, as Hegel says, must be Himself the absolute ground for the initial step.

On this passage Cardinal Newman has written a note to the effect that the argument from order with which he deals in the “Grammar of Assent” does not suffer from the same kind of unsoundness or fall with the argument from design: but we are here concerned with what he considered that unsoundness to be, and this we shall be able to gather from the following quotation out of his

letter on the "Tamworth Reading Room." Here too he came, later on to consider his language too absolute: but for our present purpose it is enough to take the words as they stand—premising only that they are used in direct controversy with the sceptical or half sceptical thought of his day:—

"The whole framework of nature is confessedly a tissue of antecedents and consequents: we may refer all things forwards to design or backwards on a physical cause. La Place is considered to have had a formula which solved all the motions of the solar system: shall we say that those motions came from this formula or from a Divine Fiat? Shall we have recourse for our theory to physics or to theology? Shall we assume matter and its necessary properties to be eternal or mind with its Divine attributes? The one hypothesis will solve the phenomena as well as the other. Say not it is but a puzzle in the argument and no one ever felt it in fact. So far from it, I believe that the study of nature when religious feeling is away, leads the mind, rightly or wrongly, to acquiesce in the atheistic theory as the simplest and easiest."

Again—a little further on in the same letter—he adds:—"To those who are conscious of matter but not conscious of mind, it seems more rational to refer all things to one origin such as they know, than to assume the existence of a second such as they know not."

It has been commonly supposed that Newman gets out of the difficulties here suggested by

inventing or discovering a religious intuition which pierces through phenomena and finds a Reality behind them—but that is in flat contradiction to his own words, which are as follows:—

After speaking of certain schools of thought in which it is maintained that certitude is simply and always a mistake, he continues:—"There are others who in order to vindicate the certainty of our knowledge have recourse to the hypothesis of intuitions which belong to us by nature and may be considered to elevate our experience into something more than it is in itself" ("Grammar of Assent"—Chapter on the Illative sense.)

Dealing as he is with certitude—as it is in fact—and not attempting to justify it or deal with it "*in fieri*," he considers it enough to appeal to the fact that certitude is felt and to the common voice of mankind.

With the origin of the error that he makes an interior intuition the criterion of truth for every individual we shall deal later on. Here it is enough to say that his saying that the moral feelings and the religious feelings are *like intuitions*, and, in some, appear *as if* infallible instincts: his representation of the religious element in man as if a "sense" and the importance of its being so regarded: his representation of the moral element in man as if a "sense," and his insistence on the vagueness and wretched insufficiency of that element if it is not so educated as to be able to act as the senses do—to warn us

from every taint in a poisonous atmosphere—this is what has no doubt led to the mistake. It is a mistake, however, which overthrows the whole structure of Newman's argument for religion from the base.

Others, again, have gone so far as to imagine that Newman makes certitude a criterion of truth, but in his book on the Development of Doctrine he represents the problem we start with as suggested by the fact that as soon as people begin to reason on morals and religion they come to different conclusions and arrive at opposite certitudes:

Again, in the "Grammar of Assent" he distinctly states that as certitudes may be opposed in different people certitude is not a final test of truth.

By this time our readers will probably understand how it was possible for Prof. Huxley to say that out of some of the works of Cardinal Newman he thought he could put together the best handbook of infidelity it was possible to recommend to the young student.

We are now, therefore, in a position to give in some detail the case (which we have already described in general) of those who thus regard his philosophical opinions.

"Here is a writer," they might say, "who suspects, and in some degree exposes the unsoundness of the argument from design: who tells us that conscience is no argument to those who distrust its informations: who denounces the feebleness of our reasoning faculty and proves it so

dependent upon its first movements and the premisses with which it may happen to be provided that its conclusions in any individual instance may seem to be a matter of chance: who not only admits but takes pains to show that certitude is no test of truth inasmuch as certitudes are often opposed: who has exposed the absurdity of private judgment or a reliance, consequently, upon our reason, our instincts, our intuitions—as if they were somehow inherently superior to other people’s just because, forsooth, they are our own—with a sarcastic brilliance which has never been surpassed: who shows that the mind itself supplies our sole criterion of truth and yet that, as our mind cannot prove its own authority, it is as fallible a criterion as any other; here is a writer who admits or demonstrates all this in favour of scepticism and yet, at the same time, demands that by a process of reason and an act of judgment we shall confer a sort of infallible authority upon conscience, implicitly obey our reason and set up our religious instincts as an unerring guide—if we do but obey them—perhaps to an infallible church, but certainly to a whole circle of moral and religious truth!”

Such is the charge against Newman, and the reader, from what we have already said, may, perhaps, be able to give an answer.

(2).—NEWMAN AS TRADITIONALIST.

The conception of Newman's dialectic which has resulted in the questions mentioned in the last chapter has been owing to a fact sufficiently clear to those who know what Newman's position was in Oxford when he began his attempt to make some standing room for the great sacramental system of Catholicism—as it is found, especially, in the works of Origen and Augustine. He was face to face with an opponent who not only rejected Catholicism, but ignored the significance of religion altogether. He found himself in the midst of a Liberalism at once sceptical and empirical.

With his main position drawn out and defended in the "History of the Arians," where he shows how he stands with regard to the philosophical Catholicism of the Fathers, he was compelled to build his outworks in the very midst of the enemy's country. He could not bring sceptic, empiricist, and utilitarian at once to the standpoint adopted by himself, nay, it is clear at once that he could do no more than describe his position as a hypothesis, though a hypothesis which man is practically bound, in some fashion, well or ill, to make.

He does not, then, begin with denouncing

scepticism as simply false and with a destructive attack upon the principles of empiricist and utilitarian. On the contrary, he shows he can grant their contention within a certain sphere; but he contends that, on their own principles, they must either go further or not so far: that they adopt narrow definitions of "knowledge," "expediency," and "utility," and then argue from the broader meaning which the rest of the world attaches to the words.

Grant, again, that the senses are what "sceptics" consider them: grant that we cannot prove the existence of an outer world—yet, still, we are compelled to act and we do act, in accordance with our senses, and as if an outer world existed. We trust our senses, therefore, in their own sphere. But if we trust our senses in their own sphere—may it not be shown that there is a sphere also for the religious element in man, and that we have the same kind of reason for believing in the existence of that as something *sui generis* and distinct and having a definite part to play in man's life, as we have for so taking the senses and the social and moral elements in man.

As we can act, and usually find ourselves compelled to act, in accordance with the premisses provided by what Hume calls "custom" in the case of the other elements in man, so we can consistently begin by acting in accordance with the premisses provided by "custom" (if such it be considered) in the case of the religious element in man. And as an object for the senses is provided

in the external world—(how little so ever the existence of it can be proved or made comprehensible)—so an object for the religious element in man is provided by the religious idea of God—incomprehensible, indeed, and in His own nature, as the schoolmen speak, infinite *and with no real relation to man*, but an object to which man, nevertheless, has a relation, as towards the universe—the relation established by the history of man's experience, for the history of religion is but the history of man's relation to all that he has ever called God and worshipped.

Now, as we have had occasion to say before, a great deal of confusion has arisen from Newman's use of the word "reason" as describing a faculty merely instrumental. He meant that the intellect cannot be regarded as an entirely separate faculty by means of which he can get at truth, because we must make for the truth "with the whole man"—"we must think," as a great French philosopher has said, "with the very body."

Had "expediency" in the mouths of utilitarians meant what it meant to Burke "what is suitable to the whole man," and did experience include all that Burke made it include—in the historical attempt of man to discover what is suitable to him as a whole, and "if the greatest happiness of the greatest number" included a happiness satisfying to the element in man, which holds together and can look down upon the categories, as well as the happiness acquired within the categories (if we may so speak)—utilitarians and

empiricists might claim to be profound philosophers.

Newman, therefore, in his book on Development, attempts to bring together into one his religious and philosophical teaching—the sacramental system of the Fathers and his philosophical defence of religion against the sceptics and empiricists of his day. And the question which lies at the bottom of his *Essay on Development* is really this:—“How is it possible to ascertain, in accordance with the process necessitated by the ratiocinative faculty, what is the true object of the religious element in man—whatever that element may turn out to be?” And it is from his answer to this question that Newman has come to be regarded as a Traditionalist in the same sense as De Bonald or Lamennais—and an Empiricist in the same sense as Hume.

For his answer practically amounts to this: that the experience of the individual and the experience of the race are the sole authorities to which we can have recourse, whether in the case of the physical senses or in the case of what have been called the social sense, the moral sense, the religious sense. When we have no experience or no sufficiently clear experience of our own we must, in this matter, as in others, throw ourselves back upon and ascertain (as far as possible) the sum of the experience of the human race in that subject which corresponds with the “sense” with regard to which we start our enquiry.

Nor is this to deny, as Cardinal Newman is

careful to remark, that there are "eternal truths," ideas, realities ascertainable by man: it is only to insist that the stubborn fact remains that no such ideas have historically shown themselves sufficiently commanding to become the basis of public union and action." They have been the reason why men have acted together, but men have been but half conscious of the reason. As man in becoming conscious of himself gets to see how far he can trust his senses, so Humanity becomes conscious of itself through a Catholic organisation—whether religious or not—and then proceeds to discover what it really is which it trusts to in its development, whether it has any faculty which it can use on the journey it suddenly becomes aware it has, for ages, been taking, whether, as an organism it has the power of finding its way or rejecting what is poison for it, assimilating what is food in a similar manner to that in which an individual may.

The religious element in man does not, according to Newman, supply itself, as it were, by means of an intuition with its own object. It is but an unsatisfied craving: a sense of law, in general, but no knowledge of the law; a sense of right and wrong in general, but no knowledge what is right and what is wrong; a sense of what is permanent, what is real, what is universal, but no knowledge how to express these things to itself. It is dependent for its growth, energy, and the exercise of its function, as the physical senses are, upon something conceived as external to it, some-

thing brought to it from without. It is in need of fertilization either by some sort of confirmation of what its desires portend or by some actual object—from a fetish to Spirit—which answers to them. Self-fertilization seems impossible to it. Indeed, did we not adopt the morality and religion, at least provisionally, which we find around us, we should but wear ourselves out in a perpetual round of thought—starting at no beginning and resulting in no conclusion.

With language, at any rate, begin we must, and language is but a tradition we have received.

Thus, too, in the sphere of religion (which is not infinite though it brings us into contact with all human expressions for the infinite) we must seek the object of religious aspiration—from without.

In the case of our senses we are dependent upon the sum of the experience of the human race for their right education and continuance in activity. On the basis of experience alone (not yet having reached a point where we can appeal to anything else) it is from the race of which we form a part that we receive not only our education, but our life and our senses themselves. The physical structure and conformation of our brain are as truly a material tradition as language is a spiritual. We cannot get outside the influence of tradition or the necessity for authority by any act of the private judgment, how bold soever, for the language in which we think, the rules by which we argue and the brain which is essential to our making any

movement in thought at all are material or spiritual traditions from the past, though they are in the very act of moving on towards a future.

Now it is the religious experience of mankind which provides this onward movement at once with a definite starting point and an object—ever approached, though never completely gained.

Were it not for the religious experience of others or the religious element in humanity taken as a whole, the indefinite aspirations of the individual would find no object at all—not even a fetish, but would exhaust his energies by their persistent recurrence, their incessant claim, their insatiable craving: for even a fetish cannot be worshipped till some evidence from without has confirmed the notion of divinity already vaguely present in the mind. Man's reason is defective because it is a part of a whole. It is so, when it does not realise its organic communion both with special faculties as memory or conscience or with the race. Man, by himself, would still be a religious animal, just as he would still be a laughing animal;—but, by himself, he would probably never laugh,—and, by himself, without the confirmation and encouragement supplied by the necessities of *thought-in-language*, he would probably never worship. In short, the individual finds the unity and the objective validity of thought by contact with other men. Such words are taken to imply that traditionalism which is condemned by the Church—just as the other half of

Newman's argument is taken to imply the intuitionism so condemned. But the traditionalism condemned by the Church was concerned with a primitive revelation and considered primitive revelation a substitute for metaphysical proof: and with primitive revelation and metaphysical proof this argument has, at this point, nothing to do. It does not deny: it does not affirm—anything with regard to subjects which could not be introduced, at this point, into Newman's argument—without begging the question. It does but prescind from them—until the argument, built on premisses which sceptics and empiricists may admit, is completed.

It denies, indeed, that any argument for the existence of God can be introduced before this argument is completed:—but it affirms that sceptic and empiricist, even if right as far as they go, are bound to admit the religious idea into their notion of experience and among the objects with which man's nature, taken as a whole, is concerned. We have no right to begin by cutting out of man what forms in him a characteristic element.

We depend, then, upon the traditions of the race to which we belong even in the most intimate acts of our mind.

And one of these traditions (whether we choose to consider it physical or not) has culminated or is expressed in the religious element in man.

To the sum of the religious experience of the human race (so far as we can ascertain it, even

though we begin only with one other human being) must we go, for the witness we need and for the object of which we are in search—as we begin by getting somebody else to tell us whether they hear the distant cry we hear, or feel the vague aspirations we notice in ourselves. Whether this religious emotion is something characteristically human, or something simply abnormal to be destroyed as evil, and whether man has been able to supply it with a place, an object, a function in his life, and what that place, object or function may be, we can only find by consulting humanity itself in whatever manner we find it possible best to do so.

Prescinding, then, from metaphysical proof and primitive revelation, how shall we arrive at some notion of such *truth* in religion as shall satisfy our need? How is the religious element in man to be supplied with an object in such a manner as to satisfy the claims of his ratiocinative faculty?

Now truth, as we are here concerned with it, “is not something abstract and detached, but must lie in the bosom of humanity.” It is the ultimate Reality of things in accordance with which things are rightly done and so, in the long run, succeed, or in contradiction to which things are wrongly done, and, in the long run, fail. “Morality is,” in this sense, truly called “the nature of things.”

As early as 1756 Burke published his ironical “Vindication of Natural Society.” The reasoning, as is well known, was intended to show that

"if the practice of all moral duties and the foundation of Society rested upon having their reasons made clear and demonstrative to every individual"—the world would fall into ruins.

"Show me," he says, "an absurdity in religion and I will undertake to show a hundred for one in political institutions."

"If after all you should confess all these things, yet plead the necessity of political institutions, I can argue perhaps with superior force concerning the necessity of artificial religion: and every step you advance in your argument you add a strength to mine." Here we have an argument for religion drawn from expediency.

In the "Apologia" Newman writes that one of the propositions of Liberalism which he earnestly denounced and abjured was that "utility and expedience are the measure of political duty."

Nevertheless, if we consider the speculative difficulty with regard to political institutions to be a *real one* and the necessity for religion to lie in the *reality of things* and substitute the words "naturally evolved" for the unhistorical word "artificial" applied to religion, the argument begins to have some resemblance to that which is used by Newman in his book on "Development."

It is founded, indeed, on expediency—but on a broad conception of expediency entirely different from that which Newman denounced and abjured. For expediency, regarded as it would then be regarded, becomes a test of truth—if truth is taken as that reality which lies in the nature of things

and is ever attempting to express itself more and more completely.

For what is, in fact, Burke's conception of expedience? "Expedience," says Burke, in another place, "is that which is good for the community and good for every individual in it. Now this expedience is the desideratum to be sought either without the experience of means or with that experience. . . ."

But "one of the ways of discovering a false theory is comparing it with practice. This is the true touch-stone of all theories which regard man and his affairs . . . does it suit his nature in general: does it suit his nature as modified by his habits?"

What, then, shows us "the expedient" for man? "The mature judgment of the species."

"The individual is foolish. The multitude for the moment is foolish when they act without deliberation: but the species is wise—and when time is given it, as a species, it almost always acts right."

The organism regarded socially or individually has a certain restricted and relative infallibility. Thus it is that he is able to ridicule the folly of those "who draw up a bill of indictment against a whole nation."

"*I do not*," he says, "*vilify theory and speculation*—no—because that would be to vilify reason itself. But all theories with regard to man must alike be submitted to the touch-stone—does it suit his nature in general—his nature as modified

by his habits." The measure of truth and standard of right gained by the purely speculative intellect, apart altogether from the experience of the race, is as arbitrary as it is vague—mere abstract notions of the private judgment may hit on the truth here and there, but usually end in the invention of an arbitrary truth of things "in themselves"—and fantastic visions of a reality never to be approached by the reason of man.

This is the scepticism which has been so freely imputed to Newman—but, in fact, it is a scepticism which he was ever attacking and exposing. Truth, thus conceived, he is continually reminding us, is simply unattainable. It is truth as it lies in things—as it lies in the world—truth as it is arrived at by slow evolution in Society, in ideas, in religions—truth as it is found in man—that we are in search of.

He does not deny the existence of eternal truths—ascertainable by individuals or established in philosophical systems,—but when they are taken as pure abstractions, when they are conceived artificially and without reference to their historical evolution in humanity—they are barren: they seem "not sufficiently commanding to form a basis for public union and action," they seem no longer to live. Truth, therefore, for him—not only in theology, but in philosophy, is not to be taken as something abstract and detached but, as in a picture of the Virgin Mother, in the very bosom of

Humanity—clinging to her and lost in her embrace.

In this manner then expediency and truth are to be conceived in order that we may reconcile the ideal and the real—: in order that the God of things as they ought to be may so become incarnate in things as they are, as to direct them to that permanent ideal reality which is ever approached but never gained—ever future but ever reigning over and guiding the present.

What, then, are the tests of the truth of ideas as they are found expressed and represented in an institution, a state, an organism?

Coherency or consistence is the statical, life the dynamic, test of truth.

The test of the truth of ideas is their capacity to live and the criterion of their having life is their power to grow, to reconcile, to assimilate, to go forth in many directions at once.

The test of dynamic truth is life. The test of life is growth. But there is also a logical test of dynamic truth—it must be shown to be one, to be proceeding from one source, to be, logically, a development. If something is advanced as true, because it has apparently grown from an acknowledged truth, and yet is obviously inconsistent with that truth—a false claim is made for it: it is a corruption. Such a later truth developed from an earlier may not be verbally developed: it may be developed by events rather than by conscious speculation,—but it must be possible to show that it does not contradict the forms in which it appeared

at an earlier stage, so as to create a break in continuity. For evolution has a logical side to it; a logic of events inherent in it; and development in ideas must be amenable to a logical test—the test of logical sequence. It need not, of course, express itself in the form of the syllogism;—but it must be able to show that it has not, at any particular stage, lost logical continuity, for it is by a logical test, in the first place, that we find to what subject-matter an idea belongs.

Truth, then, in religion is rendered amenable to certain tests.

If religion is a necessary element in man and must not be simply destroyed or explained away, we must attempt to find what is the best religion for man. And the manner in which we must find it is this: we must find what kind of truth we want and what kind of spokesman or expression of that truth.

There is an ethical and a religious process going on in the world as well as the cosmic, though all alike may owe their origin to the last and be ultimately resolvable into it. To the ethical process answers in man what is called the moral sense. To the cosmic process answer the five senses, to the religious element in man—*a religious development in humanity*.

Man has developed this religious element in various ways—but he has, in a particular manner, become conscious of what is necessary as a basis of the religious idea. It must represent as far as possible the sum of the religious ideas and the

religious experiences of the race as a whole;—it must be one for all;—it must be Catholic. It must be living, that is—it must show itself able to assimilate or able to meet and account for, what is apparently opposed to it—:

It must continue, on a Catholic basis, the great experiment of man on his religious side. It must fulfil the function which it came into the world to carry out; it must have always the same general character in the opinion both of friends and foes. It must preserve its type and it must have within it the power to express itself.

In this way Newman's tests: preservation of type: continuity of principles: power of assimilation: early anticipation: logical sequence: and chronic continuance—will apply to that organism in which the religious idea and the developments of the religious element in man are attempted, as well as to the developments taken one by one.

If that organism, which humanity has developed within itself, perishes, it is scarcely possible to imagine how humanity is to attain its purpose. It is the great experiment of the human race to become religiously conscious of itself and to find what it is which it relies on in itself in matters of religion;—where the pivot is on which it turns;—where the sense of touch is which it uses—where the eyes are with which it sees—in matters of religion. Now the Catholic Church being the *one communion* in the world which makes the Catholic idea and universal unity *its basis* and

its ideal, Newman inquires whether that Church may not be the organism required.

Prof. Fairbairn says that Newman ought to have set out first to find what was the germ idea of Christianity;—and he even goes so far as to tell us what it was.

But the problem Newman has set before himself was to find some scientific mode of discovering the type, for the simple reason that “ what the germ is ” is precisely the matter in dispute, *nor can we, in spiritual things, discover a germ except from the nature of its growth.*

Protestants having come to different conclusions, Newman suggests that their method may have been wrong and that his method may turn out more successful.

His object is to find out whether there are not a series of tests—brought from other kinds of development—which may be applied to the Catholic conception of what is the germ: because it may turn out that the Catholic conception, assumed by all Protestants to be so false as not to be worth investigating, is, on the whole truer than the others—while what is called the “ *main idea of Christianity* ” is in the process of expressing itself and cannot be known in its completeness till Christianity itself has run out its course. If the Catholic conception turns out to be truer and more in accordance with the most rigidly scientific series of tests we can apply, and the modification acknowledged on all hands does but show the

power of assimilation found in all healthy organisms, may it not turn out that Christianity itself owes more to Catholicism and the world to Christianity than has hitherto been perceived?

The world itself may perhaps have discovered, through the Church, what is the real value of its religious element and where it can trust it.

It is clear that some germ there must have been in the religion called Christian which was able to produce what has followed from it. It is possible that the germ which grew was not the "main idea of Christianity" as it existed in the mind of its founder. It is possible;—but not very probable, and if the main idea was not the germ from which what is called Christianity grew, then the main idea of Christianity perished very early and something merely incidental grew up instead.

But something of this kind may *possibly* have happened to the religious idea itself from the very first. The act of the mind by which it makes human experience a different thing from the experience of the brutes: the conception of order: the ethical and religious idea in the individual—may not be the germ of the religious development of man as we see it. It may be, he ought to return to his earliest religious and mystical instincts, and reject all the developments as corrupting if he is to get a pure religion—the true religion of humanity. It may be he ought to appeal to a primitive church in which no developments at all have been made: of which Christianity,—in its purest form, is but a corruption.

But, in that case, he will find himself bound to make developments of his own as soon as ever he comes into contact with "action," and these may also be corruptions: and, if he doubts the religious process which has begun late in the history of the animal called man—may he not have equal reason to doubt the cosmic process by which he has become man at all? And, in that case, he must set himself in opposition to the cosmic process in others as well as in himself for the cosmic process also goes forth (when viewed intellectually) on an intellectual assumption.

(3).—NEWMAN AS SCEPTIC AND EMPIRICIST.

(1)

“The problem,” says Dr. Fairbairn, “as to the evolution of the Church, the headship of the supreme Pontiff, and his *ex Cathedra* infallibility, is historical and soluble only by methods of historical research, which does not begin by *a priori* definitions and determinations of one class of growths as “corruptions” and another as “developments,” but simply observes the process, the factors, and the results. Hence we must do two things (a) find the germ, viz.:—the body or system of truth, in its primitive or least developed state, and (b) study the successive conditions under which it lived, their action on it, its action on them. The germ is simple, but the conditions are complex and varied.”

Dr. Fairbairn is telling Newman what he ought to have done in order to realize the purpose which he set before him in the “Essay on Development.” In a note he enumerates Newman’s tests of the development of an idea—“the preservation of the idea” itself; “continuity of principles,” and so forth. “These,” he says, “are so many principles of prejudgment. So independent is

Newman of historical research that he does not condescend to any critical search after the idea that is to be preserved."

Newman might have ventured to remark on this astonishing piece of criticism that he conceived it was "the germ" as the body or system of truth in its undeveloped state which was the very question in dispute; it is "the idea"—a method of ascertaining which he is suggesting in his Essay, because there is so great a division of opinion as to what the idea is. To say that he is to begin by setting forth the germ "as a body of truth" and to say that the germ is simple, is to beg the question. The reason why Newman wrote his Essay was in general terms because mankind are hopelessly at variance as to what "the germ" and the idea are. He suggests that the reason why men are so much at variance about them is (1) because they have not hit upon the right method of finding them, (2) because, possibly, the idea is of so profound a description that it was expressed, at first, in terms which look like contradictions, (3) because the idea has not yet been fully expressed at all, but, from the very fact of its depth, has only given forth its extreme propositions, its antitheses, and that, from the very nature of the case, it is left to time, by reconciling these antitheses to give, one after another, all the aspects of the idea until the day shall arrive when we have got the sum of them, reconciled all the differences and attained the full expression of the idea. And (4) because the idea, even if it was at the birth of Christianity fully

expressed (which if it was a deep one is impossible) was expressed in words with very few of which we are now acquainted. At the best we have a very short account even of the germ. When, therefore, he speaks, as he does, of "the preservation of the type," he is dealing with that obvious external expression of the idea which appears plainly in the face of history and with regard to which there is no difference of opinion. For instance; theories about the nature of "the kingdom" may be very numerous; the Christian conception of "the kingdom" may, at first, have been a crude one;—but there is no doubt that the Gospel is announced as the coming of the Kingdom of God. With such a fact it is possible to deal consistently with Newman's theory; but with the germ as a system of truth it is impossible to begin with dealing—for the nature of that system is the question in dispute and must come last, not first.

But Newman was not aiming at so much even as this. He was not aiming at finding the germ even at the end of his Essay. He was but suggesting a method which he thought might give a clue as to the manner in which the *nature* of "the germ" might be discovered. Now the Idea, as we have it, "in germ" (if we must use the expression), in the few words which are left to us in the documents of Christianity, does contain bold paradoxes, broad antitheses, apparent contradictions. From this fact as well as from the obscurity directly arising from the distance of time have arisen profound differences among Christians.

Sceptics have found great reason for triumph in these differences. Some of them have suggested that the reason is that in Christianity there was no idea at all; but only a series of incoherent propositions and that Christians were kept together, not by an idea the study of which always kept showing its depth and truth by reconciling opposites, accounting for contradictions, realizing itself on many sides at once,—but by personal loyalty to a character whose greatness could not well be exaggerated but whose depth and capacity in the region of ideas had come to be very much overestimated.

That Christianity had not at its basis some profound idea, not fully expressed but in the process of realization, seems improbable from the fact of the vigorous intellectual unity (amid the greatest mass of differences in history) of the Christian Church. But if this vigorous united intellectual life of the Church with its interior consistency and power to throw aside what it accounted heresy does not come into consideration at all, what proof is there that there was an idea? What proof is there that there was not an original, radical contradiction in the “germ” as there is now in the views taken of it? To what else can we have recourse? To a harmony of Gospel teachings? To somebody’s theory of reconciliation? To some proof that Christ is God? To a proof of miraculous interference? But such proceedings all begin by assuming a notion so arbitrary and gratuitous that they seem hardly worth the labour

they must certainly entail. If great toil has been endured and great results have been attained by persons professedly building on so narrow a ground as the remote chance that an utterly anarchical Christendom is founded on a great interiorly consistent idea,—it is because men have done so only professedly;—the profound unity which is found in historical Christianity giving the real basis of hope—often expressed with extraordinary simplicity—by persons who, in controversy, pretend to scout the very conception of external unity.

Newman considers that the growth of the Christian Church is a proof that there is an idea; that the fact of its varied developments and its power of assimilation and its capacity to flourish in different soils and among various races shows that the idea has great vitality and great depth. There is an idea; but the idea is not only deep, but so deep,—so connatural to the heart of man,—that in its first expression it partook of man's external differences just because it was founded in his interior unity. There were not only apparent, but real differences, in the Primitive Church, between one Christian teacher and another; and it was only after centuries, in some cases, that these differences could be reconciled in a higher unity. But, if they were so reconciled at last, it was the persistence, continuity and permanence of the Christian type which rendered the reconciliation possible. Such differences, then, between men who held the idea in its inchoate form as expressed in the Chris-

tian type do but prove how deep the idea must be, which, after it had more fully developed, was able to reconcile them. In this manner Newman found that the theory of development, not only removes a difficulty, but becomes a positive argument for the depth and truth of the idea contained in Christianity. The idea was so profound and brought together natures so different that it came to be expressed, at first, in apparent, and, at the moment, in real contradiction; but it united these natures from below in a bond of instinctive unity the nature of which was not explained till centuries of struggle and polemic had passed away. Only when the great sayings of the Gospel and the teachings of Peter and Paul have been lived out and realized; only, when, through the working out, in every age, of all the aspects of the idea the sum of the aspects has been ascertained and all differences thereby reconciled, will the idea itself stand forth in its fullest expression.

In other words, Newman suggests the probability (our differences being caused as they are) that it is by the world's living out the Ideal that we shall get the true development of the Idea.

It is only when humanity has done, as a whole, what in his time and degree the individual is bidden to do, the will of the Ideal, that the doctrine of the Ideal shall be known by humanity.

When man shall have done the will and lived out the ideal, then only shall he know the doctrine and the idea.

To Newman the idea contained in the germ is

even more than this. It is the Idea which, as he conceives, not only lies at the root of man's being, but is intrinsic to the nature of "the cosmic process"—viewed as containing and accounting for the ethical and the religious. It is neither religious nor irreligious; but the basis of all religion, of all idea and of all being. It is the Idea at whose birth from the Divine mind—where it had lived from all eternity—all the Sons of God shouted for joy; it is the Idea in accordance with which the Divine will formed, evolved and brought into shape the world and drew man forth as from the dust of the earth. It is the Idea which, while men slept, still, through the night, worked on.

Again: it is the treasure hid in a field, which each man must seek for himself and which, as his ideal, he shall find; but which, as the Idea, humanity itself has ever sought and must ever seek, and only at the last shall find.

It is the pearl of great price which—if a man sell all that he has, he shall be able to gain; and for which humanity must spend all that she is as well as all that she has or ever she wholly possess it.

It is the idea which gives forth in sanctity the axioms of action on which is based the ideal; but which, as Idea, can only then be realized when these axioms of action have been translated into terms of thought.

Newman, then, who does but hint at the intrinsic nature of the Idea and rather leaves room for the evolution of "the conscience" and "moral

sense " from what he calls a " combination " of natural causes than attempts to express a theory of the immanence of the Idea in the cosmic process, suggests in the *Essay on Development* a new method of ascertaining the centre of vitality in " the germ " from a consideration of the external history of the Idea. What is permanent; what still has life; what shows by the testimony of history and witnesses external to Christianity, a continuity in the Christian type—that is what witnesses to the centre of vitality in " the germ." It is the external history of the Idea in the world,—an Idea which is in the process of expression, that we find the best representation we can get of the true nature of " the germ."

As it had taken many ages to develop a few aspects of the Idea, before Christianity came into the world, so, according to Newman, it may take humanity many thousands of ages before it is able to discover, by the slow process of development, what " the germ " is " as a system of truth."

And yet it is " the germ—as a system of truth "—which Dr. Fairbairn tells us Newman ought to have begun by ascertaining; it is this idea (working from the foundation of the world, and, by hypothesis, only to be realized at the end of it) which Newman should neatly and succinctly set forth before attempting to deal with its development at all.

Dr. Fairbairn thus turns the method of Newman upside down and thinks that by so doing he has demonstrated its absurdity. He tells

Newman that he ought to have begun by ascertaining the intrinsic nature of the idea—which Newman is attempting to show it must take, and has taken, ages only partially to realize. Newman had no business to suggest that, if the idea was deep and because the idea had been shown to appeal to a vast variety of minds—it would, from the nature of the case, take time to reconcile and sum up all the aspects of it. He ought himself, it seems, to have performed the task of ages, reconciled all the aspects, accounted for all the differences, and resolved Christianity into its highest unity. It is because the Liberal theologians had seemed to him to be attempting (all unconsciously) this totally impossible task, that Newman suggests there may have been something fundamentally mistaken in their method.

(2)

How, then, does Newman come to speak of "*the preservation of an idea*" the internal nature of which he cannot describe?

Here Dr. Fairbairn has made a mistake, which, though apparently slight, illustrates his fundamental misconception of Newman's argument. Newman does not speak of the preservation of the idea. He speaks of the preservation of the type. The idea itself is too deep, too obscure and too large to be described. It is of its very nature that, in religion, the idea should be vague, inchoate, on its way to expression and not at any given time fully expressed. Were it not so

religion would be a philosophy or a science from the starting point. The relation of the thoughts, doctrines, and aspects of a religion to one another may indeed form a science and become a theology. And then the test of the truth of the science; the test of the value of the theology;—is the test which shows whether the synthesis thus attempted has been successful, and this test is the statical test of truth;—the test of consistency. But the science of religion called theology is only concerned with the relation of doctrines to one another so far as they have been able to express themselves and develope in terms of a particular age and a particular mode of thought. It is not through theology, but through history and the application of scientific thought that religion can be regarded dynamically and as a living growth. The Essay on Development, therefore, is a criticism of theology and not, in the first place, a theological work.

Having shown why “the germ” and the idea are beyond the immediate scope of the method, which is to give the means of ascertaining, not “the germ” and the idea, in their intrinsic character; but their extrinsic nature sufficiently for the purpose in hand; Newman makes his first critical test—the preservation of the type; because as the germ changes in its growth, it is possible (and he proves it to be inevitable) it should change both its “*stuff and its fashion*” as our bodies change their substance once in so many years; while identity can only be proved by the preserva-

tion of a certain continuity of character, and this is described by Newman as the continuity of type. To ascertain the type and its continuity it is not necessary to ascertain the idea, which can only be judged by what the type ultimately becomes. To ascertain the type it is only necessary to hear the world's account of it, and to ascertain its continuity it is only necessary to discover whether the world's account of it remains the same. This we do in all other cases where action is concerned. But the Christian type was concerned in the first place, as Matthew Arnold says,—with action, with practice, with conduct. The world's account is prejudiced in the case of Christianity, as we know, and so is Christianity's account of itself. But what we want to ascertain is whether there was a real breach in continuity in the type. If the world's account ever remains the same, it will not be a proof that the world's account is true, or that it is not prejudiced; but it will prove that the type remains the same, that it excites the same prejudices, calls out the same criticism, arouses the same peculiar form of hostility.

The objection of Dr. Fairbairn is, however, in the first place, an objection to the use of any *a priori* method. But it is not a very just mode of attacking a book, which professes to have made a discovery as to the method in which a certain thing should be done, to begin by saying that the author must not allow himself to use the only method in which any such discovery has ever been made. And yet in telling Newman that he ought

not to have used the *a priori* method, Dr. Fairbairn is doing no less; for it has been proved over and over again in book after book upon the principle of induction, that no discovery has been made by the use of the inductive method alone, but by the use of an hypothesis—either already existing in the mind or especially thought out for the occasion—and then by the use of deductive and inductive processes—until the first hypothesis is either proved or discarded. It is experiment applied to a clearly expressed hypothesis and hypothesis applied to long series of experiments—which bring about the discovery of new facts and new data in science; and not the use of experiment alone or the process of induction alone.

Moreover, it is not just to a book like the *Essay on Development* to attack its *a priori* method straight away as if Newman had used that method from a mere bias of his mind and theological tendency to argue in that manner. Newman has elaborately defended his use of this method; and to take no notice of the reasons which he gives in this particular case, for doing what has really been done in every case of the sort that occurs (whether the writers or discoverers have been conscious of it or not) is not really to criticize the book or the argument, but only to create prejudice and make room for that disparagement of the author's abilities which French and German writers have told us is the English substitute for literary criticism.

Now Newman's frank use of a hypothesis is

more scientific than the method of Liberal Theologians, who make a hypothesis also, but imagine that they are employed in merely getting at the facts.

It is not my purpose to go through and restate the whole argument of the Essay; but to remove the prejudices against it and attempt to show the manner in which they have arisen. Newman makes a double hypothesis—the hypothesis of Development as against those conservative theologians, who say that Roman doctrine is but Primitive Christianity expressed in modern words; and the hypothesis of an instinct of self-preservation in the Catholic organism which has taught it what was food for it and what poison in the religious nutriment with which it found itself provided,—as against Protestants who hold that the true idea of Christianity was corrupted from the first.

It is the *gravamen* of Dr. Fairbairn's argument against Newman that Newman arbitrarily introduces "mechanical supernaturalism" in the infallibility of the Church, in order to get rid of what he calls the element of "chance and coincidence" to which Liberal theologians and sceptical writers attribute the rise and growth of the Catholic Church. I have already dealt with this charge on the surface; now I must go through it in detail.

The charge is the original charge of philosophical scepticism (in a slightly different form)—the charge brought against both Newman and Pascal.

With regard to the interior argument used by Pascal and Newman for the existence of the idea of which they hold the Catholic Church to be the latest and the highest expression, I shall deal hereafter. In this place I shall deal with the charge that Newman's conception of a "mechanical supernaturalism" excludes the Idea altogether; virtually denies that the Idea is the cause of man's religious development and substitutes an arbitrary supernatural conscience and ecclesiastical authority for any use of the reason.

It is the charge that Newman substitutes a Traditionalism, founded on a Hume's scepticism and distrust of the reason, for a rational metaphysic.

I must deal, then, first with Newman's treatment of the reason.

(3)

I have already admitted that Newman in his "University Sermons" uses the presupposition of Hume. Dr. Fairbairn considers that he remained philosophically a sceptic in Hume's sense to the end; and that it was to supplement the impotence of "an instrumental reason" "forsaken by God" that Newman introduced first an arbitrarily conceived "conscience" as a moral dictator and then an infallible Church as the representative and guide of the conscience.

Dr. Fairbairn, in illustration of the charge, makes some of the quotations to which I have already alluded. As soon as Dr. Fairbairn made

his charge, however, Newman replied to it and Dr. Fairbairn answered that the reply does but substantiate the charge.

Newman had argued that, even on the presupposition of Hume, we are compelled to take the world offered us by the senses as an organic whole and to deal with it as such. Even if we allow that "custom" it is that has enabled us to do so, we have grounds of a similar nature for treating religion as an objective organic whole, though this "objective organic whole" has arisen, to all seeming, merely from a series of "impressions" on men's minds, and therefore remains subjective.

Dr. Fairbairn considers that Newman, in so arguing, leaves the scepticism of Hume where it was and merely builds upon it a religious world in the same way that Hume built upon it a world which was still really subjective, and our manner of dealing with which was supplied by custom and association. Dr. Fairbairn contends that Newman does but place authority in religion in the same position as Hume places custom; that the reason, with Newman, is a series of antecedents and consequents in the same way that, with Hume, it is a series of impressions and ideas; that the reason is left impotent and instrumental and the authority derived from "the moral sense cut off and divided from the reason is arbitrary, non-rational and mechanical. "My contention is," says Dr. Fairbairn, "that to conceive the reason as Dr. Newman does is to deny to it the knowledge of God

and so to save faith by the help of a deeper unbelief."

Now it has been my contention that Newman absorbs, so as to transcend, Hume's doctrine. In his sermon on "Bigotry," etc., he shows that in order to act in accordance with the reason, considered, at first, as an instrument, we must and always do reason "with the whole man"; and, though we still use the reasoning faculty as an instrument, we use it as a living instrument organically connected with our whole being—connected organically with our conscience as truly as with our memory; though in the individual, in the concrete, there is no necessarily realised connection between the intellect and the affections—or the intellect and the conscience. But an organic whole, when seen as organic by the mind, becomes object for the mind. Hence Newman's objective religion.

When Newman says that there is no "necessary connection" between the conscience and the reason, he is speaking popularly. He does not mean to deny that the organic connection remains, but he means that the organic connection sometimes ceases to be realized. He uses the expression, because he wishes to admit that the organic connection between the conscience and reason is not "necessary" in the same degree as the organic connection between (*e.g.*) the reason and the memory—a fact which is demonstrable, for the reason could not survive the total loss of memory but the reason sometimes survives the

apparent loss of the moral sense; and appears, for a time, to be even stronger when the affections are diminishing in power. Newman lays himself open to the charge of scepticism by making these admissions in its favour, because he does not wish it to be possible for anyone to say that he has left an element in it unconsidered or treated it, in any case, unfairly. Dr. Fairbairn considers that Newman leaves the reason vacant and idle "till it has received the deliverances of the conscience"; but Newman never says that the reason is idle: on the contrary, he says that it is "restless," ever seeking a system or a unity; but he contends that on this very ground, it is continually finding a system which it conceives to be absolute; it is ever finding a unity which is not the absolute unity—(in the individual and in the concrete) when the religious sense does not exist,—because it rightly conceives that it is bound to acquiesce in a system until it is proved that the system is incomplete. The evil is not in the reason of man taken in the mass, which would go on to make a synthesis of all history and would find in history the witness to religion; for the very restlessness of the reason makes it dissatisfied with one system after another, because it becomes aware, when experience is given it, that its synthesis is not complete. The evil is not in the reason, abstractly considered, for the reason, abstractly considered, is not subject to time. But the evil is in the reason, in the individual, in the concrete,—where men have learnt to regard the moral sense, the religious sense

and the affections as obstacles—and nothing but causes of bias, to the use of the reason. This is the isolation of the reason which Newman deplors—precisely as Burke deplors it in those who attempt to free the reason from what they call the artificial civilization of history, and talk about the “noble savage” as the highest type of humanity.

Newman then, can turn round upon Hume and say “You are doing in metaphysic just what Rousseau did in history.” In a similar manner, Newman shows the organic connection of the conscience with the reason; shows that the conscience, in its development, needs the reason as well as the reason the conscience; carries on this organic conception into history; shows that the development of the religious idea in national religion and in the Catholic Church is analogous to the development of the conscience; shows the *organic connection* of this development of the religious idea in the Catholic Church with the development of the reason and “the progress of the scientific temper”; and then sets forth the hypothesis of an instinct of self-preservation in the religious organism (infallible in the detection of food and poison) as completing the parallel of religious development in the knowledge of religious subjects with scientific development in the knowledge of scientific subjects. That is, Newman suggests that, as science can assume a certain relative infallibility with regard to its main teaching, because it has its subject matter before it, and can apply its tests with certainty; so religion

can assume a certain relative infallibility with regard to the subject matter of religion which is constantly before it in the experiences of the race, and can apply, to what has now become on its own grounds (in consequence of the differentiation of function inevitable to man) a distinct organism, *a definite series of tests*; not with such immediate certainty as science, for the subject matter in religion is still far more vague than in science, but with sufficient certainty for the purpose of carrying on the great religious and spiritual process .

(4)

Now let us turn to Dr. Fairbairn's attack and the quotations from Newman which he thinks bear out and justify his attack. "The doctrine of the reason Cardinal Newman has stated is," says Dr. Fairbairn, "in the philosophical sense, essentially a sceptical doctrine." And here is what Dr. Fairbairn regards as Newman's earliest statement (with his later notes appended): "There is no necessary connection," says Newman, "between the intellectual and moral principles of our nature—that is," he adds, "as found in individuals, in the concrete," "and we can arrive at truth but accidentally, if we merely investigate by what is commonly called reason, which is in such matters but the instrument at best, in the hands of the legitimate judge, spiritual discernment."

"Because," Newman adds in his notes, "we may be reasoning from wrong principles, principles unsuitable to the subject matter reasoned upon.

Thus, the moral sense or 'spiritual discernment' must supply us with the assumptions to be used as premisses in religious inquiry."

"And here," says Dr. Fairbairn, "is his latest statement."

"In its versatility, its illimitable range, its power of concentrating many ideas on one point, it (the reason) is for the acquisition of knowledge all important or rather necessary; with this drawback, however, in its ordinary use, that in every exercise of it, it depends for its success upon the assumption of prior acts similar to that which it has itself involved, and therefore is reliable only conditionally. Its process is a passing from an antecedent to a consequent, and according as the start so is the issue. In the province of religion if it be under the happy guidance of the moral sense, and with teachings which are not only assumptions in form, but certainties, it will arrive at indisputable truth, and then the house is at peace; but if it be in the hands of enemies, who are under the delusion that its arbitrary assumptions are self-evident axioms, the reasoning will start from false premisses, and the mind will be in a state of melancholy disorder. But in no case need the reasoning faculty itself be to blame or responsible, except if viewed as identical with the assumptions of which it is the instrument; as such I have viewed it, and no one but Dr. Fairbairn would say as he does—that the bad employment of a faculty was a division or a contradiction and 'a radical

antagonism of nature' and 'the death of the natural proof' of a God."

If, then, the reason is not to blame when we reason to a false conclusion, it is entirely separable from the conscience; and it is not only a mere instrument but an instrument unconnected "with the whole man." What hope is there, then, for the individual, if he has started on false principles that he will ever get right again? His very loyalty to his reason will but lead him further and further astray.

But Newman means exactly the opposite to what Dr. Fairbairn supposes him to mean. He means that the reason is an instrument, indeed, but an instrument organically connected with the whole man. If it is not realized by the reason that it is thus connected with the whole man, the reason will become more and more disconnected with the other elements in man, and the man will cease to be at unity with himself. The reason, however, may not be to blame—for it may be the memory only which is to blame. Surely Dr. Fairbairn will admit this: that if a process of reasoning is complete but issues in a false conclusion because, at the start, an important fact was forgotten, it is not the reason which is to blame but the memory. The organic connection with the memory remains and is even proved by the fact that the reason goes wrong because the memory is mistaken. To show that this is the case; to show that the reason may complete its process on perfectly logical grounds, and yet be wrong if the

memory is at fault is not to show that the memory and the reason are fatally divided one from the other, but to show that they are organically connected.

Dr. Fairbairn observes that Newman by making the reason "a process of antecedents and consequents," falls into the notion of an infinite series. But Newman does not imply anything of the kind. He says that the process of the reason is a process of antecedent and consequent and that consequently, if the reason is isolated from the memory or the moral sense, the whole mind ceases to be at unity with itself, falls into a state of melancholy disorder and will tend to go round for ever in that circle of errors which is infinite. Newman, that is, holds that the series began, and begins necessarily, in the reason's use of facts; but if the reason gets disconnected with the facts or has not a sufficient acquaintance with the facts, it is left to devour itself in an impotent ideology.

He does not mean that the reason is without the potentiality of finding unity from within itself; of finding its own unity. It is, on the contrary, because it must assume its own unity that it can be contemplated as a separate faculty at all. The fact that the potentiality is there is the fact on which Newman is insisting when he appears to Dr. Fairbairn to be making a division of the faculties. But the potentiality is not only a potentiality to assume its own unity; it is by the use of this power that knowledge becomes possible at all. This is why Newman says that reason is

all important or rather necessary to the acquirement of knowledge. As soon as reason begins to act it begins to reconcile "the whole man" in a unity, whose possibility it is bound, from its own nature consciously or unconsciously to assume from the first. This assumption is given in the reason itself, or else its process of "antecedents" and "consequent" would itself be irrational. Newman, however, is not dealing with what speculation shows us is given in the reason; but with reason in the concrete; and, in the concrete even reason's assumption of its unity is a thing very seldom fully realized by the reason; and not until it has been educated from without does it become aware either of its special powers or of its limitations.

It is on its limitations that Newman is insisting—because its limitations, in the concrete and in the individual, are what philosophers seemed to him chiefly to ignore. That it has a unity in itself; that it is ever seeking unity from its very nature; that it assumes the possibility of unity from the start—Newman takes as assumed as its characteristic—in the fact that it both "has an illimitable range" and gives us "the power of concentrating many ideas on one point." What he thinks is forgotten or is not realized is that its true use must result in something more than a reconciliation with itself. It must start, if it is to succeed, with the assumption that it has to reconcile the whole man; it must start on the assumption that it lies already in a higher unity of which its own unity is but a reflexion—the unity of the conscience and the

moral sense and all the faculties of man. The fact that the reason and the conscience belong to this higher unity is assumed by religion and it is the value of religion that it insists on the fact of this unity—as the basis—before the unity has been philosophically realized; before the individual has been able for himself to resolve the conscience and the reason, on philosophical grounds, into a higher unity. The reason, Dr. Fairbairn thinks, according to Newman, “is emptied of those constitutive and constructive qualities which make it a reason.” But this is because he imagines Newman to conceive of the reason as a dead, external instrument; whereas Newman conceives of the reason as a living instrument organically connected with the moral sense and the memory and the other faculties.

And, consequently, the abuse of the reason, according to Newman, consists—not in its being considered as connected vitally with the other faculties nor in its being considered as an instrument—; but in its being disconnected with the other faculties in such a manner as to make it indifferent to the conscience and the other faculties. Great as it is and necessary not only to all knowledge but also to the conscience and the moral sense, it is not great enough to assume itself as superior to the conscience; to assume itself as the sole originating cause of man’s conception of religion and morality. The conscience could not have come to be what it is without the reason; but the conscience is not a mere result of the reason

owing its place to a hereditary reverence. It has been developed by the reason, as dogma has been developed by the reason, but as it does not owe its development to the reason only, so it does not owe its origin to the reason only. Its origin is in the unknown or Divine or dependent on some special growth of the affections. The affections could not have taken such a form without the use of the reason nor can the Divine origin of conscience exclude the fact of its evolution in accordance with laws of reason or its creation (if it was created) by the exercise of that reason which is called Divine. It is as organically connected with the reason as the reason is connected with it. But, as the representative of the affections or of the Divine reason, it expresses a conclusion which reason in the individual and in the concrete comes to and works towards through a laborious process. It is the value of the conscience and of religion to give to the reason an assurance that there is a truth at the end of the journey which makes worth while the process; a truth without which, indeed, conscience and religion tell us, reason could not even exist, but a truth which the reason has to realize, through a painful process, in terms of its own. This truth is the absolute unity of the Universe. But the reason of the individual is confronted with the whole process of discovering this unity in what appears at first an infinity of difference. The individual cannot hope by himself completely to realize this unity. It is only reason in the mass which will be able to reach,

at the last, the conclusion with which conscience begins, and in the hope of which reason (even when most sceptical) is always consciously or unconsciously working.

“The only justification,” says Dr. Fairbairn, “of Cardinal Newman’s doctrine would have been the reduction of conscience and reason to a higher unity.” But it is the fact that they must be regarded as lying in a higher unity that Newman is insisting on; while the fact that they can only be resolved philosophically into this unity, after long ages, is the basis of his method:—To this reduction of conscience and reason to a higher unity, Newman would say that he had attempted to contribute his quota, by showing that it is by reason *in the mass*, working in the light of the hope which conscience and religion give, that this reduction of conscience to a higher unity will, at last, be made by humanity. But to say that Cardinal Newman ought to have done it himself would seem to Newman like telling him that he ought to be the human race. It was on this ground that Newman hesitated to accept philosophical systems which seemed to assume that a resolution of all the opposed terms in the controversy into their ultimate unity might be possible before the human race had lived out the idea or “the System of God” in accordance with which it had been created or evolved.

The reason in the individual, then, according to Newman is defective or limited in the following respects:—

(1) Because it does not necessarily realize its organic connection with the moral sense or the affections, regarding them, not as making its process richer and truer, but as causes of bias only.

(2) Because it does not necessarily realize its connection with reason in the mass or in the race or with the past.

(3) Because, although it is always attempting to gain an absolute unity, it does not necessarily realize all the elements which it has got to resolve into in that unity in order that the unity should be absolute; has nothing but education from without—, from the reason in the mass, to make it realize that the very brain which is its material instrument or expression is as much a development from the past as the language which it is compelled to use in order to act at all; and that, consequently, it fails to realize its true position in the individual and in the race; that, thus regarded, it is neither a first “reason” in humanity starting free from the hereditary developments of past ages—as Rousseau unconsciously assumed—or a last “reason” in humanity, able to act independently of the future, as if it could resolve into their ultimate unity all the elements in humanity (or at least the most important) as Dr. Fairbairn and many other philosophers with a system unconsciously assume.

This, Newman thinks, suggests the place of religion in the development of man. Because the individual cannot start fair or sum up the past so as to express the whole idea on which humanity

is living or resolve all thought into its ultimate unity—or bring about a kind of philosophical day of judgment and make his system the final judge of quick and dead,—therefore religion comes forward to give man hope; telling him that he may in the long run succeed in his philosophic endeavour, but that, as an individual, he must begin on the assumption that what he wishes to realize is in the process of being realized; that he is not the first man in humanity or the last and that therefore all he can do in philosophy is to contribute his quota, as one in the midst of many, to the process of which he must thus assume himself to be a part, or submit to philosophic or religious annihilation.

The reason why philosophers of such extraordinary greatness have fallen into the still more extraordinary error of regarding the human race as coming to the end of its developments in their own time—so as to lie before them as a whole—has, surely, been that they have either failed to give religion any commanding position at all or have acknowledged its influence as a thing of the past and ignored its necessity to the present and the future. I am far from saying that Dr. Fairbairn or Hegel (who has been accused of this error) altogether fall into it, but in insisting that no philosophic conception of reason and conscience (the chief subject matter of the world's whole development) can be worth much which does not resolve them, at once, in philosophic terms into a higher unity—all such reasoners are falling into

that finality which they condemn (and falsely condemn) in the Catholic Church.

It was the good fortune of Christianity to fall into this error as soon as it came into the world and expect the day of judgment or ever that generation had passed away. By committing the error in a manner which time could at once and finally disprove—the error itself, though constantly recurring in a slighter form, has preserved the Church from the possibility of ever succumbing to it altogether and has compelled the individual to realize that the most dogmatic assertion of the Church, though final for him in his ordinary conduct, can but be provisional for the race and conditional in its very nature; so that Pere Simon, while submitting to the great mass of the human reason in religion as represented by authority, could still believe that in the long run both he and the authority which condemned him would prove to be right—he, in the main thesis which he had advanced, and the authority, in condemning the manner in which he advanced it as not sufficiently proved to convince, or too crude to take its place in the slowly advancing system of the Church or, again, too complete, too self-sufficing to find a place in the midst of ideas which, if larger, were still inchoate, still going on to completion.

“The only justification of Cardinal Newman’s doctrine would have been the reduction of conscience and reason to a higher unity; his last condemnation,” continues Dr. Fairbairn, “is his distinction and division of the faculties, for it

involves our nature in a dualism which makes real knowledge of religious truth impossible. There is unity neither in the man who knows nor in the truth as known."

Newman, on the contrary, holds that the truth can only be known to "*the whole man*"; that it cannot be known to the reason alone or to the memory alone or to the moral sense alone; and the proof of it is that only when every faculty is given its place—is man found to be, as a matter of experience, at unity with himself; only when the reason has recognized the affections and the moral sense as no mere causes of bias, but as making the reason richer—and the moral sense and the affections have come to realize that the reason is essential to the acquirement of knowledge, even in their own domain, is "the house at peace."

"Make a present," says Dr. Fairbairn, "of true premisses to a faculty merely ratiocinative and they will be to it only as algebraic symbols, not as truths of religion; its deduction may be correct but it will have no religious character."

Does Dr. Fairbairn, then, deny that we have any faculty which is merely ratiocinative? Would he deny that when the memory receives a religious truth it merely remembers it? This is to deny distinctions so completely as to make a mere jumble of the faculties; but Newman neither makes an absolute division, nor merely confuses one faculty with another. He regards the faculties as *distinct* (as the memory from the ratiocinative faculty);—but though he regards the faculties as

distinct enough to be named as mankind have invariably named them, he regards them as organically connected. And this is not to make a jumble of the faculties, nor is it to divide in such a manner as to isolate, one from the other.

Newman is considered to have fallen into the very abyss of individualistic nominalism because, writing in the "Grammar of Assent," he does justice even to individualistic nominalism; shows that it is a necessary stage of the mind's process; and that there is no royal road to truth which does not pass through it; but he shows also that, in religion, there is only one way of absorbing and transcending it, because even individualistic nominalism is compelled, if it will have religious truth at all (and it cannot afford to obliterate religion from the subjects it must treat) to regard it, not as something abstract and detached, but as "lying in the bosom of humanity" and "lost in her embrace." That is, in religion as in everything else, the individualist, having become aware of his own subjectivity and that his mind is the only criterion of truth he has, goes on to see that, in so regarding his mind, he has discovered its objectivity; and from the objectivity he goes on to perceive that he is object among other objects—related to them by this very objectivity; that this relation involves others and that, not until he has realized, as far as he may, all these relations, can he come back to himself and use the objective criterion he has found, which is, for him, still his only ultimate criterion, with

an objective validity. Everything in the world is, as the individualist shows, subjective to the mind; and religion like everything else; but everything that can be viewed as organic by that very process becomes object, and religion, if it can be shown to be organic, becomes likewise object for the mind. Mind, in other words, must first have gained through the consciousness of its subjective individuality a knowledge of that organic unity which makes it object for itself, before it can recognize, on grounds of reason, the objective character of science from its being organic (though science is still organically incomplete) or the objective character of religion from its being organic (though religion is still organically incomplete).

But it is more important for man that he should recognize the objective nature of religion from its being an organic whole (though still going onwards as a living organism) than that he should recognize the objective nature even of the sciences, for with religion he must deal at once; from religion he usually gets the first external intimation that all his faculties have to be used together, and that his moral sense and his religious sense and his affections must be at once associated with his reason and his reason with them. For religion alone claims to give to man the hope on which all the processes of his understanding must be founded if they are ever to realize the unity for which they cannot help even mechanically seeking;—namely, the hope, based on the assur-

ance that an absolute unity is realizable because in an absolute unity all things are founded. Of this absolute unity, which is God, the authority which Newman puts in the place of Hume's custom, is the representative, because it is representative not only of man's reason, but of man's whole nature, so far as it has yet been found possible to give that nature any expression—at once social and coherent.

(5)

When reason has arrived at the necessity for an absolute, it does not necessarily find that absolute; and even if it find an absolute in religion it has not yet got beyond "absolute thing" and may still refuse to believe in "absolute Person."

And this is the point where Dr. Fairbairn more completely misunderstands Newman than anywhere else. Newman considers that the reason may arrive at a God as the expression of its own ultimate unity and so arrive at Pantheism, but he denies that the reason alone can arrive at that absolute unity which absorbs and expresses the whole man in Personality except the reason has learned "to make for the truth with the whole man." Reason can never make for the truth with the whole man except when it has learnt that there are no elements in man's nature which are to be set on one side as mere causes of bias; until it has learnt that the affections are as necessary to truth as the process of reason and that nothing is true, even to it, which is not able to pass uncontradicted

through all the depths of man's being. Morality and religion aid in the realization of the object by bringing men into contact with the nature of things through action; and, though these cannot act without the reason, yet it is they, with the reason, which are creative and not reason alone; because it is they that give to reason that sense of reality which can only be felt by man when he becomes aware that all his faculties, exercised in their several ways with full energy,—the reason not stunted by the affections, the religious sense not eliminated by the reason,—are satisfied together and can acquiesce in a conclusion arrived at by man as an organic whole.

But how is man to find the nature of that, in which his whole being can rest satisfied? Only by refusing to exterminate all desires and fears as irrational which cannot be justified or accounted for at once by the use of the reason. Of these desires and fears, those which are implied "in the sense of sin" have usually been the very first which the reason, in its restless desire for a unity satisfactory to itself alone, has peremptorily exterminated as irrational. Dr. Fairbairn might say, though he does not say it, that the reason would here be acting inconsistently and that Newman in criticizing such action as the natural and almost inevitable course of the reason is only calling the reason itself irrational. But in criticizing the reason as exercised in time, in the individual and in the concrete, it is not saying anything more than that an energetic capacity for reasoning, from

its very perfection, may become impatient of what, at first sight, must appear simply and obstinately opposed to it; and that it is necessary for the reason's perfection that it should deny the validity and the use of that for which it cannot give a reason. It is even right, as we learn from the history of philosophic thought, that reason should proceed from denying to affirming—for only through denial does the whole nature of what is denied become forced into expression. But, then, the reason in the individual cannot do this without the danger of a loss to the whole being at least for a prolonged period. It is the whole problem of sin. "Yea, hath God said?" "Does the conscience forbid?" "Well, even if God hath said, even if the conscience does forbid, it is only by trial that the truth can be found—let us try."

And what reason says is true, as far as it goes; it is only reasoned experience which shows that if everything is to be tried man will never be able to get at any straight line of life and plan of living; any course that can be pursued and achieved at all; for it is not reason, but experience, which shows that the choice of things which might be tried, is infinite.

The reasoned experience, then, in the race comes to the help of reason in the individual and says:—"These vague intimations which you distrust point to a fact. They are the hereditary instinct which warns us against what makes for the destruction of man. They are not really destructive of the reason, but though they seem to ignore

reasoning they are necessary to the preservation of the reason—nay, so necessary, so welded together are they with the course of nature and the cosmic process and so strict a line of orientation have they observed from the very first, that, vague as they are, the human race could not have remained in being had they not existed and been diligently attended to;—so that men have everywhere come to regard them with the greatest reverence, listen for what they may seem to say with the keenest attention and, even though they seem to contradict themselves on particular points, have everywhere come to regard them as oracles, as Divine intimations, as the voice of God in the soul of man.”

Here reason in the mass, having come to regard man as an organic whole, not by the mere exercise of its special faculty, but by the force of circumstances combined with that exercise, comes to the aid, or to the correction, of reason in the individual. And this is the authority without, which answers to conscience within. Now Dr. Fairbairn is very angry with Newman because he finds the characteristic element in the conscience, in religion and Christianity, to be the fear of retribution. And he scoffs at Newman for quoting Lucretius as the best authority for describing Pagan religion. Dr. Fairbairn accuses Newman of finding the very idea of religion in the sense of sin. Newman does not say “the idea”—but the characteristic which distinguished religion externally, the typical

element upon which an enemy of religion would fix. Newman quotes Lucretius as an external testimony to what a man going by reason alone finds offensive and unreasonable in religion. He hits at once upon its fear, its cowering terror, its sense of retribution. Dr. Fairbairn says that this fear was irrational; that Lucretius did right in condemning it, that it belonged to a religion which was by no means pure and which was almost entirely non-moral.

Ah,—but this is the very point! It is in this sense of retribution that the religious element showed its connection with morality; it is here that the thing especially characteristic of the religious conception of morals as opposed to the merely rationalistic conception of morals, began to grow up. It is at this point that religion comes first to be seen as an interpreter and an enforcer of the moral sense—beyond what the reason by itself would ever have discovered. True it is that superstition which regards the awful sanctity of the gods with a cowering dread is, at first, more like a Devil worship than the worship of God. But alas! such is the infinite pathos of human nature that it cannot make a step forward in the way of truth without at the same time falling into some error; and when man first began to feel for a Personal God—the God whose very Being is an awful sanctity—it was the sense of the contrast which first burnt itself into his heart; and the terror which results from his being so unlike that better self which he began vaguely to see in the Divine.

Reason, also, comes into the Divine presence;—and it comes, as the philosophers came, with a serene countenance,—easily and happily appreciating the infinite superiority of the Gods; and even if it appreciates their infinite nearness too, still it remains, even in the noblest,—“too much at ease in Zion.” Philosophers could feel the Divine; they could draw nearer to God; but it was the simple and ignorant man, filled with superstition, who knew best his own unworthiness and who first detected the shadow of the cross even in the bright religions of Paganism; who best discerned that one awful sanctity in the Divine which was the first intimation to the religious sense of the one God whose character is holiness.

Reason, indeed, may give the Divine, with a rational morality, and gives it, as to the great philosophers of antiquity, so also to Goethe, to Matthew Arnold, to all the serener tempered and more classical of the poets; but it is the primitive religious sense—intimately connected with the intrinsic necessity of morality—which expects in the Divine the awful sanctity of one supreme and personal Being.

So we have with the ancients a high morality and a serene and reasonable sense of the Divine; but with Christianity the cross and sanctity—the very genius of morality;—and it is no longer the wisdom which knew not God,—which shall judge the world,—but the saints and the awful sanctity of God.

Philosophers, then, regarded superstition as

mere waste and disease; Newman regards it as man's way of getting a new development in a sanctity based on the Personality of God.

It is not a little strange that Dr. Fairbairn should pay so little heed to this characteristic element in Christianity which even Matthew Arnold gives as the reason of its prolonged success and its great value to conduct;—the seriousness it gave to life, which he considers the characteristic difference of Christianity from the prevailing temper of Paganism. But it is stranger still that he makes nothing at all of the originality of *sanctity* which the author of "Ecce Homo" regards as *the very creation of that high development of the religious sense which we call Christianity*.

(6)

Now the claim which a Catholic makes for his Church is not what Dr. Fairbairn supposes it to be. It is not that the Church is the Christian religion—(as Dr. Fairbairn supposes) for there is still much in the Christian religion which the Church has not expressed; it is that the Church alone keeps to the front, in however crude or immature a fashion, the typical teachings of Christianity, attempts to realize them without explaining them away, and in realizing them slowly brings out the Idea which gave them birth. Thus, with the Church, the Eucharist may be expressed in philosophical terms which to modern philosophy may appear crude, but these terms were

intended to preserve the reality of the Presence which the Eucharist brings to man. So, again, the Church in describing the union of Christ with God insists on the reality and completeness of this union; and, whereas there are those outside the Church who say that it is a merely spiritual union, it is the habit of the Church to observe that this union is so intensely real and complete because it is spiritual. So with the Papacy and the kingdom of God on earth, however crude an expression the Papacy may be of the fact that the Church is a kingdom, it is the only way in which it was possible for the Church to insist on the reality of the kingship of Christ. It may acquire a deeper meaning and a further expression in the course of ages; but no clearer or more practical mode could have been conceived of keeping its reality before the minds of men.

So with the sense of sin, the doctrine of original sin and the teaching of St. Augustine may be insufficient for the time we live in;—but it represents a fact which has had its own special mode of development and on the reality of the fact the Church has ever insisted in a manner which cannot be mistaken.

A Catholic, then, claims for the Church that she has preserved as no other religious institution has done, the sense of reality in the great dogmas which represent Christianity; she has not allowed them to be explained away. The kingdom of Christ has not, with her, become a matter so vague that the word “kingdom” may mean little

more in the Christian Church than it means in such an expression as "the animal kingdom." The sense of sin has not been allowed to become so vague as to make the notion of sanctity impossible. The Eucharist, while continuing to be a memorial, has never become a mere memorial. The Divinity of Christ has never become a mere mode of expressing what is more than usually heroic or virtuous.

In consequence of the preservation of the great elements in Christianity as *real*, though sometimes crudely and as it were pictorially expressed, the special characteristics of Christianity still belong to the Church; the main lines of its truths are preserved; the main conception of its sanctity remains. The Catholic claims for the Church, then, that it has preserved a dogma which is true and a conception of life which insists on sanctity—and that these two things work together to produce both truth and holiness. But the Catholic does not, therefore, consider, as Dr. Fairbairn thinks, that the Church is his religion. In everything short of this dogma and this sanctity the Catholic is ready to admit that the Church has failed, again and again, to realize its ideal or to be a complete representative of its religion.

(7)

A very considerable portion, then, of Dr. Fairbairn's general indictment against the actual dominion of the Church, a Catholic may readily admit. Indeed, in some cases, he may go further

in reprobation of the line taken by authority than Dr. Fairbairn himself; for a large part of what Dr. Fairbairn has to say is directed against the Church only as an ecclesiastical institution.

In this sense it is certainly true that in maintaining the real nature of the kingdom of Christ, power has constantly been exercised in too absolute a manner, and the inevitable conservatism of all ancient institutions has been expressed in terms of an obscurantist nihilism. The Church, says Dr. Fairbairn, had in her hands the whole intellect of Europe before the Reformation; she is, therefore, responsible for the loss of the Reformers. The Church had in her hands the whole intellect of France before Voltaire and Diderot. "During centuries the Church had been supreme; hers had been the hands that made the men, hers the mind that made Europe; and if the issue of all her doings and endeavours were the revolt, could she be guiltless, or as wise as she must be to make her infallibility of any avail, or make it anything more than an ability to do great things if she only knew how?" Who pretends that the Church was guiltless? Indeed, there are few who would now deny that had the authorities treated the great pioneer of criticism, Simon, with common justice and common consideration, the chief weapons of 18th century scepticism would have been struck out of the hands of its most brilliant representatives and the Revolution in France, though it might still have been a revolt against feudalism might not have been, in any considerable degree,

a revolt against Christianity or Catholicism; for Simon had seen how the freest criticism could be united with the most ardent belief in the truth of the Catholic religion and was consistent with a living Catholic religion alone, but, when he was condemned, every one of the points which he had made were turned against the Church which condemned him.

But if the minds of great ecclesiastics, like Bossuet, were unequal to the task of reconciling one side of the Church's development with another—is that a proof that the doctrines of the Church were responsible for the loss of Voltaire and Diderot? If the Church had in her hands the truth she could not have lost some of her greatest sons, it is argued. But if the Church had not the truth, who is responsible for the loss of the Church herself to the true teaching of Christ? If the Church is responsible for the loss of Voltaire, who is responsible for the loss of the Church? The failure of the Church to retain the true teaching of Christ was owing, Dr. Fairbairn thinks, to the fact that the germ was mistated and misrepresented by mere human teaching and the influence of the environment in which it grew. But how is it, if the germ had in it the truth, that it lost its hold over some of the greatest minds of the early centuries? If Dr. Fairbairn makes the teaching of the Church responsible for the anti-Christian character of the French revolution, he must apply the same reasoning to the teaching of the apostles in the first century of Christianity—and that

teaching must itself be responsible for the easy corruption of Christianity which began to take place so soon in the first ages for the Church. But if that teaching itself was to blame then, in accordance with this reasoning, the ultimate responsibility must rest with Christ Himself.

If, again, it was to the fact that the germ was left to the influence of its environment and the distortions of human reason that Christianity so soon became corrupt—what are we to say of Dr. Fairbairn's belief in human reason as opposed to Newman's distrust of it? Who is trusting most to human reason here—Newman, who considers that the germ, containing truth and a great and deep idea, could be safely left to the environment of human reason and the protection of Providence, or Dr. Fairbairn, who considers that it must inevitably have been distorted?—Newman, who believes that human reason brought truth to truth and aided in the development of the Christian Idea, (though only in one set of its aspects after another), or Dr. Fairbairn, who thinks that human reason failed to recognize the truth as it really was, overlaid it by accretions of its own, did not bring truth to truth, but modified, stunted, tortured, and twisted it out of all recognition—till men might be excused for turning away from it as, on the whole, more false than true? If it is suicidal for Newman to distrust the reason in the individual, why is it not suicidal for Dr. Fairbairn to distrust the reason in the mass? But, as Dr. Fairbairn ought surely to allow, Newman does not make an absolute claim

for reason even in the development of the Church. He does not deny that there are eternal ideas or that man, in the long run, is ruled by them; but Dr. Fairbairn blames him for saying that these ideas are "not sufficiently commanding for public union and action," as giving too small a power to ideas. But Newman is inclined to allow more power to ideas which are true and are protected by the providence of God than Dr. Fairbairn, for he considers that, by its intrinsic power and the protection of God, the germ idea of Christianity probably survived, absorbed, transcended and made use of the influences which came to it from without and is present now in the Christian Church.

He does not, however, pretend that the Church so far changed human nature as to make ideas of themselves sufficiently commanding for public union and action. He is ready to admit, as he does expressly admit, that the Popes have not always stirred up the Divine gift which is within them. He is ready to admit that this treasure is in earthen vessels. It may be true, then, that for the loss of a great part of Christendom and for the failure to gain so large a part of the world the Church is chiefly responsible. The Church may have made too absolute a claim for the truth she held; may have asserted her authority too much as from above, too little as connatural to, and in consonance with, the human reason. It may have been—indeed, few Catholics will deny that it was—the obscurantism of ecclesiastics which lost to

the Church the vigorous French intellect of the 18th century. No modern Catholic historian worth mentioning will deny that it was, to a great extent, the laxity of churchmen which lost to the Church the rugged intellect of the reformers. Nay, even in the early Church, Newman does not deny that many a heretic was condemned for the premature utterance of what turned out afterwards to be true, and it is possible that Newman would admit, in these cases as he certainly does in others, that such heretics might sometimes have been treated more leniently and that authority was sometimes as much to blame for precipitating a heresy as the heretic for incurring it.

He goes further than this. He allows that heretics sometimes argued with better logic, with more patience, courtesy and enlightenment than their orthodox opponents. There has been abundant waste, as in nature, so in the Church, in the preservation of the type. There has been inevitable disaster here and there. There has been unnecessary disaster over and over again—and the question where the personal responsibility must rest cannot be answered till the end of time. But all this does not touch Newman's main contention, that, in spite of incidental corruption and ecclesiastical tyranny, the Church has preserved the type and represented Christian consciousness in the main, has never let drop the reality of Christian teaching, has not allowed it to be explained away, has represented, age after age, in the fullest and richest and most complex form

we can hope to get, one set of aspects after another, of the Christian idea; harmonized them and set them forth as a consistent whole in a manner which no other Christian community has dared to do; while reconciling and assimilating masses of religious thought from every age and from every quarter.

None of the admissions which have been made touch the contention that it is in the main stream of Christian tradition that the Christian idea is still most harmoniously and most richly,—though not yet completely, expressed, and where it may alone be finally realized—partly because it *is* the main stream and because there has been no break in its continuity.

And so Newman would argue, that even if the Papacy be but a crude and approximate centre of unity and means of expressing that “unity in multitude” which Pascal found essential to the Christian Church, yet it is only here that man will ultimately be able to find the basis for a complete and organic development of Christianity.

It is here—where the “whole pell mell of human life” is to be found and the greatest attempt to reconcile opposites has been made and the richest realization of the Christian type has been possible;—and not in the efforts of any individual;—that the Ideal Christ and the Idea that can only come through Him, must be realized.

(8)

In connection with Dr. Fairbairn's indictment of Newman we may, then, answer the questions which we drew out in the first chapter as to the main position of Newman (which so closely resembles that of Pascal) in the following manner.

How, it was asked, does Newman, from the premisses of scepticism come to the conclusions of faith? If he considers that the conclusions depend upon the right use of the reason, how does he find what is the right use of the reason?

It is on the perception that, for the individual and for the race, man must be considered as one and that the truth for which man makes is one, that the right use of the reason depends. It is by the use of what Newman called the "illative sense"—which brings "the whole man" to the task of making for truth; it is by the perception that action as well as thought takes part in the pursuit of truth; it is by the perception that it is only in the complete realization of type both in the individual and in the mass—in variety and in unity—that any proposition becomes realized so as to be "true" for the whole man or for the whole race.

It is conceivable that the ideas so realized are not true; that there is a reality which mocks the whole endeavour of man; but this is to make an arbitrary and gratuitous assumption—and the invention of such a reality—far beyond the scope of man's endeavour, may but be owing to the pathetic realization of the fact—that for no individual, for no generation, but only for the race,—

and then only in aspect after aspect, immanentially and not in its transcendent completeness, can the truth be known as it lies in the bosom of the Eternal. In comparison with its completeness all aspects of it may seem but poor and barren, all representations of it but feeble and immature—all its moralities but convention—all its law but a provocation to sin. But here the religious sense, with its great representatives in the conscience of man, in its special types, in the great religious races, has come to the redemption and consolation of man. The religious sense which is the elementary capacity for the recognition of law in the nature of man—to which morality itself may possibly owe its birth—goes beyond morality and the statical reason, and finds in the narrowness of all known law; in the insufficiency of all aspects and representations of truth; in the crudity of all discovered moralities—not a reason for despair, but a basis for hope. The very fact that man has this discontent with his law, his moralities, his representations of truth shows that he has a capacity for a truth more complete and that in breaking through a narrower law he may be finding his way to a higher and a deeper; a law which will ultimately reconcile the contradictions of his nature—the law which created him and made him what he is.

The complex differentiation of function, which has resulted from the evolution of man's brain and intellect, has been the cause of that separation of the reason and the religious sense or the conscience

—with which Dr. Fairbairn is so much perplexed in Newman's treatment of the subject. The separation of the moral sense from the religious sense may perplex Dr. Fairbairn still more, but its cause also lies in the differentiation of function which time makes ever clearer and more necessary.

But Newman did not separate these faculties in order to isolate, but in order to combine, and if Dr. Fairbairn had understood Newman's treatment of the illative sense he would have understood the nature of this combination. In order that man may be himself, he must realize his type; but his realization of his type is only possible when all his faculties are combined and acted on as belonging to a whole. In order that the religious idea may be itself, it must realize its type, but the realization of its type is only possible when man has become one and has combined in a Catholic organism. The great office of religion;—as it has been (as Newman considers) that which gave birth to the moral sense; is ultimately to become the means by which humanity is to acquire full consciousness of itself and both to set the individual at unity with himself and the race at unity with the laws of its being. It is the religious sense which (as Newman conceives it) set man making the great experiment by which these laws may be discovered; because it was the religious sense which presented such a discovery as possible and made man's discontent a reason for hope instead of a reason for despair.

With Newman, then, the satisfaction of man's

aspiration for the ideal should not begin with the question whether God is knowable, but with the question whether there is a religion for man. The question is not concerned with what man's knowledge—considered as finite and expressed in words, has been able to possess itself of and acquire; but what he has done with his thought, which is infinite. It is here, if anywhere, that there is any hope of finding whether man has or has not any necessary relation to what he calls God and worships.

(9)

In the next chapter—where we shall consider in what sense and at what point Newman ceased to be a traditionalist we shall be concerned with the inner answer to the questions here considered. The misapprehension of Newman's argument is so complete in Dr. Fairbairn and in those who before Dr. Fairbairn have taken up a similar position that in discussing their objections we find ourselves insensibly carried far away from the thesis with which Newman was really concerned. It may be asked, then, how so complete a misapprehension of a writer who, as Dr. Hort considers, has a genius for lucidity beyond almost any writer in history, should be possible?

I think the answer is that the blame lies partly with Newman himself and partly with his opponents. Newman's dislike of pedantry induced him to set on one side terminology which is almost necessary to the discussion of the problems he put

before him ; and, if it may be pleaded in his excuse that his writings are occasional and that he was bound to use popular language, this excuse will hardly avail for the " Grammar of Assent " which begins as a treatise and ends as a piece of popular apologetics. Dr. Fairbairn is thus able to use the common language of modern philosophy and contend that Newman, with his delicate eighteenth century style, fails to find an equivalent in expression for the problem he has got to solve. With all Newman's lucidity therefore, it is possible to make quotation after quotation which seems to imply the sort of absoluteness it was Newman's main endeavour to destroy. When we understand how much in the " Grammar of Assent " is written for the purpose of undermining scholasticism this misapprehension becomes impossible.

On the other hand, Newman's opponents, one and all, cannot rid themselves of the ordinary Protestant notion that in Newman, as with some Catholic writers, the principle of authority is something final and a short cut to the solution of religious problems. It was the aim of the " Grammar of Assent " to show that this is not so.

(4.)—NEWMAN AS MYSTIC.

THE INTERIOR ARGUMENT OF NEWMAN AND
PASCAL.

It is not true either of Pascal or of Newman (as has been too commonly supposed) that they abandoned rational metaphysic for a purely traditionalist theory of religion. They do not, indeed, deal immediately with metaphysic; but their peculiar use of the traditional argument differs from Traditionalism in this: that it is founded on the unity of a universal law. Pascal had discovered, as we learn from a single sentence in his *Pensées*, the possible beginning of moral law and of nature itself in what is scarcely less than a prophetic description of evolution; and Newman had found the meaning and value of religious tradition in a law of development which makes for the survival of the fittest in ideas as evolution in the life of nature.

"If habit is a second nature," says Pascal; "perhaps Nature is a first habit."

"To live is to change," says Newman carrying on this conception of development, "and to be perfect is to have changed often."

This constant onward journey of nature and the human race, though it is not at all times clearly

taught by either Pascal or Newman, is constantly implied by both of them; and is based on the immanental conception of the Divine in "the original constitution of man,"—which alone can account at once for his greatness and his misery; for the steady and unchanging consistency and growth of his religious hopes, his ever-increasing consciousness of his limitations; the slowly emerging unity of the moral law; the dignity acquired ever more completely by man as he becomes more and more conscious, though he be but a "reed" in the Universe, of the unity and progress of his thought.

The greatness of man consists in his thought; the greatness of thought in its unity—the unity which it is able to acquire within, and the unity which it is able to establish without, the man who thinks.

But in that man is, at the same time, the frailest of creatures and but an atom in the universe, his very greatness is to him a source of misery; and, if the greatness of his thought consists in the unity which it can attain, it leads him from that very attainment, to suspect the existence of a unity beyond him which is altogether unattainable. Were there any clear proof that God existed then might man be satisfied; were there any certainty that God did not exist, man might be content; but now that there is enough to set him on the search but not enough to assure him that he has been successful in it, he is driven to and fro in a hopeless quest and ever recurring misery.

Man is great because he seeks for God, and miserable because he cannot find him. And here Pascal finds that antimony of the nature of man which throws him alternately into scepticism and dogmatism, into Agnosticism and Gnosticism. But Pascal replies to both Dogmatist and Sceptic that man's misery and greatness point alike to the existence of the transcendent Unity of which they are in search or in despair of finding which they fall into misery. He replies alike to Humanity and to the solitary seeker after God—"In that thou hadst sought, thou hadst already found." The desire could not have grown up in a Universe, whether constantly evolving or created, in which there was nothing to respond to it; the hope could not spring up in a heart which was complete or could be at rest without the Divine; the search could not have been begun had not man already been compelled, by an exigency of his nature, to recognize both that there was a way and that there was a goal.

(1.)

But it is supposed that Newman and Pascal by the very fact of throwing man upon the religious tradition and demanding that he shall forego a speculative argument for God, are "vilifying" reason, become inconsistent with their own speculative position and commit themselves either to a fatal incoherency of thought or else to a scepticism from which they can only be rescued by

an arbitrary faith.* This misapprehension arises from the fact that men are "always for precipitating things"; that they will not take the arguments one by one but invariably expect that the whole argument, especially the whole argument for religion, shall be stated at once.

In the method which they adopt, Pascal and Newman, addressing themselves to men of the world and not to philosophers, were forced, in the first place, to deal with the concrete and were building up an external argument from an external unity in religious thought; but, in so doing they were making the way clear for the argument from that internal unity of which the external is a result and, when it is shown to exist, a proof.

To this internal unity, both for Pascal and for Newman, the inconsistency or the despair of the reason when left to itself, is a testimony; because there could not be despair had there not been the hope, nor the hope had there not been a prior unity in thought to inspire it.

I have already observed that Newman's conception of a tradition in religion did not include the notion (as it did with the Traditionalists) of a primitive revelation. Nor does that of Pascal. It is based on the internal revelation made to man by the exigencies of his nature in his battle with circumstance; in his attempt to discover what was suitable or necessary to that nature as a whole; in his endeavour to gain for himself his true environment, in thought and ideas as well as in fact and

* Some form of Mysticism.

in action. It was based on the unity of thought and the consistency of direction which was to be found in the religious experience of man.

If, then, Newman admits that there are opposite certitudes, and that certitude, in the individual, is no test of truth, he is rescued from the deadlock to which his adversaries consider him reduced, by that criterion of the sanity or insanity, the wisdom or folly, of certitude, which he found in the social and historical development of man. Those certitudes which survive and which can be tested dynamically as well as statically; those certitudes which are found to belong "to the whole man" and to be something more than the result of special operations of the intellect or the feelings, by the testimony of history and their power to build up civilizations, to develop and to grow as well as to survive;—those certitudes are, indeed, tests of truth. Aristotle holds no opinion to have become "certainty" until it can be said to reach to the greatest depth of our being. That which reaches the greatest depth of the being of man, under all circumstances, and in all time, belongs to the ultimate unity of his thought. It was to the sum and assimilated mass of religious experience (so far as time has enabled man to find it) as well as to the consistency, and fertility of its developments—its power to survive the thought that was opposed to it, its power to preserve its original type—that Newman yielded his assent when he entered the Catholic Church. In its attempt to secure the unity of human thought in religion

Newman finds the most general argument for the Church; because that opinion or belief which can stand the test of the greatest number of the states of our being is that which alone can have reached the greatest depths of being with which man is, as yet, acquainted. To the sum of religious thought in all the world as well as to its most consistent presentation in its modern form, I repeat, did Newman consider he yielded his assent on entering the Catholic Church; for he speaks, in a famous passage, of the Church as like the Divine child, sitting in the midst of the Doctors of Pagan thought and Gentile religion, both hearing them and asking them questions; and in its power to assimilate religious thought and religious practice from without, in all ages and in all lands, he finds one of the tests of the vitality and growth of the religious organism. The Child conceived as man was actually in ignorance and was then beginning to form for Himself that thought which through His teaching has gained so singular a sway in the world. The Child, conceived as the God of that Humanity which is finding its unity through Him, was bringing into a Divine coherence the elements of religious truth that lay scattered and isolated, in all parts of the world and among all conditions of men.

Now the great writers, on the Protestant side, do not deny the value and meaning of unity. All thought which progresses at all, if it arrives at any truth, must arrive at a certain consistency and must become at unity with itself. All thought, in every

department of life, is making for and attempting a unity. This they admit. But they deny that the Catholic Church presents us with a true unity. They say that it is, for the most part, an external uniformity brought about by coercion.

It is considered, therefore, that Pascal and Newman have recourse to the external unity of the Catholic Church because they are inwardly sceptical, and deny the power of man's reason to attain to unity except through the means of coercion and authority.

But this is not true of Newman or of Pascal or of the Church, but only of the "Traditionalism" which the Church has condemned.

The objection to Traditionalism is that it shuts up man's conception of God in the notion of a Primitive Revelation, and makes man dependent, for his religion, upon a revelation from without rather than upon the objective validity of his religious thought gained from the knowledge of its practical universality.

It, therefore, tends to make man find his spiritual freedom in the service of the Church which gives him the tradition rather than in the service of God to Whom that tradition testifies. It has the effect, which has been observed wherever it has prevailed, whether in the Catholic or Protestant Churches (for it has, at times, prevailed in both) of making men cultivate obedience at the expense of originality; of encouraging general servitude of the mind rather than that kind of service which is itself man's perfect freedom and of

checking the progress of the very religion to which it owes its existence.

And in this way, traditionalism came into direct opposition to the religious tradition itself. For, in its Christian form, this tradition testifies to the fact that man has a law *within* him which differentiates right from wrong, "his conscience accusing or else excusing" and a power *within* him of seeking after God in which lies the very meaning of man's belief in the Divine. Man, indeed, receives the object of his religious nature from without and by means of tradition and through other men; but not only is the evolution of this religious nature, which calls for such an object, conceived by the religious tradition as springing up from within man at the beginning; but in every generation the whole process starts again from the beginning in every individual.

Every man is bidden by that tradition to seek and to find for himself the God which it presents to him.

Moreover, it is in man's power to change and to deepen his conception of God that the strongest proof of the progressive unity of his thought resides. The depth and plausibility of modern Agnosticism is only negative proof of the existence in man of this power to develop and to enlarge his religion. The religious tradition, then, is conceived by the Church as absorbing and taking up into itself all the affirmative results of the ever renewed struggle of man's soul in his search for the unity of his thought, in every generation and

in every individual; whereas traditionalism conceives of the existence of God as a definite external fact, revealed once for all to man from without, and having nothing to do with the development of man's religious sense from within or that immanent revelation which is the only revelation to which history can testify.

If we now return to Pascal we shall find that this line of thought was familiar to him. The external unity of the Church is prior, in his mind, to the coercion which attempts to preserve it, and is itself the result of an interior unity in the thought of man of which it is the best evidence and the clearest proof. There is coercion; and coercion has been pressed to an extreme; but it is coercion in the name of consistency, of growth and of interior unity. It has sometimes gone so far (we now commonly perceive) as to prevent the very growth, and to endanger the very unity of thought in whose behalf it was said to be employed. But it was not prior to the unity; it was not the cause of the unity; which actually exists.

It was a protest on behalf of the whole against the part; it was the protest of man taken as a moral, religious and social, as well as an intellectual, being, against speculations which regarded him under one aspect alone. It was a protest in favour of social and religious unity, as necessary to the "wholeness" even of the individual, against the individualism which would break it up into sectarianism, provincialism or nationalism. It was a protest in favour of what had been found

suitable to the whole nature of man, against private and particular conceptions, which would shut him up in one period of his thought or in a single form of his activity.

It will be found that in their attitude towards reason and speculation in the individual and in the mass Burke, Pascal and Newman are remarkably in agreement. The unity of human thought is, for each, to be found in the mass. Neither one nor the other vilifies the intellect; but all alike question the validity of its testimony when it stands alone; whether in the individual as opposed to the race or in the name of a particular faculty as opposed to the unity of the whole man. When Burke speaks of what is suitable to the whole nature of man and opposes this to theories of individuals which do but answer to one part of his being, he appeals to that kind of expedience which has been found by experience to set man at unity with himself. He appeals on behalf of reason in the mass against particular theory and speculation. He does not, he says, condemn theory or speculation, because that would be to vilify reason itself; but he requires of such theory or speculation that it should first reckon with reason in the mass and be submitted to the touchstone of experience in that region political or religious with which the theory or speculation is concerned; because that experience, in politics and religion (which have an immediate practical bearing) shows the results, and testifies to the unity, of the reason of man exercised on the largest

scale and connected with the greatest number of the states of man's being which we can bring to bear on the subject in question.

When Newman speaks of eternal ideas as discoverable by man but as not sufficiently commanding to be made a basis for common union and action, he means that men are commonly incapable of ideas if they are to be discovered by speculation and by theory, and that only *such ideas* as are presented by means of religion so as to bring unity into all the processes of man's life and so as to be suitable to his whole nature and to all the states of it, are in a position to command, because they alone admit of a practical as well as an intellectual test; they alone can be submitted to the test of a long experience and the deeper expediency; and they alone can give to men (taken in the mass) any chance of unity in thought or consistency in action. What the man of genius or the philosopher may discover by the immediate action of his intellect, the human race discovers by experiment, by action, by the slow processes of experience; and, while the man of genius has made his discovery only on the lines of intellect, the human race finds for the truth discovered a basis broader and more secure by finding its relation to all the exigencies of man's being and all the conditions of his feelings.

Both the philosopher and the race of which he forms a part are making for, and express, the unity of man's thought; but the race can do what the philosopher cannot, can find by experience how

the whole being of man is a result of unity profounder still—a unity of which the unity of thought is but a particular expression. It is in the unity of man's moral and spiritual as well as his intellectual being; it is in the fact that a certain external and voluntary unity in these things has been attainable by man—and is ever more and more to be attained—that is to be found the first and most easily recognizable testimony to the absolute unity of the Universe in which man's being is assumed by the Church to be founded.

By making this experiment on this assumption, man has found one of the ways of discovering whether the assumption is true. His progress, his civilization as well as his religious unity (though all three are yet far from the ideal attainment) are yet each of them strong testimony to the truth of the assumption; for they show a unity gained amid the greatest difference yet known to man; a unity between races opposed by temperament, by blood and by temper more than any races that have had any unity at all before; a unity of a greater variety of races; and a unity (where it is attained) more remarkable than any heretofore experienced because it is deeper, more complex and more inward and has met with a greater number of streams of tendency in opposite directions than the unities attained on so stupendous scale (from similar causes and with a similar testimony to the unity at the base of things) in India, China, and among Oriental races generally.

It is not, then, reason in the great mass of

men; it is not reason where it represents and attempts to unify the whole of man's experience; it is not thought contemplated as one great whole against which Burke or Newman make any protest, —but the intellect of the individual attempting to found in terms of the intellect alone a basis for that human nature which is still on its way to completeness and with which the intellect may not even yet be completely acquainted.

For if there is already to be found in the world an immanent unity, not less certain is it that there is, in the future, a unity which transcends it. The sciences could not exist without this unity in the past; but all scientific men are agreed that this is nothing to the progress and systematization which must happen in the future. But this progress and systematization are nothing else but a tendency to, and a realization of, a unity even more complex, even more remarkable, even more extended in its sway.

When Pascal, too, speaks of thought as that which confers dignity and greatness on man but at the same time uses expressions of despair about the limitations of man's reason; when he exalts man's power to seek, but mourns his inability to find, the unity of the universe; he is no more inconsistent with himself than are Burke and Newman.

Thought it is which has given to man the very conception of any unity at all. But thought alone cannot find, and by itself, would not even seek, that unity whose discovery is dependent upon a motive derived from the dynamics of man's nature.

"The heart has reasons that the reason knows not of," and it is the heart that adds an impulse to the intellect ere it can search with unwearied patience and in the very fact of searching find.

Reason by itself; reason without the emotions; reason, taken as intellect, and not representing the whole man, would rest satisfied before the whole nature of the unity it seeks was discovered; for the intellect in isolation demands unity indeed but not absolute unity,—not a unity which shall satisfy heart as well as mind. Not until the intellect has learnt to understand and to represent the whole man does this absolute unity appear to it, what in fact it then becomes, an intellectual as well as a religious and moral necessity.

Nevertheless, the reply of Pascal, if we examine it in the light of what has now been said, is an answer to the reason as well as to the religious sense. We may sum up Pascal's account of the sceptical side of man's nature in the answer which it gives to the question "Can man by searching find out God?" The sceptical side of man answers "No."

We may sum up the dogmatic side of man's nature by its answer to the same question; for it answers "Yes."

But Pascal says that both are right and both are wrong.

By no direct speculative argument can man arrive at the absolute or the infinite; and therefore the dogmatist is wrong. He must first assume the very thing he wants to prove.

But man does seek for the absolute and the infinite and could not do so if he were not already aware that there was something to be sought; were he not aware of some privation of what must in some sense also be his. He could not discover or invent an exigency of his nature which did not belong to it prior to all thought and before he had begun to enquire. And, therefore, the sceptic also is wrong, for he must deny, not only that the search can be successful, but that it could ever have been begun.

To both, to all, to Humanity at large and to the individual, Pascal makes God reply "In that thou hadst sought Me, thou hadst already found Me."

It is the answer of the unity of man's thought to all his particular thinking; it is the answer of the unity of the Universe to all particular investigation; it is the answer of absolute unity to all thought, to all enquiry and to all prayer.

And as it is the answer to these; so is it the sole justification for all thought, for all enquiry, for all prayer.

Were not the universe based on an absolute unity not only would all prayer be vain (for there would be no unity higher or deeper than man's, the most complex and the latest unity the universe has developed, with which he could unite himself), but all inquiry would be useless and all thought impossible. Two intelligible words spoken by a child are the result of a tendency to unity at which it has taken that tendency billions of years to

arrive; but the earliest expression of that tendency could not have existed did it not answer to the nature of the Universe itself. No number of instances, however great, proves an absolute unity but all these instances prove the taking for granted such a unity in the process of things before any consciousness of unity was possible.

Now in arguing at all, the sceptic is compelled to assume the objective unity of thought, and in admitting the progressive unity of the sciences he is compelled to admit the practical universality of this unity. Here, then, an objective unity has been borne within the subjective consciousness. The only assertion left for the sceptic is that it may be an illusion, and that therefore all certitude remains impossible.

But we have only found out that there is such a thing as illusion by comparing it with this objective unity. Without this objective unity we should have no conception of the meaning of illusion. It is only then by arbitrarily assuming the possible existence of a reality more real than the only reality we know that the sceptic can justify his suspicion that this reality is an illusion.

The sceptic has a right to his position simply because it is possible to thought; nor is scepticism without a place in the history of religion. It points to the necessary limitations of our faculty and proves that we cannot include the whole of possibility in any conceivable system.

It is, at this point, that Newman and Pascal part company altogether with the dogmatist,

though they cannot be said to join with the sceptic. The dogmatist, indeed, admits the possibility of doubt in words but seems to deny it in fact. But the difference between Pascal and Newman on one side and the sceptic on the other is that the sceptic considers possibility a sufficient reason for practical doubt whether the speculative unity is valid at all; whereas Newman and Pascal consider it sufficient only to prove a limitation of our faculties. And this limitation does not prove that the absolute unity, for which these faculties seek, does not exist; but, that it is not to be found in subject alone or without it alone, but in that unity which is called absolute only because it completely unites two kinds of reality into one.

The doubt is sufficient to prove a mystery but not to demonstrate illusion; to make God incomprehensible but not to make Him unknowable; to make the ultimate unity of man's thought only partially attainable by man but not to remove the fact of an ultimate unity (pre-supposed in the totality of man's being) from his nature as the only object for which he can employ those energies which most differentiate him from the brutes; the only environment in which the most distinctive part of his developed being can exist at all.

Now it is on the unity of the moral being of man and the unity of the religious element within him that Newman lays most stress.

To this element in man it is in the first place that Pascal addresses the Divine words "Thou hadst not sought Me, hadst thou not already found

Me." It is, in the first place, an answer to the solitary seeker after God, and, only in the next, the answer of the unity of the Universe to all the inquiry and all the thoughts of man.

And it is the religious element in man which first set him seeking not merely for an ideal life nor only for the ideal, but for a law that should be absolute and a unity which should transcend and should absorb all the unities of life.

Conscience, as Newman conceives it, is not a law but a feeling for a law; not the dictate of a law-giver but the consciousness that there is a law—a unity in the moral being of man like, but transcending, the unity of his thought in other things. It is not a testimony to the existence of a uniform, moral law throughout the world of men, for its testimony is inconsistent and one kind of moral law is held the true one here and another there. But it began, whenever it began, as a sense that a law there is. And in seeking it had already begun to find,—not indeed the perfect law of liberty—but yet a law of some sort, suitable to its condition, tentative and hypothetical in fact but peremptory and stern enough in its dictates.

Throw back the argument which Newman uses for the Church, on the basis of development, and apply it to the slowly emerging sense of morality and religion and we shall find that the development of the conscience was altogether similar to the development of the Church. The gradual attainment of unity in the moral being of man, because he unconsciously started on a single

inevitable line of orientation till he discovered the notion of right and wrong and could give his new consciousness a name; with all the difficulties he encountered; with all the inconsistencies into which he fell, with all the comparisons of tradition with tradition which occurred as one race came into contact with another; with all the various stages of development through which he passed; is, in every respect, parallel, to the slow development and complex unity of the religious idea in the Christian Church—a culminating point and continuation of the history of conscience in the world.

Newman, strangely enough, never explicitly accepted the principle of evolution in man, though he probably held it in some form peculiar to himself. But so far from there being any inconsistency between his conception of religion and the doctrine of evolution, one can hardly be said to be consistent without the other.

The moral certitudes, slowly gained by the conscience of man, are parallel to the religious certitudes, slowly developed by the Church; admit of the same tests, are liable to the same corruption, are proved sane or insane, suitable or unsuitable to the whole nature of man, by the same method.

And, as nature testifies to the absolute unity of the Universe in which she lies, so man also adds, in his complex moral development, one more testimony to that unity of which it is but an ever clearer result, an ever profounder symbol, an ever deepening proof.

This, then, is the interior argument for

judging by their survival or decay, their growth or decline, of the sanity or insanity of those religious certitudes upon which the great religious tradition of humanity is founded.

It is only when seen in the mass and in this complete social aspect; it is only when they have received the confirmation of centuries and of progress that the fact of their being a food to humanity and not a poison, at unity with the whole nature of man, expedient to the unity of his thought and to his unity with himself and inspiring to his organic development, that these certitudes (so often opposed in their expression when contemplated in isolation) no longer lead to that deadlock which arises from contradiction, but point to the fact that they are founded on a Unity which must go on, for all time, increasing their intensity and enlarging their scope.

The Church, then, thus regarded, began with the beginning of conscience; has developed in accordance with the same law and claims the allegiance of man on the same title. It is, as a society, heir by default to all that the conscience and religious element in man have been able to acquire, on a social basis, consistently with his intellectual and scientific progress.

But it is also more than this. It testifies by its unity and by its development alike to the unity of the religious thought of man and to the absolute unity to belief in which it owes its existence; whose reality is an article of its creed;

of whose universal sway it is at once a representative, an instance and an exponent.

“In that thou hadst sought, thou hadst already found.”

I have said that these words are addressed first to the solitary seeker after God and only in the second place to that Humanity which has been seeking God ever since it has appeared on the stage of history. And in these words may be found the reconciliation between the individualistic and the social conception of religion.

“Woe unto him that is alone,” says Lamennais, the great champion of Traditionalism. “Woe unto him that is alone;” says he to the solitary seeker after God; for, though he seek Him, he shall never find Him. From the great tradition of the human family alone can the Divine idea be learned, for from that testimony alone can man become assured of the validity of his thought; from the universality of its subjective certitudes or aspirations alone can their objective validity be proved; from a revelation made to Humanity at the beginning witnessed to by all the races of mankind and summed up and delivered to the individual by the Church—from such a tradition alone can man learn the articles of his creed. In this Traditionalism, condemned by the Pope, so thoughtful a writer as Tulloch finds the essence of Popery.

And yet most philosophers will allow, and Tulloch himself among them, that it is from the universality of the subjective laws of thought that

their objective validity is proved, if it can be proved at all.

And here it can scarcely be denied that Traditionalists were right, if they were not to fall into the scepticism which would deny that there is any objective validity in thought.

Why then were Traditionalists condemned?

There can, indeed, be little doubt that they were condemned too soon and in too peremptory a manner; nor do the advocates of the Papacy deny that Lamennais, their leader, was treated with a harshness and intolerance which amounted to little less than persecution. But, nevertheless, the Church had been thinking out the problem for many centuries before Lamennais appeared and had come to a conclusion not dissimilar to that which Tulloch expresses when he calls Traditionalism the essence of Popery. With Popery itself, perhaps, Tulloch was not very intimately acquainted; but he means that Traditionalism would lead at once to ecclesiastical tyranny and would destroy the religious liberty of the individual for ever. He means that in so far as the Church can be proved to have exercised an ecclesiastical tyranny, it was on a Traditionalistic basis that she had done so.

Yet it remains a fact that though the Church like other religious institutions, has sometimes fallen into Traditionalism, she has never explicitly committed herself to its teaching. And now she has explicitly condemned it.

Tulloch, then, may be right (and I think I can

show that he is) in saying that Traditionalism leads to tyranny and that wherever the Church exercised an ecclesiastical tyranny she did so on an unconsciously traditionalistic basis. He may be right in so saying and we may admit that he is right not only without coming into opposition with the explicit teaching of the Church but in full and perfect consonance with that teaching.

The Church condemned Traditionalism because it denied that man, as an individual and apart from Revelation, could arrive at the belief in God. The belief in God or the Divine is the basis of all religion. He who takes away the power of the individual to arrive at a belief in God, takes away his power to originate in religion at all, or so diminishes his power as to leave him helpless in the face of the Tradition which surrounds him and has given him the basis of the religion which he holds. Traditionalism, therefore, would seem to tend as a theory, to destroy originality and the religious liberty of man.

Universality is, indeed, the completest proof we have of the validity of our subjective reasoning; and the Church attempts to apply that test on as large a scale as is possible. But reasoning may be valid and may be universally true without having yet gained the assent of all mankind. Religious reasoning may be valid and may be universally true without having gained the assent of all religious persons. And the individual, apart from tradition, may have arrived at a basis for religion on grounds which he might justly

consider enough because he had no more. He might find, that is, something which answered sufficiently to the religious exigency of his nature to give him an object and to make life endurable. This would be his God and it would be his representation of what religion means by God.

The supposition of a being entirely solitary is necessary to explain the position, because the first directly conscious thought of religion must have occurred to an individual. It is necessary to conceive that any conscious being, even in complete solitude, might become aware of the religious exigencies of his nature and might supply them up to a certain point, from the very fact that he had found them.

The fact that he felt the need would present to him at once the nature of its satisfaction. In other words, *the fact that he was seeking would itself shew him that he had found.*

Such a being is ideal; because a man entirely solitary from his birth could scarcely be said to be capable of thought. But it illustrates the fact on which Pascal and the Church are relying that man (whether consciously or unconsciously) becomes satisfied of certain facts for himself; believes himself to be objective because he cannot help being aware of his own subjectivity and finds a test of the truth of his operations in the fact of his being compelled to live in accordance with them. His life is for him a test of truth. He can bring no objective test beyond his own belief in his objectivity to bear upon his operations; but he

believes in them because he has no other test and cannot live without them.

The Church, then, makes room for the reality and the depth and the truth of the arguments for a God that occur apart from her own tradition. She holds that, among her own people, the belief in God or the Divine or whatever else it is that the tradition presents to the individual, does not spring from the tradition alone or the authority of the Church, but also from an exigency of man's nature which would have demanded, sooner or later, something of this kind, whether it had been presented or not.

Tradition of some sort there must be, even in order that man should think; for words themselves come to man by a tradition. But words must have come into existence to serve the purposes of something very near to thought—that inchoate thought in which feeling first attempted to express itself. In this sense thought is prior to words. The Church, then, holds that the basis of religion does not rest on authority alone, on revelation alone or on tradition alone; but upon tradition as united with an exigency in the heart and intellect of the man who receives it. And as the tradition contributes something to the man who receives it, so he, too, is able to contribute something to the tradition which he receives. On this basis rests his power to originate in religious thought, and on this basis rests his religious liberty. And this religious liberty of the individual the Church proclaimed in her condemnation of Traditionalism.

Though it is commonly allowed that Lamennais was, in one sense, a representative of religious liberty, and Gregory XVI. in the same sense, a representative of religious tyranny when he condemned him; yet, in another and far deeper sense, the Pope, however, peremptory and premature his condemnation may have been, was, on this occasion the true champion of the liberty of mankind.

Still, without doubt, he acted despotically; and, strangely enough, the crude condemnation of Traditionalism may be taken as an instance of the Church's falling into the very error she condemned. For she fell into that arbitrary and mechanical mode of regarding tradition which allows no time for originality to mature; and thus refused to recognize that liberty in the individual which is logically necessary to her own position; because her tradition itself is dependent on the reason and on the free acceptance of fallible men.

It is necessary to make this perfectly clear because one of the ways in which Newman, and, through him, the Church has sometimes been attacked as sceptical, has been to say that he considers that a man can only come to believe in a God through the Church, or that a man could not believe in a God without believing in the Church. Whereas what he said was that a perfectly consistent mind which believed in a God would go on to believe in the Church.

(4)

I said some time ago that a popular religion would always be corrupt; that the Catholic Church represents a popular religion and that this popular religion is corrupt. If it is corrupt, then, it must have some characteristic vice; and its vice is superstition.

The exercise of authority in the Church is not always infallible, even in the opinion of Ultramontanes. If it is not always infallible, it may be, sometimes, tyrannous, despotic and peremptory. A popular religion has a vice and the authority, which represents it, may be expected to have some defect which is parallel to the vice of the popular religion.

In a Church, which has a powerful tradition, it might well be expected that, if it erred, it would err in making too arbitrary a use of its tradition. That is, its defect would be a tendency to fall into traditionalism. A Church, founded on the social as opposed to the individualistic idea, would have its defect in a tendency to exclude the individual. A Church which had aimed at systematization would have its defect in a tendency to exclude originality.

All these defects, in a certain degree and in temporary exhibitions of them, we may allow that authority in the Catholic Church has sometimes shown, without denying that an authority it is.

But, in the main and by her real teaching the Church holds a doctrine according to which the individual freely

receives and freely uses her tradition in sincere accordance with the religious experience of his own life. That is, she reconciles, in her doctrine, the individualistic and social conceptions of religion; though, in her practice, she has too often sacrificed the individual for the Society. In this sense, then, Tulloch is right when he said he regarded Traditionalism as the essence of Popery. When Church authority has fallen into traditionalism (a parallel defect to that of superstition in the people), it has exhibited all that peremptoriness, all that tyranny, all that unwillingness to give place to originality or to genius which Protestants usually associate with the word "Popery."

In her theory, then, the Church allows such liberty to the individual as will make his testimony to her truth equal to that of, at least, a unit in humanity. So far as she has done so in fact, her unity is real and significant.

Here, then, we may find an internal limit to the coercive authority of the Church—a limit which is part of the Church's teaching.

The individual is not regarded by the Church merely as a passive receptacle for her tradition. He accepts it, when he comes to years of discretion, because it answers to an exigency of his nature and he can only discover that it does so by the use of his reason. Any hypothesis which, from his own religious experience joined with the tradition seems possible to a *bona fide* member of the Catholic Society, however strange, however

original, however heterodox it may at first appear,—if it be presented as a hypothesis only and as long as it is not presented as a dogma—cannot be justly condemned by authority until it is proved to be false by the universal and certain consent of mankind.

If the individual has the liberties of a unit in a Society he may claim to be answered, if he argues; to be refuted, if he makes hypotheses; but as long as he does not usurp the rights of the Society, as a whole, he may claim immunity from condemnation. The error of Lamennais, then, and, far more, the error of the modern Traditionalism of conservative theologians consists in this: that, while they allow for a logical development and for such liberty in the individual as follows from it, they do not sufficiently realize that the great religious vision which the Church presents to mankind owes its immediate validity to the free testimony and active experience of the individuals who have freely accepted it as in accordance with the exigencies of their nature; who have had experience of that vision, though only in part; who can therefore, each for himself, give some account of it,—not indeed as if the particular vision were equal to the whole,—but in accordance with special religious opportunity and in terms free, fresh and original. It is only in consequence of this liberty, too often obscured and betrayed, that the Church has been able to produce, not only social reformers and saints, but the most strenuous individualists in

religion that the world can show—the vast host of mystics, the followers of St. Theresa and St. John of the Cross; not only Bossuet but Pascal; not only St. Francis Xavier but Tauler; not only More and Erasmus but Juliana of Norwich. Nothing can exceed the freedom which has been claimed by the mystics in the use of religious hypothesis. The freedom, then, is granted by the Church in theory, and must, in time, be granted, by the Church's representatives, to criticism and history as well as to mysticism.

From what has been said it will be obvious that the certitudes at which man has arrived, through the criterion offered by the Church, at one period of his existence, will often appear crudely expressed, at another period in which he is still more mature; especially if any particular stream of tendencies has borne him along a new line of thought and opened to him new vistas of being.

But the certitudes, for all that, may not be the less real or the less profound. The more ridiculous his expressions for his consciousness of the transcendental appear to him when his consciousness of the immanent is uppermost, the more his inner nature is crying out for some new expressions of transcendence to redress its balance.

But to live from the greatest depth of our being; to see that opposite desires may alike deserve fruition; that the desire for finality and the

desire for growth ; the desire for rest and the desire for action ; the desire to break down and the desire to build ; the desire to destroy and the desire to preserve may, at all times, be rightly felt and justly made motives of life—requires, above all things, things, patience and courage.

Whether man be matter or spirit, certain it is that he is suspended between two eternities and that he knows it. Deep calls unto deep and the breath of the upper and nether eternity,—the eternity whence he comes, the eternity whither he goes,—blows through his fragile being from the day of his birth to his death. What can he desire, then, with all the energies that being may possess, but to be at one with that which begat him and with that which shall, at last, receive him into its arms? What is his hope but that he may have peace and be at unity with these masters of his destiny?

Whether he be matter or spirit he has desires ; and his main desire must ever be the explanation and the underlying motive of all the desires he knows. To be at one with himself ; to be at one with all the depths of his being ; that he may rest on the eternal that is below him and that he may find room for all the complexity of his energy and all the passionate yearning of his nature in the eternity that is beyond him : this is the main desire of man.

But his desires, taken one by one, are as multitudinous and anarchical as they are pas-

sionate. How shall he reduce them to order and so give them the best chance of fruition? For he sees very early in the course of his long journey that the setting his desires in some kind of order is essential to their having any fruition at all.

The ordering things by a certain standard, the reducing of things to a certain unity, the making the less give way to the greater, the weaker to the stronger, the more superficial to the more profound—these interior actions began in the very animal or ever the animal conceived of itself as man.

In the mere matter of his brain, whether regarded as an expression of his spirit or as all that there is of his thought, the great tradition of man's intellectual unity began; and from this great tradition it would be arbitrary to exclude, at any point in its growth, however early, the conception of that sense of order, that desire for unity, which is represented by conscience.

And, indeed, conscience, as the desire for ultimate unity in morals, is the simplest of desires in its origin. It represents the desire for order unconnected with the thing to be set in order. It belongs, therefore, to anything that can be said to have desire; for, to all desire, a certain order is essential, that it may meet with its fruition. This must be done first and thus, in order that that may be done next at all.

If man, then, has developed so far as not only to have found a word for "being good at getting this or that," but a word for "being good in

morals"; if he has got so far that this "being good in morals" he calls goodness *par excellence*, so that he has not to use any other word, but is immediately understood; this order and unity in him have travelled a long way and must have gone, in the main, in one direction. Here, then, a distinct line of orientation has been acquired; here is the matured judgment of the species on one great general point; and, in this line of orientation, he has found and made for himself a criterion—a criterion of right and wrong, a criterion of what is good and better and best in action.

"Goodness" then has stood, in its many forms, high enough in his esteem. It stands higher than anything else, for, if he thinks well of goodness in intellect he is compelled to add a second expression, but "goodness" is, however grotesque a form of it may present itself, a word which by itself has come to mean a special sort of being good at a thing, and means man's satisfaction in one kind of action only.

In the face of so stupendous a triumph of the moral nature of man, all the future victories in man's search for unity are as nothing. To have found, however vaguely, that there is a unity such as this is as much greater than anything afterwards attained as the discovery of number is greater than the discovery of algebra. And yet what follows is greater in this: that it is built on what has been

already discovered and, if it stand, is a confirmation of all former discoveries.

Moreover, the sense of the malice of sin, the sense of moral responsibility, the fear of the Lord, the fear of some judgment to come or a judgment immediately to follow the deed, was the very characteristic of those religions which were regarded by men, who came to take a purely philosophical view of these matters, as superstitions. In this sense "fear made the gods" and fear was the parent of religion. But if the fear came first what created the fear? "No doubt, the dualism which man at once found in nature; the dualism which made nature his best friend and his most terrible enemy; the dualism which made him feel his intimate association and connection with the earth and the cruel necessity which compelled him to trust as his nearest ally one who invariably and inevitably at last betrayed him, crushed him to the earth and destroyed him. To primitive man the apparent dualism in things at once suggested an arbitrary being who changed his mind and repented that he had made man; or beings, some kindly and the others hostile, for ever interested in his career, watching his conduct and sometimes peering into his thoughts. Nevertheless, the process he was pursuing was a process of unification. He put together certain events as acts belonging to a particular kind of nature which he regarded as good. He put together another set of events as acts belonging to another

kind of nature which he regarded as evil. He ordered; he classified; he unified; and the very detection of difference was a means of advancing to unity. It was a process of unification which led to Polytheism as well as to Monotheism, and, as soon as a single law underlying and connecting the gods could be detected, the mind of man rushed with the speed of light to the one God who should be regarded as superior in power to the rest.

The process of unification is, indeed, merely the necessary course of the reasoning of man. He cannot do otherwise, if he would, and, if he applies his mind to what is called religion at all, he must think in this way, for this is the very nature of thinking.

If, then, the sceptic argues (as we all along allow he may) that the necessity for an absolute unity proved in the mind of man is no proof that an absolute unity there is, St. Thomas as well as Pascal and Newman reply that this argument may overthrow the metaphysical dogmatist or it may not; but it does not touch religion regarded as the necessary relation of man to all his expressions for God, the Divine, Infinity or Law. Even if there is no word in human language or thought in the human heart which answers even by analogy to the Divine as it really is, still there exists in man a necessary relation or "*habitus*" towards which he must act, in reference to which he must think, either consistently and on a plan or without any plan and in despair. He *has* acted towards it

on a plan and, as far as he can do so, he has lived experimentally on a consistently growing notion of the plan and he has, in one part of this world at least, found such a way of putting the matter as leaves both sides of his nature free and not only free but continually inspired to further action. Assuming the utility of his experiment, the validity of his mental operations even here, though they seem contradictory, from his success in the discovery of goodness in the past; assuming an end in which unity will ever more be gained, he has found a basis for thought and for action in which indefinite progress is promised and is possible. Let him assume, on the other hand, that the whole line of his orientation in the past has not been progress and has only resulted in negation (as is assumed in the great oriental religions) and his own capacity for progress is shut up in a single Agnostic formula, the dogma that no dogma is possible to man.

It is true that this is a conceivable conclusion and therefore a possible conclusion. It is true that truth about the absolute, truth about religion may be more real and real in an *infinitely* higher degree than the only reality he knows and that he is thereby precluded from the possibility of any kind of progress in regard to it. But the same possibility, the same conceivability is true also of the future; is true also of what may happen to-morrow. Every law which experience has taught us may conceivably cease to be valid not a generation hence but within an hour from the last thought in

our mind. Yet necessity compels us to think on as we have thought before. In a similar manner, therefore, man, having found that there is a way of thinking in religion, which, though it may conceivably not be valid for a reality higher than the only reality he knows, yet has been valid for his own progress in religion and in morals and, above all, in the union of the two in sanctity—valid for the individual in the conduct of his life and for his race also as the basis for progress; man, having discovered that this way of thinking in religion has validity in the only kind of reality he knows, may justly conclude that he may continue this way of thinking for a similar reason as that in accordance with which he thinks about the immediate future as dominated by the same laws as those he experiences to-day.

And this is not because he excludes the negative results of his thought. For he expressly includes them as necessary to the development of the affirmative results. But only because he refuses to allow the negative result such predominance as to exclude all further movement in his thought.

We mentioned in an earlier chapter the objection to Christianity (as the only representative of religion to be considered) derived from the long duration and persistent vitality of the Oriental religions. Sir L. Stephen had said that the reason for taking Christianity rather than another religion was the superiority of Western civilization. We answered that that was not the whole reason.

It is, above all, that the Eastern religions do not make their essential note Catholicity, the including the whole nature of man. At this point we may add that the argument mentioned by Sir L. Stephen may be turned round and looked at the other way. Easterns themselves allow that the points in which Christendom is superior are points which man owes to Christianity; while Catholics are ready to allow that the points in which the West is inferior to the East are points in which the eastern character of Christianity has not yet been sufficiently realized.

The Church, then, standing between God and man, represents both the negative and affirmative results of man's thought and finds both alike necessary to the great religious process in humanity. As representing man before God, she says: "In that I have sought Thee I have already found Thee." As representing God to man—whether the individual or the race, whether the result of his thought has been affirmative or negative she says: "In that thou hast sought Him, thou hast already found Him."

NEWMAN, PASCAL, LOISY AND THE
CATHOLIC CHURCH.

PART II

(1).—THE ACTUAL POSITION OF THE
CHURCH.

Is there, then, no such thing as a corruption in the Catholic Church? Must every development be a true one and must the accepted, the popular, the conventional view of religion always be the true one and the personal view the false?

No man has suffered more than Newman from this misapprehension of his argument in the *Essay on Development*. "A popular religion," he says, "will always be corrupt," and the Catholic religion is popular and will, therefore, as a popular religion, be corrupt.

The fact of applying tests to religion—the fact of applying tests to the development of the Catholic Church is, in itself, an appeal to the reason and conscience of individuals; and the Church has never disdained the use of argument or denied that her authority can only be defended by reason.

The Church does not exist to destroy, but to call forth, to exercise and to educate reason. But she demands that she should herself be regarded, at least, as a natural product; as a social phenomenon, in accordance with the needs, capacities, and social habitudes of man; and no man has a right to begin by assuming that she is outside the usual tests of

truth because she claims a supernatural origin or that her unity is no argument for her internal consistency because it is but the result of coercion. She does not deny that she is a subject for historical criticism, or rational enquiry; but she demands that, as in a natural phenomenon, the fact that she answers to some necessity of nature and has a meaning in the system of things shall be clearly apprehended by her critics or their criticism will be pointless and futile. Her doctrines and her development must be regarded as, in the first place, a natural process and not criticized from the first as an artificial growth, the invention of priests and a means of blinding the people.

After such inquiry has been made and such criticism has been attempted, it may be discovered that an artificial and coercive despotism, founded upon the inventions of priests, has been the true cause of the Church's enduring life and wide popularity. But this not very probable conclusion is too often regarded as a premise, and a philosopher like Mr. Morley does not hesitate to speak of the doctrine of future reward and punishment—one of the most ancient in the world—as if it had been the arbitrary invention of priests and had no roots and no growth from the very base and heart of human nature. In the name of truth such philosophers denounce Christian dogma as a legend; but in so doing they give an importance and validity to falsehood which can be convincing to none but sentimentalists.

The Church, then, does not regard herself as

perfect, but as having found the only possible way in which to make a great religious experiment, to organize and objectify the religious idea; to create and to continue an organism in which the religious process may be carried on. She does not say that she has accomplished her purpose in a manner the most perfect that could be conceived—far from it, she does but say, that she has done what she could; but she adds that if she has failed in her purpose it is not easy to see whom else she should regard as having succeeded, nor is it easy to find in the world an organism which has united experiment, consistency and advance in the religious idea, in an equal degree with herself.

She does not profess to have attained perfection or to have come to the end of her development, or to have lived out in its fulness, or as yet to be able to express "the main idea" of Christ. She has implicitly allowed—nay earnestly insisted on, the moral and intellectual imperfection from which she has suffered, in the fact that she commissioned the schoolmen to set forth in a new form the whole of her teaching and encouraged the Saints to reform, exhort, rebuke and train her people. She does not exist to coerce the intellect and will of the individual or to repress the conclusions of reason or to force mankind into an arbitrary unity. If coercion she has employed; if repression she has exercised; and thereby weakened the argument derived from an intrinsic and voluntary unity it was, at any rate, on behalf of that very progress which she seemed to prevent and in condemnation of that very finality

which she seemed to profess that time has shown her to have acted. For, as a fact, she has been in religion, the natural ground for *that struggle for existence between ideas*, that struggle between the past and the present, and that struggle between authority and the individual in which alone a survival of the fittest becomes possible, and order and continuity are united with progress, advance and development.

Outside the Church the struggle of ideas on the subject of religions has either become an endless controversy, as in the Protestant Churches, or has practically ceased, as in the Greek Church; while the purely intellectual discussion of religion has but given birth to theories which ever more tend to justify the course of purely religious development in the Church.

In this manner, every kind of idea—(Platonism, the Aristotelianism of the schools, the license of the Renaissance, the Puritanism of the Reaction, liberty and necessity, and an endless host of speculative philosophies) has been given a part in a struggle which is still going on; because only those which can prove their consistency with the continued vitality of the organism can ultimately survive, unless they succeed in killing the organism itself.

Now an organism must die that it may live;—must change that it may endure. The question is, have the changes in the Church been corruptions or have they been changes which are necessary to growth?

No one denies that some kind of vitality exists in the Church and no one denies that there is some kind of corruption. Is this a religious vitality and is it a vitality which shows itself consistent *in type* with that religious life whence it professes to be derived and on which it professes to be founded—the Christian religion as set forth by Christ? In the attempt to sum up and reconcile all religions and the whole religious idea has not the profounder religion been lost sight of and some sort of Paganism survived? or has not the Christian type, at least, been modified to the advantage of a type opposed to it?

So great an authority as Harnack adds his testimony to that of the Protestant communions by declaring that it has; that the Christian religion in the Catholic Church has become a cult, and that this is the very sort of religion which Christ came to destroy.

It has been said that every kind of religion must have the defect of its qualities. The vice of a subjective religion will be fanaticism; the vice of a religion which makes self-renunciation its chief object and insists on tradition will be superstition. From these defects will arise the kind of popular corruption incidental to the greatest religions from the very fact that they are popular.

Matthew Arnold considered that Protestantism had got the method of Jesus—His earnestness and inwardness; that Catholicism had kept His secret of self-renunciation and gentleness; and that both had

lost, except in the greatest of the saints, His reasonableness.

This representation of the matter is probably not far from the truth and it is borne out by Kant, who says that the defect of Protestantism has been fanaticism and the defect of Catholicism superstition, and this, from the nature of the case because the defect of an individualistic religion could hardly fail to be fanaticism and the defect of a social religion superstition.

But, if these are defects, they are, without doubt, the defects of qualities; and where the defects do not exist we shall hardly be likely to find the qualities, that is the religious spirit itself.

It is not, therefore, a very profound objection to a popular religion that it is a cult and has become superstitious, because a popular religion which has any life at all must be a cult, and will be sure to have those corruptions which arise from its characteristic defect, for a popular religion, says Newman, will always be corrupt.

The real objection would be founded on the completeness of this corruption and on the depth of this superstition. It must needs be that corruption should follow both the extension and the intensification of religion: the question is whether there was at the same time a development.

If Harnack is objecting to a religion becoming a cult and to a cult simply as such, the objection (as the Abbé Loisy observes) is really an objection to the social nature of man. If he is only objecting to the kind of superstition which is sure to exist in

a popular religion, he is objecting to a religion becoming popular. But if he means that the Catholic Church by her teaching has encouraged superstition for its own sake and has so enlarged its sway that true Christianity is in danger of perishing altogether, the point becomes a question of fact and we must inquire what sort of example the Church holds up to imitation and what kind of teaching she imparts.

Now, it is surely a significant fact that it should be in a Church which is considered to have so far forsaken the special teaching of the Gospel, *rather than among those who made it their boast to have returned to the Gospel* that those Saints who are considered by modern writers of all schools best to represent the spirit of Christ have, somehow or another, continued to arise. "There is more of Jesus," says Matthew Arnold, "in the little finger of St. Theresa, than in the whole body of John Knox." Nor can so Evangelical a writer as Sir James Stephen find any character in the Protestant world which so kindles his religious enthusiasm as the character of St. Francis Xavier. It is a Protestant writer in France who speaks in the same terms of St. Francis of Assisi. It is Carducci in Italy who adds his testimony to that of Sabatier. It is Castellar in Spain who adds his testimony to that of Carducci. It is the Positivist Cotter Morrison who gives a like position to St. Bernard.

If the Church, then, has among her people fallen so far into superstition as to fall away from Christ, it is not for want of a remedy within Herself nor for

want of the spirit of Christ in her teaching. Not only have these Saints been in great part at least the direct result of her teaching—but their lives are themselves a part of Her teaching and their writings are commended to the perusal, and their sanctity to the imitation, of all Catholic peoples. It is in vain to say that the Saints are the exception which prove the rule and that the Church is but building the sepulchres of her prophets in commending them, for she does not cease preaching in their very words and insisting daily on their example.

It would seem, then, that the superstition which exists and whose existence no one denies, how little so ever we may wish to defend it, or to excuse it, is but a part of that corruption inevitable to a popular religion and does not arise from, and is not of so gross a kind as to be characteristic of, an inward apostacy from the teaching and example of Jesus; but that, on the contrary, in spite of Her acknowledged developments and Her assimilation of that which is without, She still produces something which at any rate appears to persons who are not Catholics at all, more like the teaching and secret of Jesus than is to be found in reformed and Evangelical communions.

The Catholic religion, then, cannot rightly be said to have become a mere cult; to have fallen so far into superstition as to have lost the Christian type; to have so modified Christian teaching in the attempt (whether conscious or not) to reconcile all religions to itself, as to have become but a Chris-

tianised Paganism; to have become, in short, the very sort of religion which Christ came to destroy.

But it is a question whether there is any kind of religion which Christ came on earth to destroy. He said Himself that He had come not to destroy but to fulfil, nor did He treat the most superstitious expression of the religious spirit in the woman who hoped to be healed by the very touch of His garment as a matter for rebuke or contempt.

And the Church in dealing with Pagan nations—when she adopted much of their language, many of their rites and something of their ethos—was but following the example of her Master and refusing to convert by the imposition of ideas solely as from above. By thus acting perhaps she gained something for herself as well as for the converts who approached her. She acted on the principle that the Christian religion contained the deepest truth and ultimate unity of religious thought, but that other religions also contained something that was true. “Dig deep enough,” said the greatest of her Doctors, “into the human and you will find the Divine.”

The freedom to use Pagan ceremonies and to adopt something that remained of Pagan philosophy may have had its dangers and its scandals; but it was a freedom that had been slowly acquired by the ever increasing consciousness of the sovereignty, centrality and depth of the Christian religion. It was only by experience that the deeper meaning of Pagan thought and custom could be fully understood; and then it sometimes appeared

as if it was rather the fear of idols than the use of images which was a sign of an idolatrous habit of mind. When the Christian religion, by gathering into its embrace those who had had inner experience of Pagan worship, had ceased to be a party or a school or a sect, and had become a "world religion" it could regard all religions as in some degree expressions of its spirit and elaborations of its thought.

As I said just now that you cannot have the qualities of religion unless you have the defects—so now I add unless you have the corruptions you cannot have the developments: for it is of the very Pagan stuff out of which the corruption was made that the development became possible.

By a slow process; by the influence of one man here and another there; by the conversion of a philosopher in one place; by the gradual influx of the simpler Pagan crowd in another, the Christian Church came to inherit some of the deeper spiritual riches of the Gentiles; and, though sometimes at the cost of the individual here and there, the society gained the liberty, by giving Paganism a deeper interpretation, to use it in the service of Christ. The religious idea was compelled for many a year to travel along a narrow way, but it was brought forth at last into a wealthy place.

Therefore, that Catholicity, which at first did but mean the collection of traditions from all parts within the Christian Church, came to mean what it was inevitable in the nature of the case it should, from the first, actually imply,—the bringing into

one and gathering together of all the strongest facts and experiences of religion,—all elements in the religious idea wherever found which could prove their fitness by survival or their vitality by their growth or this “richness” by their capacity for a deeper interpretation;—all “truths of religion,” outside the Christian Church as well as within it. In this manner and on a basis of the deeper expediency, begun but not completed, attempted not achieved, a Catholic Church has alone any chance of becoming “Humanity grown conscious of itself.”

It is often the poor and the simple, with a few isolated scholars and mystics, who are the first to realize and to feel the benefits of this triumphant freedom. Untroubled by intellectualism or pietism, untrammelled by controversy and the mere appearance of consistency they have found pleasure in all that gives aid to their religious aspiration; and as to the pure all things are pure, so for them, without a thought of exterior consistency, an inner and deeper consistency of the spirit has been formed.

And it has been from this cause, rather than from her theological development that we are able to regard the church as “the fullest exponent and transmitter of life” in the world; not as she appears in controversy laden with texts and shackled with scholastic logic, though even there she sometimes takes a wider sweep and makes for a higher goal; not as she appears in Councils, in Synods, and in Congregations, though there also she has a vivid inspiration;

but in the full stream of her magnificent progress and with her people's shout of triumph in her ears; for there it is she is seen to be greater than the Ideals of the older civilisation, not because she has destroyed them, but because, set on the highest throne that she can offer, they are no longer rivals of the majesty of Christ.

It is because the throne of Christ is conceived as founded in the deepest part of man's nature, that it can thus be raised above all principalities and powers; and it is in the Church's recognition of the intrinsic glory of Christianity that her own glory altogether lies. She could never have shewn her confidence in the incommunicable greatness of Christ had she continued for ever blind to the intrinsic greatness of Pagan ideals or regarded the gods of the heathen as, in her first impulse and onset, she had been compelled to regard them. Christ's triumph must be shown to be no mere military victory in which opponents are not only vanquished but annihilated. The victory must be one in which all rivalry ceases because all that is great in the enemy is both transcended and absorbed.

Not yet can that victory be won; not yet has every enemy been thus brought into the embrace of God. But if "morality is" indeed "the nature of things"; if "the greatest thoughts come from the heart"; if it is from living out the true life that religious truth may best be secured; and if the saints are those who have had a genius for morality, that Church may, surely, be said to have got nearest the

nature of things, nearest the objective ground and basis of religion, which, with so full a recognition of Pagan worship and Pagan thought as to cause scandal to her enemies, has been able to produce the saints whom men, of whatever creed, have felt to be the highest and the best representatives of the spirit of Christ.

If that victory is ever to be won, here alone is the promise and the presage of our winning it. If the throne of Christ is founded not only in the hearts of a Judaized Christendom but in the heart of human nature itself, then it is not by a constant return to Primitive Ages or by a deeper interpretation of Hebrew prophets—how necessary soever in its place that return and that interpretation may be,—but by bringing the living Christian spirit, in its spontaneous growth, into contact with the living spirit of man and finding how, of its own nature and from its intrinsic depth, it goes beneath, absorbs and outdoes all the aspirations of the old religions—summing them up, explaining, transcending and uniting them—that the first steps in religious development must be made.

If it is a religion, which fills to the utmost edge and touches at its centre, the heart of humanity, that is necessary for man; if it is in the fact that the heart of man is naturally Christian that the deepest argument for Christianity lies; if it is in order that man, whether Jew or Greek, whether Protestant or Catholic, whether of the ancient or the modern spirit, should be enabled to realize his complete ideals, find the basis of his deepest

thought and transcend them both, that God is conceived as becoming man; if it is not by an isolated and circumscribed following of Christ—in the course of His life during the few years of His struggle with the Jews—that this universal spirit is to be attained and that man can be conceived as becoming God; but by taking the whole life of man and finding its interpretation and its basis in the universal and ever deepening consciousness of the Christian ideal; if Christ is indeed the God of humanity, then what He said of the religion of the Jews, He must be conceived as saying of all national and all ancient religions:—That He was not come to destroy but to complete; that not one jot of those laws, those hopes and those ideals should fail but that every one of them should be fulfilled.

(2).—THE IDEAL OF THE CHURCH.

THE TRUTH WHICH MAKES MAN FREE.

If it is true that “*morality is the nature of things*” and that the saints are persons who have “*a genius for morality*,” it is clear that the best way to get at the nature of things is through the morality of the saints. Again, if it is through the Church that humanity is to become completely conscious of itself; and if it is only through the nature of things that this end can be attained, the Church has not done amiss in giving so high a place to sanctity. But religion, which is the immediate concern of the saints, has been called “*morality, touched with emotion*”; while, according to Newman, it is anterior to morality, what brought morality into being, and the natural reformer, not only of men’s morals, but of their very conceptions of morality. Thus it would be to the saints that man should have recourse if he wishes to find experimentally the true place of religion in the order of his being. The Church, then, in the attempt to accomplish the great purpose of making humanity conscious of itself, was compelled to become, in the first place, the exponent and interpreter of religion and the organism in which the religious process should be carried on, and could scarcely do otherwise than entrust her reform, her preserva-

tion and the methods of her action to the saints rather than to persons of any other kind of excellence. Nor have some of the most determined among her opponents denied that the persons, to whom she has given so high a place and made the leaders in the great work which she has endeavoured to achieve, were, for the most part, worthy of the honour.

But, in order that humanity may attain complete consciousness of itself, nothing is more certain than that the intellect must have freedom and the power to use, in all directions, the whole of its resources. No one will deny that where the intellect is dead, there can be no other kind of life. It was from the fact that religion and morality were given by experience the very office of keeping the balance of man's nature and holding him true to it, that the Church came to possess any authority at all. If it should turn out, then, that the rule of sanctity has resulted in the collapse of intellect, the value of sanctity, in bringing about the great object of the Church, would be open to serious question. If sanctity is indeed a genius for the nature of things, and if the Church has ruled in accordance with the genius of the saints, intellect ought to be more completely liberated in the Church than outside it. Now, in her ideal, the Church has set up sanctity as her first object, and acted on the assumption that if men seek first the Kingdom of God and His righteousness, all other things shall be added to them. To those who do the will is made the promise that they shall know the doctrine

and philosophers who have studied the lives of the saints and the nature of sanctity, from their very desire to deny to sanctity a supernatural origin, have found themselves compelled to admit that the saints, nevertheless, hold a position which is but their due, because morality is the nature of things and sanctity is a genius for morality. Such philosophers have perceived, too, that as the variety in the character of sanctity gives the colour to life, and as each saint contributes a colour of his own, the union of all these in one Church which attempts to amalgamate them, may give that one light clear and dry which is the truth in the region of morals and religion. That division between the higher nature and the lower, the spiritual and the material, to which these philosophers justly object in speculation, they are ready to allow, has been experimentally established and rightly acted on by the saints, for even if there has been exaggeration in the sacrifice of the lower and the material, they maintain that without taking this kind of risk, the greatest triumphs humanity has won could never have been possible. So far all is simple and clear enough. But, when the saints are taken as themselves witnesses to the truth of the Catholic religion these philosophers reply that the Church has never properly made the truth an end; the truth has been regarded as a means and sanctity itself as the end. As there is a considerable difference of opinion among men in regard to what truth is, these philosophers do not, for the most part, attempt to show that there is a truth which the Church has

notoriously failed to attain, but they assert that official theologians have ever stood in the way of scientific progress and that the intellectual vitality of Catholics is a low one. This fact, they think, is enough to show that truth and the intellect have been neglected and even opposed by the Church. They acknowledge that the Church has produced in sanctity the finest flower of religious humanity, and that, in so doing, she has made a vast contribution to religious truth. They do not even go so far as to argue that the saints belong to the world and, therefore, are in no special sense witnesses to the truth of Catholicism. They allow that it is the very fact that the saints have significance for all the world which makes their significance, as witnesses to Catholicism, so far as it goes, valid for all the world. But they complain that the Church, having had the best opportunity for gathering the religious advantages which sanctity offers, has failed to reap those advantages and has left the task to philosophy and science. And the reason why the Church has failed, they consider to be the fact that she has discouraged all originality of thought, condemned all the movements which have arisen within her towards a modern systematization of her principles, and acted, in the sphere of intellect, in a manner directly opposed to the very axioms of life which she might have learnt, and which she has actually taught, from the lives of the saints. The saints refused to break the bruised reed or quench the smoking flax, and, with regard to the moral life, the Church which taught the saints,

has generally acted as they acted; but in the life of the intellect, it is said, she has acted on an opposite principle and invariably broken, when she could, the bruised reed and quenched the smoking flax.

In the moral and religious life, the saints have often been allowed a freedom which even Macaulay can praise as the result of politic prudence and a far-seeing wisdom; but in the life of the intellect we look in vain for "the liberty wherewith Christ" is said to have "made man free." In the breadth, variety, boldness and independence of the action of the saints, we find a testimony to the freedom of the City of God, and in this freedom we cannot but recognise a note of the Church of humanity; but, in the region of the intellect, the Church has imitated the rule of the Cæsars rather than the rule of the saints and lorded it over the flock of Christ.

Now we cannot, consistently with Christian teaching, deny that in order to realise to the full the ideal of Christ, the whole man must be free and that, in order to realise the ideal of the Church, the Church on earth, like that Jerusalem which is above, must be free, and that, in this sense, freedom is a note of the true Church. Christ did not come only to liberate man from the false Sabbath of the Rabbis, but from all the false Sabbaths which have interdicted the healthful and beneficent energies of man, whether in his practical or in his intellectual life. Were the Church to be represented only by the Inquisition, the Congregations and the Index,

or even as a purely clerical institution, her cause could be defended, at this day, by few. But here, it must be allowed to be a significant fact that, in spite of the narrowness of theologians, it has been in the Catholic Church, and not in communions which are supposed to have given most freedom to the intellect, that the pioneers in modern philosophy and modern criticism, Descartes and Simon, did actually arise. If the intellectual vitality of the Catholic Church had to be tested by the breadth of thought and depth of insight shown by official theologians, it would seem like irony to cite these great names in her defence. But official theologians are, from the necessity of the case, only one element, and that the conservative element, in the Church. Their duty is to preserve the consistency of the Church's teaching. To expect among officials like these, instances of progress or proofs of advance, would be like expecting an intelligence such as that of Lord Eldon, the greatest of English constitutional lawyers, to provide an instance of the progressive spirit of the English constitution. It may be admitted that official authority in the Church has exceeded the privilege of officials to be obstructive; that officials have done all that in them lay to represent the unity of the Church, not as a spontaneous unity arising from the depth and vitality of her teaching, but as an artificial uniformity brought about by tyranny and coercion. It may be admitted that, by their condemnation of so vast a number of philosophers, theologians and critics, they have at the present day brought

about a deadlock between thought and religion, and reduced authority to impotence. It were indeed vain to deny that there are officials who act as if they thought that the strength of an executive consisted in pushing its claims with peremptory violence and straining prerogative till it snaps. But these facts, which few deny, do but afford a clearer evidence how stupendous must be the vitality, and how profound the inward unity, of the Church, when even such a strain as this has not been able to suppress the one or to dissolve the other. If, in spite of this intolerant narrowness and this direct discouragement of all originality of thought; if, in spite of so rigid a conservatism and the avowed attempt to attain, by coercion, a merely external uniformity, some of the most original minds in the world have nevertheless appeared in the Church and thought it worth while rather to suffer persecution within than seek an individualistic liberty outside, it is surely a proof of the depth and vitality of an inward unity which none but the ignorant could confound with the uniformity of the drill-sergeant and the schoolmaster. A peremptory spirit in authority has done all that could be done by interdict, by threat and by terror to turn the unity of the Church into some such rigid uniformity as this; but the more resolutely the attempt has been made, only the more clearly has it been proved by the result that a deeper unity exists in spite of the officials—a unity which defies them now and will be their condemnation hereafter.

A witness to this intrinsic and free unity of thought in the Church do these great liberating spirits inevitably form. The point on which I am insisting is, not only that Descartes could find in the Catholic Church and nowhere else the basis for his "morale pour provision," or that Simon could find in its living authority the only security that a free criticism would not dissolve the Christian society; but that it is in the Catholic Church rather than in any other community that these first liberators of human thought should have actually arisen. Nor is it only by Descartes and Simon that this point is illustrated. The breath of the Time-spirit, which has destroyed the religious significance of so vast a number of Protestant writers about religion, has not only preserved but added to the significance of Catholic writers on religion, to that of Bossuet in his broad and massive treatment of society; to that of Pascal in his treatment of Christian apologetic; to that of More, Erasmus, Tauler, Mabillon, Maldonatus, and Fénelon.

It would not be too much to say that the kind of intellectual unity which subsists between these writers, so essentially different in temperament, is the firmest basis for hope in the intellectual progress of man in matters of religion which it is possible to find in the history of Christendom.

Can it be said that those Anglican and Protestant divines upon whom Mark Pattison and Matthew Arnold alike consider that the breath of the Time-

spirit has blown, perished because they deserved to perish, or that they failed from some intrinsic defect of intellect or of learning? Can it be said that Bull, Waterland, Thorndyke, Barrow, Tillotson, Sherlock, Stillingfleet were wanting in learning or in ability sufficient to cope with the problems before them? No, it cannot be said even of Tillotson, nor in the long run is it possible to doubt that some of them will receive in a larger Catholicism what is but their due, a recognised place in the City of God for which they laboured.

But, that men may acquire universal recognition and permanence, there must be some definite line of orientation on which they work; and, great as the contribution of these men sometimes was to polemic and to learning, they were so far hampered by their position as to fail to rise to the height which the argument required or to deal with great subjects greatly. They could defend a special rendering of Christianity with masculine vigour and acuteness, but they dared not make use of any positive development or take any positive line of advance. They had destroyed too much already to make progress on their own account, and progress along a definite line is necessary if any permanent advantage is to be gained.

But there cannot be any progress without some kind of continuity; there cannot be advance without some kind of consistency; there cannot be development without some means of relating the present to the past. In the sciences, continuity is preserved

by the consensus of opinion and by the testimony of the facts; but, in religion, the facts are only known through the testimony of ages to the exigencies of man's nature and through the test of experiment made upon the use of the testimony; and the facts, concerned as they are with so delicate and subtle a subject as the religious nature of man, can only be treated as facts, when, through consistency and coherence, they have arrived at some objective expression.

If, then, Catholic writers on religion have been able to avoid the provincialism into which other religious writers have fallen; if Catholic writers have displayed a certain universality of spirit, which makes them significant for all time, and Protestant writers have been too negative, too controversial and even too conservative, is it not because the Church secures a consistent basis, a basis of spiritual fact, a mode of continuity, a mode of relating the present with the past, which makes a bolder progress possible and, in the long run, a truer liberation of the mind? Is it not because a consistent objective basis, however crude or vague, is essential to progress itself and so to any intellectual freedom of real value or universal validity? Had this consistency of basis been of a nature intrinsically false or opposed to the nature of things, it would have destroyed this significance and imperilled this duration. But the fact that these writers show signs of an indefinite endurance and ever increasing significance is surely a proof that the basis on which

they build is in accordance with the nature of things.

Writers of the 18th century did the world an invaluable service by showing how little religious truth is truth in historical detail or veracity in physical fact. But the 18th century writers dismissed as so much rubbish, not only the physical phenomena of the mystics but that kind of truth of which these phenomena were but the vehicle or symbol. Now, then, that men have come to see that the kind of truth which lay beneath is concerned with their happiness, with their "living from the greatest depths of being" and that "sanctity is a genius for morality," the fact that Catholic writers on religion have still a significance for religious minds of every communion is beginning to be accounted for. The Catholic writers whom I have mentioned were as little concerned with mystical phenomena as the writers of the 18th century. But the kind of truth that lay beneath—this they trusted, this they expounded, this they enforced.

But, it is a still further testimony to the truth of this underlying consistency, that, in accordance with it, some of these writers were able to make an actual advance in the intellectual appreciation of religion. The greater Protestant and Positivist philosophers, who have dealt with the subject, have united in showing that these Catholic writers were not Protestant reformers born out of due time or sceptical philosophers in disguise, but as profoundly Catholic in religion as they were free in

criticism and that they, one and all, considered the Catholic Church the only kind of authority consistent with the full use of such freedom. To these writers the testimony of authority to the religious exigencies of man was not a fetter to bind them but a light to inform them; not an obstacle to progress but a basis on which alone progress became possible; not a means of narrowing the spirit but the very cause of their freedom from the narrowness of sect.

In Erasmus and Malonatus and Simon, in Astruc, Geddes and the Bollandists, a steady advance has been made in criticism both of Church and Bible, without breaking up the kind of authority in religion or lessening that seriousness in its teaching, upon which the majority of mankind must depend; nay, such writers as Mabillon and Pascal and Fenelon have added to the weight of authority at the very time that they have diminished its crudities.

In these writers a clear and definite line of orientation has been taken; and, through their means, a progress has been made in religion which is no mere indefinite movement, and an authority has been set up which is no mere tyranny, but one which, as the grounds of scientific criticism become objectively clear, can put away for ever the crudities which belong to the childhood of the race.

By one of those paradoxical coincidences, which abound in history, it so happens that Bossuet who condemned the Biblical criticism of Pere Simon, was the first historian to make a philosophic

use of that conception of society which regards it as an individual, growing from childhood to maturity, nor could he avoid including religion in this kind of growth. Pascal, on the other hand, who sympathised with the objects of Pere Simon, excludes religion from the operation of this growth, expressly in his own bold treatment of the progress of science. The general argument of Bossuet is, however, an inevitable justification of the position taken by Pere Simon, and Pascal's "Thoughts" cannot even be understood, without including religion among the elements of man's growth. These writers, then, taken together, give us a means of reconciling authority and criticism and making progress consistent with order.

"Everything that frees our spirit," says Goethe, "without giving us control of ourselves, is ruinous." "A state without the means of some change," says Burke, "is without the means of its conservation." In these two sentences, which contain all the law and the prophets on the subject of liberty and authority, two kinds of writers on religion are condemned; first, those who would set aside an authority which has grown up and developed from the nature of things, when no substitute for it can be immediately produced; and secondly, those who refuse to acknowledge the necessity for criticism and change from within the society in which such authority has grown up. Without the power to change from within, a society is likely to suffer the loss of that part of its constitution which its conservative defenders most religiously

wish to preserve. Without a central and living authority, criticism and the spirit of liberty will only lose self-control and tend to dispersion and ruin. But Pere Simon found in the necessity for an innovating criticism, a reason the more for a living authority; and Erasmus, in the necessity for a living authority, a reason the more for an innovating criticism. Because the Church is itself an ever-present testimony to the truths which created it, Erasmus and Simon alike held that it is possible, consistently with the Church's theory, to criticise both Church and Bible, with more freedom as well as with more truth, in the Church than outside it.

To those who find in the Church an ever present witness to the real religious exigencies of man, and, in the Bible, teaching that has enabled the Church to make the greatest spiritual experiment the world has yet known, there can be no fear that the Bible will suffer any real disadvantage from a criticism of its mere historicity, or the Church, from a criticism of the immaturity of its methods of action or the crudity of its forms of expression. Church and Bible are not to be judged only by what they say, but rather by what, for society and the individual, they have actually achieved; and what has acted for so many ages as a key to so complex a lock as human nature has its testimony in itself. With the firm conviction arising from the fact of this achievement, Erasmus and More, Simon and Pascal, Newman and Loisy have been able to let their thoughts play freely

round subjects with which the Church and the Bible are concerned.

Indeed, it may be said that those only show a true conviction that the foundation, which is already laid, is strong enough to bear the weight of all the historical or religious truth that may be revealed by the future, who urge that the Church has still greater tasks to accomplish and still wider truths to maintain in the present than in the past. Persons who take an opposite course, speak as if no criticism were possible from within the Church and look for all change and reform from without, though they speak with an intention to edify and in support of authority, produce quite the opposite impression. They give birth to the suspicion that they speak and act from motives of panic alone and one of the chief advantages of possessing a living criterion of truth in the Church is altogether lost.

The adjustment of the claims of authority and freedom, of sanctity and intelligence is no doubt a practical question, and, like all practical questions, can only be settled, in the ultimate resort, by the individual. But what writers like Erasmus have demonstrated is that in the Catholic Church the individual need not, in accordance with the Catholic theory, either give up his freedom or neglect her authority, and that there is abundant precedent in the history of the Church for a true as well as a false use of authority on the part of the individual.

It cannot be said, if what has been urged here is true, that the Catholic Church has altogether suppressed the intellectual vitality of her children or that there is unity in the Church only because all things appear the same in the dark. On the contrary, the first Christian author to criticise the Bible on a definite critical method was a Catholic priest; the first Christian author to criticise scholasticism on a definite philosophical method was a Catholic layman; the first to set astronomy on a firm scientific basis was Galileo, a Catholic. These pioneers of modern thought were neither Protestants nor sceptics. But it cannot be denied that there is a true and a false use of authority on the part of the individual, and that only the greatest spirits in the Catholic Church have as yet dared to use it as, perhaps, they alone were, in their own time, worthy to use it, with that full freedom which has now become a necessity for all.

It is clear as daylight that if authority is used as the mystics used it; if authority is used as a testimony to the true religious exigencies of man and as a guide to the true law of our minds, it will be not only consistent with freedom but a cause of liberation. In this sense authority has been already a cause of progress and a liberator of the intellect, for it has brought sanctity to the use of thought and thought to the use of sanctity. "Knowledge is power," and it is the truth alone thus slowly developed or discovered that can make man free. But where authority has been used in a servile spirit; where authority has been allowed to

act as despotism imposing fetters on the soul of man, then thought itself has been in danger of perishing and that spiritual freedom, which is the note of the Church, has disappeared. "He who forbids me to think," says Pere Malbranche, "might as well forbid me to breathe." But authority in the Church is, after all, the result of experience that has been gained through reason and experiment by the society of religious persons, and it is for the individual to take and to use what authority gives him in accordance with the experience of his own life and with the laws of that human soul which the Church herself has declared to be by nature Christian. Christianity is empirical in its historic growth and development, but its empiricism is but the testing of laws which it is the task of philosophy to analyse and to co-ordinate.

Throughout the history of the Church these two modes of using authority have run parallel to one another; and as the results of the one present us with a stream of ever-broadening light, so the results of the other present us with a mass of stifling gloom. In St. Paul and Origen, in St. Augustine and St. Thomas, in Erasmus and More, in Pascal and Simon, in Newman and Loisy, in the mystics and the saints we find one; in the acts of the Torquemadas and the Alvas of history we find the other. This mass of stifling gloom, tyranny, bigotry and persecution, has not, however, always been dependent upon the worst passions of mankind alone. In former days it has alas! found patrons

and defenders among some of the best of mankind and St. Augustine, Ximenes and Bossuet once gave it the support of their great names. But its results have surely now become its sufficient condemnation, for, while it has always begun in the name of religion and authority it has always ended in a re-action which has cut up religious vitality by the roots and overturned religious authority from its base. Which use shall be made of authority depends not so much on authority itself, which is like one of the forces of nature and may always be used for evil as well as for good, but on the individuals and the nations who are free to choose which use they will make of it—whether they will take their religion as a tradition imposed from without to fetter and obstruct or whether they will use it freely and with their eyes open, for their own advantage, as the greatest exponent and transmitter of religious life that humanity has been able to produce. To such persons, as to those Catholics mentioned already, the unity of the Church is not a mere uniformity of discipline, on the one hand, nor a mere agreement to differ, on the other; but a unity springing from the unity of man's soul and evermore dynamically widening and deepening; a unity under a symbol whose words are always capable of clearer exposition and profounder meaning; a unity growing through all the stages of temporary coherence into greater completeness and a deeper consistency—into the fulness of the measure of the stature of Christ.

As this unity could not grow without freedom, so it could not exist without authority. As the freedom man desires is but freedom to follow the law of his nature, so the law of his nature in religion is the only authority which can give him the freedom he desires. But the Church represents the one great experiment in the world by which man has attempted to discover and to set forth, through the religious exigencies of man, what those laws are. There never was a time when there was a more general admission than there is at present, that the Church has been right in the main, in her selection of her saints, and the very sanctity she has canonized has been allowed to be a genius for morality. But morality is, we are told, "the nature of things," and the freedom of man is to be gained, not in the mere reckless expression of whatever comes uppermost, but in following the law given in the nature of things. This very nature of things it is which the Church has attempted to discover.

"She has altogether failed," cried her opponents in former days. "She has altogether succeeded," cried her apologists in reply; but, from the nature of the case, neither complete failure nor complete success are to be expected. It is enough, if the achievement of the past has provided the best testimony to the religious nature of man that can be found,—the largest, the richest, the most complex in the world. It is enough, if the basis which the Church provides can be proved to be compatible at once with the freest use of the

intellect and the highest development of sanctity. It is enough, if that basis is a fact of solid achievement having its own evidence in a success which its enemies are now ready to allow, and its limitations in the crudity which its friends will not now deny. In this case, it cannot be unreasonable to retain this basis as the starting point for new experimentation, for if we cannot start from this, we can find no other, but must acknowledge the past to be but failure and the future devoid of hope. In a word, if it gives us, however crudely, the only definite preconceptions we can find for a necessary experiment, and if preconception in some form is essential to experimentation; then we are not only justified in using the Church as our basis but are compelled so to use it.

Nor is there any period in the history of this prolonged experimentation which we can afford to overlook or disavow. If the saints form a cloud of witnesses to the solidarity of the spiritual life and the objective reality of that central light which is its inspiration, they witness also to the efficacy and value of all those devotions which can be shown to have added depth or refinement to the ideal which they realised. They do more. They show where the spiritual experiment in which they take part has touched reality, gained access to new sources of light and proved that, hidden in the infinite, such sources of spiritual life are still truly to be found.

But not only does the Church provide a basis

of actual or sufficient solidity to make future construction possible but she gives also through her scholars, philosophers, and thinkers, the lines on which such construction may proceed. If the Church of the past provides us with our basis and the testimony of the saints with their genius for the nature of things has compelled us to include in the nature of things the religious experience to which they testify, the great writers of the Church whose universal significance has proved the validity of their religious thought, provide us with the criteria by which to judge the Church of the past so as to discover its crudities and limitations and at what points it has failed to realise the principles which it exists to enforce. It is by thought alone that we are able to discover the true nature of these principles and only by a criticism of the past can we hope to be able to carry out the principles we have discovered with less crudity and more success in the future. Nor is it inconsistent with the practice of the Church which gives to the saints the duty of preserving her spiritual type, that so important a part should be taken by the thinkers of the Church in preserving her intellectual vitality. It is often forgotten by those who most praise the saints that modern civilisation is, in some of the best of its developments, a result of the thought and action of the saints. What the saints laboured during many years to acquire, comes to us at once as the result of their labour. In the practice of virtue it will never be possible to dispense with labour, but in the manner of regard-

ing life we gain results from the labour of others. And though in the region of intellect nothing can be gained without personal labour yet the labour of centuries has given us the power if we will but use it to begin with a firmer hold on principles and as it were at a point of vantage, with a clearer insight and an unencumbered gaze. Now, of this general progress in the manner of regarding life the mere development of dogma can give but a vague and shadowy indication. The importance of veracity and seriousness in historic science; the fact that impartiality of judgment is as necessary to progress as charity to virtue—these are points in which the ideal of sanctity has enlarged its sway and the axioms of the saints have been found to have a validity wider and more profound than the saints themselves suspected. It is because the axioms of action have been translated into terms of thought, that the liberation of intellect becomes possible. If, then, sanctity is really to prevail in the future, the Church must make use of all those results of the sanctity of former ages which are to be found in the general civilisation of man. And these results can only be gathered from those great and far-shining writers who have been able to reconcile the highest civilisation of thought with the deepest Catholicism in religion. Thus alone can the whole body of the Church be enabled to apply the criteria of the saints to the life of the Church, and thus we are provided not only with a basis for construction, but with the lines on which such construction may proceed.

In this manner, Christianity, while regarded from without as a kind of empiricism, is, in fact, a philosophic system and a spiritual science in the making, only that it deals with a philosophy, and slowly experiments in a science, which belong to no single period and can be summed up in no single age, but must proceed through aspect after aspect and a series of experiments to a completeness which can only be realised in humanity's completed consciousness of itself.

At no time, then, can there be a break in the manner in which Catholicism envisages itself and we can condemn, in full accordance with the conception of the Church here set forth, the proposition of Schelling condemned by Newman, "that the time is now arrived when an esoteric speculative Christianity ought to take the place of the exoteric empiricism which has hitherto prevailed." And for this reason—that, though Christianity is an experimentation, it is an experimentation on a basis which is, in every age making itself speculatively more exact, more coherent and more consistent but which in no age can become a completed system, because man himself is conceived by the Church as capable of living from ever greater depths of his being; of gaining continually a more perfect reconciliation of his differences; of resolving the dualisms of his thought into an ever higher unity. Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty; but it is the liberty of the Spirit of the Lord and only at a great price can man gain this freedom. For two thousand years has the Church struggled to gain

the spiritual freedom of the religious Society from the tyranny of the world without; still harder is the struggle to gain the spiritual freedom for the individual from the tyranny of the world within. But the very failure of her representatives fully as yet to gain it is a sign that the attempt is being made and it is made by the Church alone. For the first step towards the true liberation of thought is the recognition of its importance and never has the Church acquiesced in that miserable indifference to thought which regards a great book as of less importance than a great battle or the profoundest thought as of less value than a famous action. But only in the complete adjustment of all the faculties of man and only in the translation of axioms of action into terms of thought can the Spirit of the Lord in the heart of man be truly liberated and sanctity become the Redeemer as well as the Master of the Mind.

NOTE.

The aim of a Catholic philosopher will never be to find natural law in the spiritual world or, with vague analogies, attempt to confuse one kind of science with another. But it would not be contrary to the genius of Catholicism to say that she has attempted to discover laws special to the spiritual world, their action upon man and the attitude of the spirit of man towards the spiritual world.

(3)—MARKS OF CORRUPTION IN THE DOGMATIC LIFE OF THE CHURCH.

Dogma is the expression of what God, what Christ, what Christianity is, to the common Christian consciousness. It gives forth to the world the results of the great spiritual experiment which has been made by Christian humanity. It testifies to what the exigencies of the religious spirit have been found to be, so far as it has been possible, through ages of persecution or prosperity and weakness or vigour, for the Church to discover them.

(1.)

Now the great difficulty which set Newman to writing his *Essay on Development* was the appearance of change between the Christianity of the Gospels and the Christianity of the Church. Protestantism had said that this change was a corruption. But Protestantism in its Anglican form at least, admitted the definitions of the Nicene Council. Is there not a considerable appearance of change between the Christianity of the Gospels and the Christianity of the Council? Many of the opponents of Christianity, on the other hand, while insisting on the fact that there is a change and that the change is a profound one, at the same time

acknowledge that if the change had not taken place, Christianity would have sunk into a legend.

How is it, then, that a change, which an individual would certainly not be justified in making, came to be made without a scruple by the Church? How is it that a change which to an outsider must inevitably appear a logical saltus could yet come to be made in the interests of the religion which it seemed to corrupt or to modify? What was it that justified the Church in taking a course which, it now seems, could only have been a leap in the dark and could, from the nature of the case, only be justified by the event?

Newman answers that great principles, lived on as ideals, followed out as premisses, made the source of life to a community, throw out inevitably, from the life they inspire, the external forms (whether in words or in an organism) which protect and carry on that life. Dogma is the form of words, as the Church is the organism, in which Christianity has exhibited the instinct of self-preservation.

What, then, is it which justified the Church (if the Church is justified) in making what appears to be a logical saltus, which the individual could not be justified in making?

Not the Bible,—for it is apparent inconsistency with the Bible which presents the difficulty. Not any “depositum” in the sense of “a form of sound words,” for some of the most important words in the Councils do not appear in any early symbol at all. Not oral tradition,—for the expression “of one

substance with the Father " was actually rejected for some time before it was adopted. It is, then, an instinct of self-preservation. The living on Christian principles; the becoming a community for this purpose, and "*doing the works*" that followed from the principles, on a social basis, taught men to know of "*doctrines*" whether they were "*of God*"; that is, whether they were life giving for such a community, or destructive; preservative or corrupting; development or decadence; food or poison. And the event justified the process at least as far as this: Christianity did not sink (as opponents of the Church allow it otherwise might have sunk) into a mere legend.

In this manner the Church looking back upon its past could trace a self-preservative infallibility in its history which had been its protection all along. It was not, in the first place, that it had been inspired by God; watched over by Providence; made infallible by a particular Divine assistance; its thought and development superintended by an external and supernatural authority:—It was that from the very nature of its principles and its struggles, it had created a criterion from within itself as evolution brought into shape and use and a like relative infallibility the eye and sight of man in the material universe. Then the criterion thus evolved became an objective authority, external and representative of the immanent spirit.

Dr. Fairbairn's objections, then—(1) That Newman separates the reason and the conscience and (2) that he introduces, in his theory of develop-

ment, a mechanical supernaturalism to make up for the natural defectiveness of a reason "forsaken by God"; that Newman arbitrarily introduces an external authority infallibly presiding over the Church's development, are here at once accounted for and answered. Reason and the conscience are treated of separately (as eye and heart) where they are treated statically, (in "the Grammar of Assent" and elsewhere). They are treated as belonging to one nature, altogether united in its origin and tending to a higher unity through development, whenever they are treated dynamically (as in "the Essay on Development.") Thus the evolution of the Church as a natural phenomenon is made parallel to the evolution of the conscience, and all the consequences in this parallel are left to be worked out by the reader. To assume that these consequences are not foreseen by the writer is only to take it for granted that the book was written without a purpose and without a plan.

The infallibility of the Church, then, is not arbitrarily introduced by Newman as "an external authority" founded on "a mechanical supernaturalism." It is an infallibility which springs up spontaneously from the immanent action of Christianity and Christian inspiration, of which the Church is not even conscious until the struggle with the world has forced it to become more and more intimately conscious of its own subjectivity. On the other hand, this infallibility from the very first, this consciousness of its subjectivity in its

slightest form, did give it, as it gives ourselves, an objectivity, and thus gave the individual, in the Church, an objective external guide.

What, then, is the cause of this relative infallibility? It is the Christ in man. It is the consciousness of that inner exigency of the religious nature which has made Christ Himself come to be called the "Desire of Nations." It is the combined result of the thought and desire of men, in every generation, in whom Christ is forming. It is that thought of man which, when it has come full circle and has run its course and is fully liberated, shall be the system of God, shall display all that it owes to the essence of Christianity and shall make clear what was the main idea of Christ.

As it is the Christ in the heart of man that was to be brought out and made to grow, so it shall be Christ Himself who, when one aspect of Him after another has been set forth and developed, shall stand forth as the sum of these aspects at the end of the days. The vague impression that something of this kind lies at the base of Newman's "Essay on Development," is perhaps the reason why he has himself so often been called a mystic. Thus Juliana of Norwich makes Christ address the lonely soul, saying, "I am the ground of thy beseeching." And the desire of nations, the hope of all mankind, in this sense, had Christ for its ground. It is the Ideal which can only be realized when it is itself taken, tested, used and set forth (as is attempted to be done in the Church) as the ground of man's

attempting. And, no doubt, something of this sort did lie at the base, and is implied in the argument of the Essay on Development. But Newman hardly once uses mystical language, and, indeed, in this Essay he appears to be carefully avoiding it.

Liberalistic forms of Christianity look for a criterion of the truth which is wholly in the future. Protestant theologians look for a criterion which lies wholly in the past. The former criterion is no criterion at all and the latter is a criterion which binds the present to a time which may have, for it, no meaning. The theory of development justified the existence and modified the form, of a living criterion which should rely upon the past, relate itself to the present and provide a new ground for the future.

Dogma, then, is the criterion of truth which is discovered, in every age, by consulting the exigencies of the religious nature as it is found educated, elicited and combined in the Christian community as a whole; "and the Church is that community," which, by preserving a continuous existence, in the midst of external struggle and the limitation caused by schism, has been the organism which displays by its growth or decadence, its vitality or decay, whether those dogmas have been rightly selected; whether they are healthy expressions of the religious nature and true to the religious exigency or spurious accretions forced on from without by a merely ecclesiastical machinery.

(2.)

Matthew Arnold's objection to Newman's theory of development is, that, in the Church, the ecclesiastical machinery forced on developments, in matters of criticism and philosophy, before the times were ripe for making true developments in such matters and that, then, the same ecclesiastical machinery made them final and absolute.

How a Church which has committed itself implicitly to the theory of development and an infallibility which, expressing itself in human language, is necessarily relative, could make its developments final and absolute must be left to the ingenuity of conservative theologians, on one side, and that of those who take up Matthew Arnold's position, on the other. But, in order to realize the full force of Matthew Arnold's objection, I must quote it at length. With Dr. Fairbairn's, which is substantially the same, it will be easier to deal after we have dealt with this.

"A historic Church," says Matthew Arnold, "cannot choose but allow the principle of development for it is written in its institutions and history. An admirable writer in a book which is one of the least known of his works, but which contains, perhaps, even a greater number of profound and valuable ideas than any other one of them, has set forth both persuasively and truly the impression of this sort which Church history cannot but convey."

"We have to account," says Cardinal Newman, in his *Essay on Development*, "for

“ that apparent variation and growth of doctrine
“ which embarrasses us when we would consult
“ history for the true idea of Christianity. The
“ increase and expansion of the Christian creed and
“ ritual, and the variations which have attended
“ the process in the case of individual writers and
“ churches, are the necessary attendants on any
“ philosophy or polity which takes possession of
“ the intellect and heart and has had any wide and
“ extended dominion. From the nature of the
“ human mind time is necessary for the full com-
“ prehension and perfection of great ideas. The
“ highest and most wonderful truths, though com-
“ municated to the world once for all by inspired
“ teachers, could not be comprehended all at once
“ by the recipients; but, as admitted and trans-
“ mitted by minds not inspired, and through media
“ which were human, have required only the
“ longer time and deeper thought for their full
“ elucidation.” And again: “ Ideas may remain
“ when the expression of them is indefinitely varied.
“ Nay, one cause of corruption in religion is the
“ refusal to follow the course of doctrine as it moves
“ on, and an obstinacy in the notions of the past.
“ So our Lord found his people precisians in their
“ obedience to the letter; he condemned them for
“ not being led on to its spirit,—that is, its develop-
“ ment. The Gospel is the development of the
“ Law; yet what difference seems wider than that
“ which separates the unbending rule of Moses
“ from the grace and truth which came by Jesus
“ Christ? The more claim an idea has to be con-

“sidered living, the more various will be its
“aspects; and the more social and political is its
“nature, the more subtle and complicated will be
“its development, and the longer and more event-
“ful will be its course. Such is Christianity.”
And yet once more: “It may be objected that
“inspired documents, such as the Holy Scriptures,
“at once determine doctrine without further
“trouble. But they were intended to create *an*
“*idea*, and that idea is not in the sacred text, but
“in the mind of the reader; and the question is
“whether that idea is communicated to him in its
“completeness and minute accuracy on its first
“apprehension or expands in his heart and in-
“tellect and comes to perfection in course of time.
“If it is said that inspiration supplied the place
“of this development in the first recipients of
“Christianity, still the time at length came when
“its recipients ceased to be inspired; and on these
“recipients the revealed truths would fall as in
“other cases, at first vaguely and generally,
“and would afterwards be completed by
“developments.”

“The notion thus expounded of a gradual
“understanding of the Bible, a progressive
“development of Christianity, is the same which
“is in Bishop Butler’s mind when he laid down in
“his Analogy that the Bible contains many truths
“as yet undiscovered.” And then Matthew
Arnold makes certain quotations from Butler with
which all readers of Matthew Arnold are as well
acquainted as readers of Bishop Butler himself

ought to be. "All this," he continues, "is indeed incomparably well said; and with Cardinal Newman we may, on the strength of it all, beyond any doubt 'fairly conclude that Christian doctrine admits of development'; that the whole Bible is written on the principle of development.'"

But, then, he goes on to say that Cardinal Newman uses this idea in a manner which, though ingenious, seems to him arbitrary and condemned by the idea itself. "He uses it in support of the pretensions of the Church of Rome. He says, with much ingenuity to Protestants: The doctrines you receive are no more on the face of the Bible or in the plain teaching of the anti-Nicene Church, which alone you consider pure, than the doctrines you reject. The doctrine of the Trinity is as much a development as the doctrine of Purgatory. Both of them are developments made by the Church, by the post-Nicene Church. The determination of the Canon of Scripture, a thing of vital importance to you who acknowledge no authority but Scripture, is a development due to the post-Nicene Church. And thus Dr. Newman would compel Protestants to admit that which is, he declares, in itself reasonable, namely, the probability of the appointment in Christianity of an external authority to decide upon the true developments of doctrine and practice in it, thereby separating them from the mass of mere human speculation, extravagance, corruption, and error in and out of

“ which they grow. This is the doctrine of the
 “ infallibility of the Church, of “ faith and obedi-
 “ ence towards the Church, founded on the proba-
 “ bility of its never erring in its declarations or
 “ commands.’”

This is one of those expressions of absolute dualism between the human reason and the supernatural element in Christianity which so offends and naturally offends Dr. Fairbairn, and naturally Matthew Arnold is offended by it too.

But Matthew Arnold continues:—“ Asserted
 “ in this absolute way, and extended to doctrine as
 “ well as practice, Dr. Newman’s conclusion seems
 “ at variance with his own theory of development,
 “ and to be something like an instance of what
 “ Bishop Butler criticizes when he says:—‘ Men
 “ ‘are impatient and for precipitating things.’”

“ But Dr. Newman has himself supplied us
 “ with a sort of commentary on these words of
 “ Butler’s which is worth quoting, because it
 “ throws more light on our point than Butler’s few
 “ words can throw on it by themselves.

“ Dr. Newman says: ‘ Development is not an
 “ ‘ effect of wishing or resolving, or of forced
 “ ‘ enthusiasm, or of any mechanism of reasoning,
 “ ‘ or of any mere subtlety of intellect; but comes
 “ ‘ of its own innate power of expansion within the
 “ ‘ mind in its season, though with the use of
 “ ‘ reflexion and argument, and original thought,
 “ ‘ more or less as it may happen, with a depen-
 “ ‘ dence on the ethical growth of the mind itself,
 “ ‘ and with a reflex action upon it.’ It is impos-

“sible to point out more sagaciously and expressively the natural, spontaneous, free character of true development; how such development must follow laws of its own, may require vast periods of time, cannot be hurried, cannot be stopped.”

Now it does seem most remarkable that, seeing thus clearly the meaning of his quotation from Cardinal Newman, Matthew Arnold totally fails to see its application to the context in which it appears. Archer Butler, a far less accomplished person than Matthew Arnold, perceived at once that Newman all through the *Essay on Development* is addressing two audiences—a Protestant and a Catholic; that in a large part of it he is using an *argumentum ad hominem* first to the Protestant and then to the Catholic, but that the theory as Newman holds it himself is intended to cut both ways, and while it destroys the Protestant position altogether is meant to modify the absoluteness of the Catholic.

When Newman speaks of inspiration in an absolute manner; when he speaks of the “appointment of an external authority” in an absolute manner—he is using an *argumentum ad hominem* and speaks in the only language which persons, who have not yet grasped the whole of his theory, can understand. But when he has shown that the Catholic can use the argument from development against the Protestant, and that if he does not use the argument from development he cannot argue fairly at all, he turns to the Catholic and says, “But if you use this

argument you must take it with all its consequences. It does not only mean that Protestantism has failed to develop, but that your external authority is not final, not absolute, but itself a development and a means you have discovered of reporting progress on the Development of the religious idea;—a means by which you have been able to objectify whatever is significant in the religious sense.”

“Newman,” says Matthew Arnold, “describes in the words here quoted, how such a development must follow lines of its own, may often require vast periods of time, cannot be hurried, cannot be stopped.” And this implies as clearly as words can imply anything—that, whether we like it or not, there is a certain inevitableness about this development, which is the only point upon which Catholics can insist; and that this development may, consequently, express itself sometimes in the terms of a philosophy which will afterwards be rejected, always in the terms of a science which will afterwards appear immature, yet may be the true line of development nevertheless. And if we would arrive at the best that human thought can now offer to us, in this matter, we must follow this line in order to reach that best;—though even, then, we must not stop, as if there could, in the future, by the continuance of the same development, not be a better still. But Matthew Arnold fails to see that this development may be true and yet not ultimate; may be the highest expression and the best possible for the

individual at a given time, but not an absolute or final one—fails to see, what in other matters he is always pointing out, that an approximate truth is all we can hope to arrive at in any particular period of human thought, while the necessary limitations of human thought endure.

After having himself declared “that such a development must follow laws of its own” and “cannot be stopped”—he immediately proceeds to lay down laws for it and to insist upon the necessity of breaking the continuity upon which alone it can be conceived to persist.

“So far as Christianity,” he says, “deals, as, “in its metaphysical theology, it does abundantly “deal, with thought and speculation, it must “surely be admitted that for its true and ultimate “development in this line more time is required, “and other conditions than we have already. So “far as Christian doctrine contains speculative “philosophical ideas, never since its origin have “the conditions been present for determining them “adequately; certainly not in the mediæval church “which so dauntlessly strove to determine them. “And, therefore, on every creed and council is “judgment passed in Bishop Butler’s sentence:— “*The Bible contains many truths as yet “undiscovered.*”

Here Matthew Arnold is evidently aware that he is pushing matters a little further than his own arguments will warrant. He is half aware that Newman would admit that the speculative developments, in the Middle Ages, were not “ultimate”

or "adequate," but would urge that they were the nearest to the truth possible to the times and under the conditions, and that, if we are to deny any truth at all to the only developments which were made, we are denying that development must "follow laws of its own" and insisting upon breaking its continuity at every point where it does not suit our "wishes" and realize our "desires." It is true enough that the philosophic development of the Middle Ages might have been truer and profounder had the Mediæval theologian been acquainted with all that remains of the literature of Greece, or even if philosophers like Roger Bacon had been able to come into more direct contact with philosophers like Duns Scotus. But, as the aim of poetry is to set the "shows of things to the desires of the mind," so religion has to reconcile the science of things as they are with the faith in things as they ought to be; the real with the ideal, that the ideal may be realised. To do these things religion must, in all ages, use the terminology of every age and show that, if nature is organic, so also are the desires of the mind. It were easy to set up now some theory of religion which would look more plausible at first sight than the religion of the Middle Ages; but in the Middle Ages religion showed itself to be something organic, and it is of the highest advantage, in studying any complex subject, "to have before us a distinct and systematic attempt to explain it." This was the attempt which the Mediæval philosophers made; and, if they made no other true development, they

showed, at any rate, the necessity man must always feel of recognizing the organic connexion between the shows of things and the desires of the mind; the fact that the shows of things are organic, and the fact that the desires of the mind are organic too. In this matter, Newman would have said, they did not trust God too much, but confined Him too much. They rationalized because they reasoned before reason had grown to a sufficient maturity to know its own limitations. In this sense, Newman, in the sermon on the inductive method and by his theory of development, admits that the schoolmen were for precipitating things. But along this line religion was forced to go in order to realize, to itself, its organic nature; and reason, in order to realize, to itself, its limitations. And its organic nature religion did thus come to realize. Nor only its organic nature, but its organic connection with certain speculative problems. When, therefore, the individual comes forward as Matthew Arnold does, and says that the Middle Ages made no true development in philosophic questions but was barren and incapable, what he has lost in not following this part of development is not an ultimate and adequate explanation of Christianity, for no one pretends that Mediæval Philosophy gives us that, but the realization of the organic nature of religion. And it will be only too likely that such an individual will consider that, the Middle Ages having failed, he may now come forward and give us the true and "adequate" explanation, and, for the first and the last time, tell us

what "the essence" of Christianity is. But this is just what the Middle Ages show us the individual cannot do. The Middle Ages show us that what man demands is a continuous organic treatment of religion; that no individual, however enlightened, can master in a particular age, however progressive, a problem so complex, so delicate, so inwardly bound up with a thousand philosophical questions. It requires the combination of all the parts of the problem and all the powers specially suited to deal with those parts, on a common basis and with a common aim, to give forth from age to age, not the essence of Christianity, not the solution of all its problems, not the main idea of Christ—but that point in its organic development which the religious thought of man has reached; that point in its reconciliation with the progress of the scientific temper which the religious element in humanity has attained. This does not mean that the individual has nothing to do with the matter, for without the individual nothing could be done; it does not mean that there is no room for the discussion of what is essential to Christianity in the Church. But it does mean that it is through the union of all the activities of man on the ideal of sanctity (which is a genius for the nature of things) that the idea comes to be expressed, not as a whole like a proposition in mathematics, but in one aspect after another. And the reason why the idea cannot be expressed—is not because it is a puzzle, not because it contains contradiction, not because it is a mystery belonging to another world, but because

it is (if it exist at all) the basis idea of all life; the nature and meaning and depth of which man can never know till humanity has realized the whole process of its existence. To man the idea itself can only be the sum of its aspects; and all we can know about the idea, at present, is, first, the aspects of it which have been developed by man; and, secondly, the fact that if humanity continues, and if the ideal of Christianity is the true and permanent one (corresponding to the nature of things) many more aspects of the idea must be presented to man. The ideal is given in conduct and in the sanctity of Christ and the saints. It teaches this and that in the practice of life. It comes into contact with thought. It gives a new ideal in government; a new ideal of liberty; it moves on to one point in speculation after another. Like a slowly widening dawn, it now pours its light on the Imperial power of the Cæsars; now touches the absolute monarchy in France; now fires with a new ideal the Republics of Italy; now gives a new aspiration to the democracy of England: in every case it enlightens, it etherializes, it colours; but, in no case, has it yet altogether transformed; because it has not yet reached its foundations. It enlightened, it etherialized, it coloured, the imperial power of Rome in St. Leo; it enlightened, it etherialized, it coloured the absolute monarchy of France in St. Louis; it vitalized and spiritualized the political aspirations of Italy in Savonarola; it has given moral energy and warmth to the democracy of

England. But who can say that even now it has translated itself fully into terms of thought or become as useful to the mind as it is to action? Who can say that it has yet brought consistency into economics even when economists are convinced of the truth of its moral axioms and of the organic unity of all thought?

The Middle Ages teach us, and suggest even to Matthew Arnold, the organic unity of thought: for a little later on, he acknowledges that the speculative questions of the Middle Ages were "inevitable." Yet a great mass of thought outside the church is united in extolling the ethics of the Gospel and in cutting off the ethics from any organic connection with speculative problems. Is not this because men are for precipitating things, and Matthew Arnold among them? Is it not because they are impatient of the slow process of translating axioms of action into terms of thought, and refuse to see how it must be through sanctity, which is a genius for the nature of things, taken as a whole, and not a mere specialism or naturalism, that the great mass of thought must be always trying to get its organic unity; and that, if it does not, moral conduct will get separated from beauty (as in Puritanism and Utilitarianism) and both will suffer; or science will be opposed to religion (as, in fact, it is over and over again) and both will suffer?

Matthew Arnold says that the Church of the Middle Ages could not be a channel for true developments in philosophy and speculation, be-

cause the necessary conditions for making such true developments were not present. And Newman in his sermon on the Inductive Method urges the same fact and accounts for it: the law of growth from below and from within, the necessity of beginning with facts and hypotheses and dispensing with fixed ideas had not become clear, though the teaching of the Gospel, the axioms of action there set forth when translated into terms of thought, had always been pointing in this direction. But to quote Pasteur once more:—"Preconceptions are the very life of science." It is as preconceptions that the Mediæval developments of philosophy are useful and as preconceptions they do begin to form the channel for a true philosophical development. Though treating their premisses too much as "fixed ideas" the schoolmen did perceive and did develop the main element in philosophic progress, the necessity of its being organic; the necessity that every truth discovered should be made to work its way through the whole mental organism. They showed that the ethics of the Gospel cannot be separated from speculation without the destruction first of the ethic and then of the speculation; that the notions of force, truth and beauty lie at the base of ethics and at the base of all thought; that beauty is the "splendour of truth"; that in the ideal, consequently, which religion has to realize, the supreme place of the greatest ethical force and the highest ethical beauty must be shown to be the deepest philosophic truth; or else force and righteousness will be turned against beauty and

beauty against truth. The manner in which the Mediæval Church expressed all this by means of mystical interpretation and then by scholastic logic, may be quaint and grotesque to modern minds; may be critically false and philosophically unsound; but it nevertheless resulted in the only channel for a true philosophical development; while it was through mystical interpretation alone, when the Bible was regarded as absolute authority and an objectively grounded criticism had not grown up, that the mind of man on religious matters could be fully liberated. To lament that religious development should have taken its inevitable course is to lament, as Burke says, "that we have not other bodies, other minds."

A large part of all this Matthew Arnold evidently perceives, and a little later, in his *Essays*, he seems to imply it. But he cannot get rid of his objection to the crudity of philosophy and criticism which appears in theological dogma. He feels that the Church, in compelling him to accept the dogma, is compelling him to accept the philosophy. There are pedants, no doubt, who would say so; but no one but a pedant could say anything so absurd. All scholasticism is but a prolonged attempt to express in terms of thought what is meant by the pictorial words of religion and the axioms of sanctity, and to translate such texts as "All power is given me in heaven and earth" in such a way as to show that it is ethical power—spiritual power, which is in the long run the true centre of all force and the hand that moves the

world; that morality is the nature of things and that at the centre of things there is morality. The Church, as Matthew Arnold says, had in the first place to deal with practice and to show what Christianity meant for the individual, for nations, for herself as the Kingdom of God. In this she had much success with the people: not, all at once, so much success with "the Kingdom." She brought it into being, indeed, and the spirit of Christ did inherit the earth. But in order to deal with politics and rule upon a great scale, her ethic had to be philosophically treated and carried into thought. There were already politics in existence connected with great philosophies and a system of ethic. These had to be transformed or reconciled with Christian teaching; and this, again, could not be done without the intervention of thought. To effect this transformation not only time was required but prolonged labour; and the transformation is not effected yet: not because the workmen have been indifferent or the labour impracticable, but because it is the greatest, and therefore the most inspiringly difficult labour in the world. But, if an excuse is made, from the slowness or the failure of the task in the past, to break continuity altogether, and for individuals to erect little, cheap, religions of their own, or even national religions, cut off from the main labour, then the element of variety in the work will be lost; the labour will be prolonged indefinitely and the days when faith shall be lost in sight will be put off till men shall despair of their arrival.

What meaning, then, is there in saying, as Matthew Arnold does, that as the development of thought and science "have laws of their own" (as undoubtedly they have) they should be regarded as separate altogether from the Church and then brought from without to criticize, reform and judge the Church? Because thought has its own laws of development that is a reason why science is safe in Church; because thought has its own laws of development that is a reason why thought is safe in the Church; but, because science and thought have been regarded as so much specialism and divided from the ethical idea, this is the reason why Church authorities have learnt to fear, to hate and to persecute scientists and thinkers. It is just the opposite thing that needs to be said, and curiously enough, in a few pages, Matthew Arnold proceeds to say it. What needs to be said is that thought and science are better off in the Church than elsewhere, because, when time is given them, they will there find the avenues to religious development, on grounds of thought and science, "least closed." This, as we shall see, Matthew Arnold proceeds to say.

It is clear that, if thought and science are to be regarded as having nothing to do with the Church, specialists in thought and science will be absorbed in their subjects and treat the Church with indifference. The Church will repay the compliment. Thinkers and scientists will then lay down the law for the Church; criticize it and judge it from without and consequently with no sym-

pathy. The Church, meanwhile, will have made her own developments and treat thinkers and scientists with no respect. The indifference will turn into hate; the hate will give birth to a struggle and progress will be lost in an interminable warfare, all carried on in different languages, on different planes of thought, with any kind of weapon that comes nearest.

Now Matthew Arnold observes that when philosophical development of the true sort did begin to appear, it appeared altogether outside the Churches. It appeared in Descartes, it appeared in Bacon. "The doctrine of Luther and Calvin had no more likelihood as a philosophical or critical matter, of being an adequate development than the doctrine of the Council of Trent. And so it has gone on to this day. Philosophy and criticism have become a great power in the world and inevitably tend to alter and develop Church doctrine, so far as this doctrine is, as to a great extent it is, philosophical and critical. Yet the seat of this developing force is not in the Church itself, but elsewhere; its influences filter struggling into the Church, and the Church slowly absorbs and incorporates them. And whatever hinders their filtering in and becoming incorporated, hinders truth and the natural progress of things." It is, however, not only the obscurantism of the Church which has hindered this incorporation.

Descartes was within the Church and remained within the Church. Simon, the Founder of the

critical method, an even more important figure, for the moment, than Descartes, was within the Church and remained within the Church. They had a hard struggle—as all pioneers always must have—with those who surrounded them, with Church authority and with popular prejudice. What was the reason that, in the long run, all their labour was, so far as the Church was concerned, in vain; that Christianity and the Church became so weak and attenuated that they fell before a mob of the most superficial thinkers the world has ever known?

First, no doubt, because the authorities were afraid of Descartes and Père Simon; and their responsibility was then, as it is now, a grave one. But there was another reason. Philosophy and criticism in the hands of Montesquieu and Voltaire came more and more to be turned directly into a weapon of attack upon the Church and made a basis for contemptuous, often false and often barren criticism. In Montesquieu the opposition was partially concealed. In Voltaire it was open. This also had been, to some extent, the fault of obscurantism in the Church. But more still it was the evil I have mentioned before, that authority was taken at its word, was expected to be, what Matthew Arnold implies it ought to have been (if philosophers are to belong to it) the exponent of ultimately true developments, conscious of their truth and conscious of its limitations. If it turns out not to be this and yet claims to be even more than this, then philosophers can have nothing to

do with it, but must judge it and condemn it from without.

This is the reason why the Church has not been such a channel of development as it might have been and this is the reason why it has ceased to be the ground and centre in which philosophical and ethical development are made and are reconciled. Not because Church authority was too absolute, for its absoluteness under these circumstances was inevitable, but because those who could have modified it from within attacked it, and increased its stubbornness by attacking it, from without.

It will be said that Matthew Arnold's complaint is not that the Church made philosophical dogmas which were not true, but that it ought not to have made philosophical dogmas at all. But he has said that it was inevitable she should have done so. It was inevitable also that she should have regarded her authority in too absolute a fashion. It was the philosophers alone who could have modified it. It was the philosophers who could have best modified the dogmas so as not to destroy the authority; and the authority so as not to destroy the dogma; and, though they had, in their time, only too good an excuse for avoiding so difficult a task, the accumulation of difficulty is historically owing to this indifference and not to the absolutism which was inevitable. At an epoch like the present, the excuse has disappeared; the responsibility is as great as ever and the necessity for making these changes from within is far greater,

if an organic, social development inspiring every kind of activity at once is ever to take place.

(3)

And this task, neglected by philosophers, and made impossible to those who, like Matthew Arnold, refuse to build on the basis made by the Church because that basis is itself incomplete and inevitably crude and absolute, the Abbé Loisy, with the aid of Newman's theory of Development, has had the boldness and the patience to undertake. And for this reason : because the basis provided by the Church alone offers any prospect of making the development complete on all its sides—that is, organic.

And here, when once the problem is fairly faced, we find Matthew Arnold, Loisy and Newman in the most perfect agreement. They come to the consideration of what is called "*the essence*" of Christianity.

But what, says Matthew Arnold, does the Gospel describe itself to be? It at once describes the good news which it brings in this manner. "The Kingdom of God has come among you." It is not, in the first place, an essence at all; but the organism which is to contain and to proclaim a life, whose centre is not a matter of words at all, but the character and person of Christ.

And henceforth Matthew Arnold sets forth the arguments for unity (with an exception in favour of the Church of England on account of the moral corruption of Rome;)—for "unity in multitude"

—as the only basis of development for the Kingdom, for the ideal, for the thought of Christianity, in almost the same terms as Newman and Loisy, except that the terms “nature” and “natural” are used in a shallower sense by Matthew Arnold, as we shall see.

“The power of Jesus upon the multitudes who heard Him gladly was not that by rising from the dead and ascending into Heaven,”—as Paley, according to Sir James Stephen, thought, “He enabled the saint to prove to the worldly man the certainty of hell fire (for He had not yet done so) but that *He talked to them about the Kingdom of God*. And how was this to come to mankind? Because *Jesus is come to save His people from their sins*. And how does Jesus save us from our sins? By teaching us *to take His yoke upon us, to do God’s will, and to lose our life for the purpose of saving it*.”

The essence of Christianity is in the whole Christ and in no one word that He said, and in the mind of man naturally Christian; but if any words of His are taken as elements in the life of the kingdom which He founded and added to the idea of the kingdom, then we have what may stand for the essence until the day when time shall have fully declared it.

Now, in a note which is so important that he might well have put into his text, Matthew Arnold adds, what now the Abbé Loisy has demonstrated quite apart from Matthew Arnold, “Nothing can be more certain than that the Kingdom of God

meant originally, and was intended to mean, a Messianic Kingdom speedily to appear; and that to this idea of the *kingdom* is due much of the effect which its preaching exercised on the imagination of the first generation of Christians. But nothing is more certain, also, than that while the end itself, the Messianic Kingdom, was something intangible and future, the way to the end, the doing the will of God " " in those duties, above all, for which there was then in the world the most crying need—the duties of humbleness, self-denial, pureness, justice, charity"—in a word, sanctity,—“ became from the very first in the teaching of Jesus something so ever present and practical and so associated with *the essence of Jesus Himself*, that the way to the Kingdom grew inseparable in thought from the Kingdom itself, and was bathed in the same light and charm. Then, after a time as the vision of an approaching Messianic Kingdom was dissipated, the idea of the perfect accomplishment of the will of God had to take the room of it, and in its own realization to place the ideal of the true Kingdom of God.”

Here Matthew Arnold has brought us very near to the great idea which the Abbé Loisy has done more than any one to clear up and express. But he has not brought out quite clearly enough the universality which came to be the characteristic of Christianity as soon as it came to be thus spiritualized. “Jesus,” says Fr. Tyrrell, “was the true *because* the spiritual Messiah.” And so His kingdom became the true Kingdom *because* a

spiritual Kingdom, and the true spiritual kingdom because a *universal* kingdom—a kingdom founded on the ideal in Christ and in the mind of man naturally Christian, while Christ, in the very act of proclaiming the kingdom was founding it and making Himself its chief corner stone.

“On this foundation arose the Christian Church, and not on any foundation of speculative metaphysics. It was inevitable that the speculative metaphysics should come, but they were not the foundation.” No; they were not the foundation; but, if they were inevitable, they were also necessary, in order that the kingdom should grow, with whatever difficulty and through whatever crudities, as an organic whole and in mind as well as in heart. “When they came the danger of the Christian Church was that she should take them for the foundation.” Yet it was only by means of speculation that she could make the Christian idea universal. It was necessary that Christ should cease to be merely the Messiah, even though the spiritual Messiah, of the Jews, if He was ever to become the Ruler of Mankind. In order that Christianity should “become a world-religion,” says Ranke, “the thought of Greece as well as the order of Rome was a necessity”;—not only inevitable, owing to the weakness of man, but necessary, owing to his intellectual vitality and the greatness which through order and intelligence he had already attained.

“When ” speculative metaphysics came, the danger was that the Christian Church “would take

them for the foundation." But now we can see that the still greater danger was that she would shut up her mind to them altogether, anathematize them, as at first she seemed inclined to do, and so never become a world-religion at all, but sink into a sect and into fanaticism. "But," Matthew Arnold continues, "however that may be, the Christians who were built on the real foundation, who were united in the joy of Christ's good news, naturally, as they came to know of one another's existence, as their relations with one another multiplied, as the sense of sympathy in the possession of a common treasure deepened,—naturally, I say, drew together in one body, with an organization growing out of the needs of a growing body. . .

"Without some strong motive to the contrary, men united by the pursuit of a clearly defined common aim of irresistible attractiveness naturally coalesce; and since they coalesce naturally, they are clearly right in coalescing and find their advantage in it."

"All that Cardinal Newman has so excellently said about development applies here legitimately and fully. Existence justifies additions and stages in existence. The living edifice, planted on the foundation of Christ, could not but grow if it lived at all. If it grew it could not but make developments; and all developments not inconsistent with the aim of its original foundation, and not extending beyond the moral and practical sphere which was the sphere of its original foundation, are legitimated by the very fact of the Church having

in the natural evolution of its life and growth made them."

And, if man's growth is an organic growth, are not speculative developments, however crude, which were as Matthew Arnold admits, inevitable, and, as Ranke thinks necessary, legitimated in exactly the same way? And presently we shall find that Matthew Arnold comes round very nearly to admit this too. How strong soever his dislike of systematization and metaphysic, the course of his argument forces him in this direction. "A boy does not wear the clothes or follow the ways of an infant, nor a man those of a boy; yet they are all engaged in the one same business of developing their growing life, and to the clothes to be worn and the ways to be followed, nature will, in general, direct them safely."

Then he goes on to show how Christians grew and why they coalesced. They coalesced "because such was the natural course of things. It had nothing inconsistent with the fundamental duty of Christians to follow Christ; and it was approved by their growing and enlarging in it."

Then once more he finds it necessary to repeat that though "to develop a form of outward life for itself the Church had necessarily, like every other living thing, the requisite qualifications; to develop scientific dogma it had not." But here he begins more or less dimly to perceive not only that scientific speculation was "inevitable," but that the dogmas of the Church in scientific speculation were more likely to be useful to Christianity than

the opposing dogmas. "Even of the dogma which the Church developed," he continues, "it may be said that, from the very nature of things, it was probably, as compared with the opposing dogma over which it prevailed, the more suited to the actual condition of the Church's life, and to the due progress of the divine work for which she existed. . . . Whatever may be scientifically the merits of the dispute between Arius and Athanasius, for the Church of their time, whatever most exalted or seemed to exalt Jesus Christ was clearly the profitable doctrine, the doctrine most helpful to that moral life which was the true life of the Church."

But if morality is the nature of things then what is profitable to the moral life,—however crudely expressed at first, must in the long run and in the main be permanently true to the nature of things. If the growth of man is inevitable; if, in his growth speculation is inevitable, if morality is a truth about the nature of things and if speculation is concerned with the truth of the nature of things, when the time comes in which the truth for the moral man can be turned into terms of truth for speculation, that dogma which has best answered to the moral exigencies of man will best answer to his speculative exigencies too,—and what has at first been most profitable in morals will turn out also to be most true in speculation. And a little further on, after showing that separatists, if they separated on points of discipline were wrong, "because for developing its own fit outward condi-

tions of life the body of the community has, as we have seen, a real natural power and individuals are bound to sacrifice their fancies to it; and if they separated on points of dogma they were wrong, also because, while neither they nor the Church had the means of determining such points adequately," the true instinct lay in those who refused to break their bond of union on such points as these"—he suddenly cries out (a page further on) "This, I say, is the true religious instinct, the instinct which most clearly seizes the essence and aim of the Gospel and of the Christian Church."

And in the next sentence he comes round to the whole conclusion which we are advocating. "*But fidelity to this instinct leaves, also, the way least closed to the admission of true developments of speculative thought, when the time is come for them, and to the incorporation of these true developments with the ideas and practice of Christians.*"

(4.)

It is plain to any thinking person that this sentence does not leave Matthew Arnold a loop-hole for escape from the necessity for universal unity in the Christian Church. He himself, indeed, allows that there is but one. "Is there not, then," he asks, "any separation which is right and reasonable? Yes, separation on plain points of morals." And then he instances "the sale of indulgences" and says that that was a valid reason for breaking unity; and contrasts it with the doctrine of

Purgatory, or of the Real Presence, which was not.

Catholics deny that "the sale of indulgences" was "instituted or persisted in by the main body of the Church" as Protestants suppose, and this is one of the points in which separation has resulted in that fatal want of insight and that fundamental breach in common charity which, More and Erasmus foresaw at the time, between nation and nation. But if the whole Church was falling into moral corruption, were two great nations like England and Germany so weak and so insignificant that they could not attempt to do for the Church what one man like St. Francis of Assisi attempted to do, and, to a great extent, succeeded in doing for the Church (at a time when the Church was, by no means, at the height of sanctity)—without a thought of leaving it—at a time, too, when there was no More or Erasmus to appeal to, no example so original and so independent as that of St. Francis himself to quote?

But Matthew Arnold himself goes on to point in the direction where the true solution of the difficulty lay and where it still lies. It lay then, as it lies now, in the full development of national life, of national Churches using their strength and weight according to the measure of the strength and weight they have been able to acquire by their moral and political action, *within* the Catholic Church. It lay then, as it does now, not in making acknowledgment of royal supremacy so far as the law of Christ allows, but in making acknowledg-

ment of Papal supremacy so far as the law of Christ allows, and in going on to show, by the practical work and discipline and order of the national Church how far Englishmen find that the law of Christ allows it; how far the Church can act without it; how far the Church is constrained to find in it a centre and symbol of unity, a bond and means of union.

Matthew Arnold does not go so far as that, because he is writing with an immediate practical purpose, and it is clear that, for the present, action of this kind would be impossible. But it is clear that such action would aid in doing for the Church of England what its greatest leaders have always wished to do. It would modify the reproach arising from isolation, which, if it is kept up on grounds of morality (as Matthew Arnold considers it is) is dangerous, because it is an attitude encouraging to that national pride which thanks God "that we are not as other men are" and that we had too scrupulous a conscience to make a compromise with a Church for which Sir Thomas More, a man who had criticized contemporary corruption with as keen an insight as anyone, was content to die, and in which St. Francis of Sales, who was not a man to play fast and loose with his conscience, later on, did not consider himself too holy to live.

If, on the other hand, this isolation is kept up because it is considered that the cosmopolitan type of political organization ought to give place to a national one and that England was too great a

nation to remain part of the Catholic organism, the difficulty, as Matthew Arnold remarks, is really a political and not a religious one. If, indeed, it is set forth on religious grounds and it is considered that Englishmen are in a special sense nationally Christians and that this isolation is an isolation necessary to them on account of their religious superiority to other nations we seem to lay ourselves open to the reproach of Voltaire that we imagine that "the Son of God became incarnate for the Anglo-Saxon race." But if we may modestly believe in the greatness of the nation to which we belong—and its significance, weight and use in the service of God this is a reason the more for religious union with others who may possibly want our aid and who will certainly not easily prevent our having our due share in the government of the Church at large or our due liberties in our government of the Church at home. "A Church with Anglican liberties," says Matthew Arnold, "might very well, the English national spirit being what it is, have been in religious communion with Rome, and yet have been safely trusted to maintain and develop its national liberties to any extent required."

On the whole matter, then, there is little to be objected to in this line of argument, by a Catholic, except in two important points: first, that Matthew Arnold does not lay sufficient stress on the necessity for a natural organic development of man to realize all the aspects of the idea towards which man is ever inevitably working. He sees, indeed, that this

kind of development must happen ; but he does not seem to see, what his line of argument so clearly points to, that it is only in the corporate realization of all the aspects of the idea—it is only in the sense of these aspects thus gained by humanity at large that there is any chance of the idea itself becoming completely set forth, known and acted upon. And this is a matter even more important than religious peace founded on an agreement to differ. And, secondly, in trying to get rid of a mechanical supernaturalism, he leaves out of sight altogether that kind of superiority to nature, as known before Christianity arose in the world, the advent of a new force into humanity which made Tertullian and St. Augustine—(St. Augustine, who in his letter to Faustus is so careful to deny a merely external mechanical supernaturalism opposed to, or simply cut off, from nature) which, I say, made Tertullian and St. Augustine exclaim “ I believe because it is impossible.”

Indeed, in another work of his he joins in the chorus of reprobation with which this saying has been generally received. But there is nothing unscientific in the expression in the mouths of the greater writers who used it.

It was not until scholastic logic had crystallized the conception of nature, that the supernatural came to be regarded as something isolated and mechanical. Nor even then were the two worlds so separated as they have since become. The distinction between “ *natura naturans* ” and “ *natura naturata* ” between the study of a fact or event “ *in*

fieri” and “*de facto esse*” left room, even in the Middle Ages, for a conception of miracle similar to that of St. Augustine and might have accounted for the most unexpected facts and events, apparently impossible according to our previous knowledge or habits of thought, as a new combination of natural laws. Any other conception does, indeed, suggest a dualism so radical as to be inconsistent with the Christian condemnation of Manichæan heresy. To this subject it will be necessary to give a separate treatment; for the present what has been said is enough.

Matthew Arnold's two objections to the Catholic Church are:—(1) that it developed scientific dogma too early at a time when the necessary conditions were not present; (2) that there was moral corruption instituted and persisted in by the Church.

With the second objection I have already dealt; and indeed Matthew Arnold himself almost retracts it as soon as he has made it.

With regard to the first, I have already observed, he is inconsistent, because he admits that development must follow laws of its own; that, in the religion in question, speculative developments were inevitable and that even if they were mistaken, the Church as a whole was sure to be less mistaken than the individual at the time when the developments were made.

Nevertheless, Matthew Arnold holds this to be, so far, a mark of corruption in the Church from the

original idea of it; because it led away from conduct and practice which are the Church's true concern.

But if Christianity brought man into contact with a new force, a force so new that it seemed to accomplish what according to men's experience was simply impossible; it was not only inevitable to thought, but necessary to action, that Christianity should put itself into some reasoned relation with this force.

This, then, was what speculation had to do and what it did. It accounted for this new force—not adequately, not completely, but in the vague. It set this force into the order of its ideas.

Had it not done so, the moral question would at once have arisen—viz. :—was not this force anti-social and immoral in its very nature?

It was a question which had to be faced at once; for the Roman world held that, however virtuous Christians might happen to be in other respects, their insistence on the absolute rights of their religion,—as superior to the law of the State,—was in itself immoral and anti-social. Christians were compelled, therefore, to give their position a basis in speculation. And were they wrong in the manner in which they did it? Were they wrong in insisting that though the powers that be and the order of the world are ordained of God yet there is another order of ideas, immanent in the world but superior because profounder and nearer the base and centre of nature than even the order of government and society?

And how could they express this at all but by

insisting upon the supremacy and depth—the divine nature—of the spirit and ideas of Jesus?

How could they give this spirit that supremacy without insisting on the fact that it was ruling in the world ever since the world began to be; that it was ever preparing the world for its fuller advent and more perfect rule on the coming of Christ; that the belief they had in Christ could itself never have been what it was had not the spirit which was in Christ's words long been ruling, by implication and suggestion, in their hearts already, and that this spirit was now so satisfying to them only because the mind of man was naturally Christian and Christ the Master of the mind of man?

Had Christians, then, not developed the full conception of the Divinity of Christ, as the God of humanity and the expression of the order of nature and "the nature of things" to the heart and mind of man, Christianity not only could not have ruled in the world,—but could not have set forth its real claims at all.

Because Christ was the living foundation of the living city of God, He was Himself the living God; because the city of God was but the world (always by nature Christian) turned Christian altogether, Christ was the world's true God; because the world is but a part and a necessary development and expression of the whole process of things, if Christ is the Lord of the world, He is—contemplated as Spirit—Lord of all worlds, and begotten before the worlds were made. Because by His doctrine of "dying to live" He had got at the

centre of things, had conquered death and become the exponent and transmitter of life,—He was the sole Lord of Life and death; as He was “the true, because the spiritual, Messiah” of the Jews, so was He the true, because the spiritual, *God of mankind*; and if, of man, then of all that long series of developments in time and space of which man is the apex and the crown. This Messiahship is not less real because it is spiritual; this Godhead is not less real because it is of the spirit, for it is the spirit which quickeneth, the flesh profiteth nothing—and a spiritual union with God is not less a union, but a far profounder union than any material commingling can conceivably be. These were words of praise; they were the *Magnificat* of the Christian soul; but they were words which cannot be said to exaggerate the facts except by those who regard physical evil as greater than moral and matter as more real than spirit.

If, then, the doctrines of the Incarnation and the Trinity are expressed in terms of a crude metaphysic—that is only a matter of degree. All metaphysic must be crude in this sense—that all metaphysic which is expressed at all must be expressed in words. But a crude metaphysic is not therefore false; or else all metaphysic must be false as soon as it comes to be expressed in language.

The fact is that Christians, knowing what Christ was to their consciousness—that He was, for them, a new source of life, a centre of their being, the exponent and transmitter of sanctity; and finding that this sanctity was a genius for morality

and morality was the nature of things, in all simplicity, declared Christ to be "an absolute"—for they must either do this or stultify themselves; Christ must take the place of the gods, the whole Divine idea must be conceived as having become man in Christ, or they must still be in bondage to some part of another system, an earlier system, of the Divine, and their religion must perish. To give this position to Christ, it was necessary to express the fact in terms of speculation. They did so; they made Christ an absolute in terms which set Him above all the past and above all the future too. In so doing they asserted, by implication, that what was true for their consciousness was true for all time; and in so far as they did this they were making a hypothesis absolute and final. Here, on the grounds on which Matthew Arnold is arguing, it is impossible for him to follow them; but though he cannot follow them in the sort of speculation which expressed their confidence in the fact, he says, in his *Essay on Christmas Day*, that as the old ground in philosophy is slipping away and we find we cannot lay down axioms about persons, however great, which in themselves are necessarily true, yet, as if by a coincidence, in this crisis for Christianity, when the old philosophy fails, "the apprehension of the depth, *necessity* and *truth* of Christ's teaching about ethics and the apprehension that morality is itself of an eternal value and *centrality*," have found profounder proof and made Christ an absolute once more, not on the same grounds indeed but on grounds which reach

far deeper. Whether the Christians had a right to expect for Him an eternal supremacy on the instinctive basis that what was true for them would prove true to all, we cannot say; but now that so varied a period of history has passed away and so many have come from the East and the West and are sat down in His Kingdom;—"Now that He is so evidently great and yet (as we see more and more) so uncomprehended, now that He is inevitably so to remain for ever, He comes to stand before us," in a new and even deeper way, "as what philosophers call an absolute." "The way, truth and life have been found in Christianity, and will not now be found outside of it."

(4).—THE MISSION OF THE CHURCH.

(1)

“The Catholic Church,” says the Abbé Loisy, “maintains hope in the world.” She maintains hope in the world against the gnosticism and agnosticism into which the world has ever been divided; the gnosticism which would shut up the hope of man in a system suitable, at the best, only to a single stage in man’s knowledge; and the agnosticism which would deny that any progress or development in religion is possible, because religion is concerned only with what cannot be known.

She has discovered the general attitude of man to what he calls Divine and worships; she has summed up and presented to man his general relation to the infinite; she has found that “the soul of man is naturally Christian,” and she declares that the relation of man to God gives her the right to found on experience the relation of God to man. If such a proceeding appears optimistic, she declares that such optimism has become its own justification; if optimism is an error, among the possible conceptions of the best end of man, which may all conceivably be erroneous, it is the wisest of errors and, if in assuming the possibility of progress, arriving at ever new aspects of truth and a perpetual development of religious ideals, she turns

out to have been wrong, she has, at least, made the greatest spiritual experiment possible to man and has failed only with the failure of mankind.

Because man has felt himself to be the Son of God, she has declared that God is His Father; because man has conceived himself to be of God's offspring, she has declared God to be the author and giver of life; because man has felt the necessity for consciousness in his Deity, she has declared that God is a Trinity; because man has discovered ever new depths of horror in sin she has confessed that moral evil is worse than physical and that she cannot fathom the depth, or find the end, of hell. Because man has declared that he cannot find God; that God is infinitely distant from him and infinitely unlike him, she has declared that God is infinite, and because man has found God to be nearer than a brother—nearer than hands and feet—she has declared that the kingdom of God is within man. For her, God is as truly infinite in the heart of man as in the constellations, and though all partake of Him He is as wholly one in a child as in the universe. She makes no explicit mention of a system of God slowly brought out by Scripture and the church; but she takes it for granted that through the hearts of mankind comes, for all time, that realization of things which, at last, if it "come full circle" shall indeed be the system of God. She denies that it is possible for the scholar to find for himself in Scripture what parts are the word of God and what are not; she has found by experience that even when such a procedure has seemed most

plausible it has led to anarchy in opinion and fanaticism in action; she therefore affirms that all Scripture is the word of God, but that history, tradition or the experience of man—expressed in the authoritative decrees of the church—is the sole judge of what is permanent in Scripture and what is temporary, and therefore, what is, in an ultimate sense, Divine. In other words, man, by throwing himself upon Scripture, finds by experience what it is which continues to support him and what fails beneath his weight.

Now it is easy to say, and it will be said, that such language as this is not the language of the "Church," and that a Catholic cannot consistently speak in this manner. The Church speaks of revelation, inspiration and the "deposit" of the faith, and would condemn any who should speak of these things as coming *from* man and not rather *through* them, or as if history, tradition and experience were the same thing.

But the Church does not deny that, regarded from without, revelation does come from man and that tradition is history and experience. On the contrary, she affirms that this is the case. She adds, indeed, that they are more. But this she does on the authority she has acquired from the immediate success of her primary assumption and on the authority which has accrued to her from the intrinsic and extrinsic evidences of her mission. It is with the extrinsic evidences alone that we have here to deal.

And in this case the church speaks by her acts

as well as by her words. If she seems unconscious in her express declarations of the variety and splendour of her growth; if she makes no boast of being continually in the process of reconciling Greek thought and Roman organization; if she regards it as no matter of triumph to have attempted the reconciliation of the Old Testament and the New, it is none the less true that these things she has to some extent accomplished, and is still in the act of achieving;—nor does it detract from her majesty that she has acted as one of the forces of nature from motives which lie too deep in the heart of things to be expressed in the terminology of any particular age. These reconciliations, indeed, are a task far beyond the scope of a single century; the differences between Greek and Roman civilization are differences which lie at the very base of man's thought; the differences between the Old Testament and the New lie as deep; any boast of success in these things would at any given moment seem premature and superficial; it will have taken her perhaps 2,000 years to realize the fact that she has been facing these problems in anything like their true proportions; but on this reconciliation and on this resolution of uttermost difference in a higher unity depends the whole hope of man. For if in such different manners man was always travelling towards a consistent conception of things then man has been progressing from the beginning; but if these differences never can be reconciled, then there may be progress for individuals but certainly there would be no progress for man.

It was her fortune to come into the world when these uttermost differences that lay in the hearts of men had found a high degree of expression and it was a matter of supreme importance to her welfare that she was compelled to start her journey through the ages not from Christ alone, but from Christ and the Synagogue; not from the East alone but from Rome, as well as from Jerusalem; not from Rome only but from Athens also and Antioch and Corinth and Alexandria; and those who would reject everything but "primitive doctrine" may well despair of Christianity, for in their sense she can scarcely be said to have been primitive at all, because Christ Himself would seem to have borrowed from the teaching of Scribes and Pharisees and Rabbins who lived before He came.

It is because the church has assumed the possibility of reconciling the world to its past; and civilizations, philosophies and nations to each other, on the basis of what is common to all, that she has been able to maintain that hope in the world which philosophers ought to protect, but which they have very nearly succeeded in destroying.

"When the stir and rush of new ideas," says a candid and thoughtful writer, "have passed into acquiescence and the débris of shattered prejudice has been cleared away, it will be seen that, if the name of Christianity appears unsuitable to the phase of faith embodying this new discernment, it will be only because we have associated that

“ name with limitations which oppose themselves
“ to the idea of growth and force us to take up an
“ attitude towards the past incompatible with that
“ atmosphere of promise which the idea of evolution
“ spreads everywhere around us. But it is in truth
“ only that later form of Christianity which we
“ know as protestantism to which these ideas are
“ strange. The elder church embodies an idea of
“ development which it has neither exhibited nor
“ enforced, but in which, latent and confused as it
“ is, perhaps lies no small portion of its mystic
“ charm and enduring dominion.”

(2.)

What, then, is “ Revelation ” in the language of theology becomes realization in the language of those who are regarding theology from without; “ inspiration,” one of those impulses in which man has recognized a movement from the greatest depth of his being; and the “ assistance ” promised to two or three gathered together in a Divine name, that confidence in success inevitable to the combined effort of man.

So long as criticism was purely subjective and so long as the interpretation of texts might be regarded as arbitrary and dependent upon private judgment, it was impossible for the Catholic church to allow the claims of criticism; but as soon as criticism could show itself to be scientific and therefore “ objectively grounded,” first one Catholic and then another was able to adopt interpretations which had not “ the unanimous consent

of the Fathers " for their only criterion, and Catholics like Père Simon and Astruc were able to be pioneers in Higher Criticism before Protestants could venture on so dangerous a territory.

But Catholics like Simon at first and Geddes afterwards could not expect to escape rebuke and condemnation from officials ; condemned they were ; yet their position is felt every day more certainly to be secure, because they started on a line which is every day more clearly perceived to be scientific and to have nothing to do with the extravagant notion that scripture can be privately interpreted or made to rest ultimately on the dictates of the private judgment. Against such scientific and objectively grounded interpretations the unanimous consent of the Fathers holds no more than it holds against the changes made in the Catholic conception of Scripture by such scientifically demonstrated facts as the movement of the earth and the antiquity of man.

In such criticism, in such interpretation, in the realization of such scientific facts what applies to one applies to all ; and what has been but the theory of an individual becomes the conviction of the race and something as directly affecting the whole as the part. But when such critics as Bleek attempt the definition of inspiration and divide the sacred books into parts which are fully and parts which are incompletely inspired, though they are contributing what may turn out to be a useful speculation, to the general progress of thought, they are unconsciously passing over the line of legitimate investigation

and usurping the function which the church is alone capable of performing.

The word "inspiration" is one of those terms, vague and general in meaning, but of a particular application, which the church has been the first to use and of the true use of which the church alone can be the judge. That certain portions of the Scriptures have a deeper spiritual import than others; that history has proved one part to have a greater degree of permanence than another, is all that the scholar can discover. But the church keeps the whole mass of Scripture under the general protection of this term and leaves it to her own experience and the process of history to prove what particular portions of the Sacred Books have the deepest or the most prolonged vitality. It is a matter in which particular and partial criticism is, of necessity, subjective, and it is precisely in points such as these that the church is enabled to appeal to that objective process, which, by her careful preservation of continuity, she alone has been able to secure to the human race. Actual permanence and power to rule in the world are the sole tests the church allows of the differences of value in different parts of her Sacred Books.

It is here that the church is enabled to prove the difference between her system and an intellectual or philosophic Eclecticism. Eclecticism is dependent upon thought purely subjective; but the decisions of the church are brought about by the impact of facts, the results of thought only where they have proved themselves to be scientifically

grounded or to be the expression of a natural law ; so that it is made a matter of reproach to her that as long as thought continues in the sphere of speculation she pays no regard to it and refuses to receive the hypothesis of a Galileo or a Darwin until the whole world has become convinced that the hypothesis is a fact.

Speculation and thought mean for the church very little until they can prove themselves to be the embodiment and the expression of those laws of the universe by which alone she will allow herself to be controlled or directed because on them alone can be based, in the ultimate resort, the final hope of man.

With eclecticism the mode of choice may depend upon the intellect, the heart or even the taste ; but with the church there is not so much a choice whether she will receive this or that teaching, but rather an acquiescence in what is inevitable ; an obedience to laws, ultimately existing even in speculation which are so completely objective in their nature, that he who disobeys them does but bring himself into opposition to that deeper kind of expediency in which some would recognize necessity and some an utterance of the Divine Will. For us it is enough to consider it as the gradual realization of a completely objective truth.

And in the history of what is called " mystical interpretation " we have a parallel instance of experimental test and decision by the impact of facts. The church began her mission in the world with few words and a narrow vocabulary. It was a

necessity of existence with her to preserve the Divine authority of those words which were the basis of her teaching, nor was it less a necessity of her being and essence to believe with a wholly unconscious simplicity in their Divine origin and veracity. It was impossible for her to go beyond them; and it was likewise impossible to meet all the exigencies of her ever-changing life with words which were addressed to a particular age and with a limited meaning. She, therefore, expressed her own convictions by means of these words with a superadded meaning applying universally what was first intended only for particular occasions. This was an experiment which arose from necessity and was submitted at once to the touchstone of as wide an experience as the circumstances allowed her.

She had within her ranks the literal and critical schools of Antioch as well as the "mystical" schools of Alexandria; but for her development and the expression of her ever widening vitality the fettered and ascetic poetry which belonged to mystical interpretation was the very instrument and mode of speech that she required.

She had to express not a logical deduction from facts; not the elaboration of a system nor the propositions of geometrical problem, but a constraining law of her being, the inevitable tendency of her thought, the spontaneous movements of her religious consciousness. Of this kind of law, this inevitable movement, this inarticulate and massive

thought which lies in a whole generation of men—scattered and yet consistent, a fact of the spirit as stubborn as facts in matter—the Church felt Herself the embodiment, the representative and, as far forth as it can have a voice, the voice. And in the mystical interpretation of Scripture alone could she find the mode of utterance which had become a necessity to her preservation.

And in this sense, as we have attempted to show in a former chapter, she is infallible: not as if her interpretations of Scripture were historically correct, but, as if she were one pronouncing in the words of Scripture whence she drew the sources of her life; what was religiously true and what religiously false—what was poison to the religious spirit and what was food; what would destroy that kind of hope essential to the life of man and what would best kindle and renew it.

In this spirit and on these grounds it is not surprising that she should have condemned the Philosophies of Paganism and erected a theology, which would admit no human system as true. She did not mean that such systems contained no truth; but that, professing to give the basis of all truth, they pretended to complete what on earth can never be completed.

In these matters, then, and in this sense, along the main line of religion the church has been, even regarded from without, at once progressive and consistent. She has shown, by the manner in which she has avoided the exaggerations of Pantheism on one side and the exaggerations of

Transcendentalism on the other, even in the judgment of some who do not admit her claims, that the line she took is objectively justified and grounded in the facts of human nature.

(3)

But, on the other hand, it must not be supposed that viewed as an ecclesiastical body she has, on these grounds, always been trustworthy or an infallible guide to mankind.

Those who attack the church have always attacked her as a body of ecclesiastics and nothing else; and if this were the truth, it would be as true, perhaps, to say that she has been infallibly wrong on all those occasions on which she has been consulted as to say that she was infallibly right.

No one would deny that in her actual condemnation of Pagan Philosophy, however true the grounds on which she was constrained to oppose it, she was yet, in the manner and the words of her condemnation, totally mistaken; nor need it be denied that the course which was taken by her representatives was productive of untold mischief in the reckless fanaticism and childish superstition from which Christianity suffers to this day.

So, also, in her general acquiescence in the philosophy of Aquinas, as if the system of Aristotle was indeed what she had already said no human system could be, the whole truth, she is now generally held to have committed herself to exaggeration as great as in her former condemnation of what she afterwards so enthusiastically approved.

Nor need it be contended that she was invariably wise in the stress she laid upon mystical interpretation in her controversies with the Arians, for she could have expressed her meaning perhaps even better in a language less fantastic. That is, even practically, she may be considered to have gone too far for the necessity of the case; while no one at this day, will contend that, on critical or historical grounds, her interpretations of Scripture will hold for a moment.

It was inevitable, human nature being what it is, that she should have acted as she did; but that does not make her interpretations of Scripture the true ones. Her action was necessary as the only mode of self-preservation possible to her, and her interpretations the exactest expression she could find of her religious development. But her infallibility in the expression of the life of religious and Christian thought was perfectly consistent with false interpretation of texts, and an exaggerated condemnation of opponents. Considered, then, as an ecclesiastical body she has been liable to exaggeration and mistake; and therefore it has been natural, as for the enemies of the church who wish to convict her of error, so also for ecclesiastics who wish to refute them, that both one and the other should speak as if the word "church" meant only an ecclesiastical body, and as if the infallibility of the church meant the infallibility of ecclesiastics.

So it has been said of Cardinal Newman that he submitted his conscience to an ecclesiastical

body as if that were the whole church of Christ.

But no one has gone further than he in insisting on the duties of the laity with regard to the preservation of orthodoxy, and in showing how the "*ecclesia docens*," if left to itself, on more than one occasion, would have destroyed the faith which the laity preserved.

Viewed from without, therefore, the infallibility of the church must be regarded as residing in the whole body and not in what is called the "*ecclesia docens*" alone; while the operation of that infallibility must be restricted to the religious element in man, upon which the "*ecclesia docens*" only speaks infallibly so long as the whole body is faithfully represented.

It was inevitable, however, that ecclesiastics should regard themselves as the chief instruments of this infallibility.

If the church is contemplated as an ideal institution in perfect working order, there would be no great objection in such a division. The division might be arbitrary and absolute, but it would produce no necessary harm. Were we to regard the theory as only describing the *ideal* of the church it would, at least, be plausible.

But when it is assumed that the church actually is in this condition; that Popes are always speaking infallibly and *ex cathedra*; that Bishops always represent faithfully the mind of the Holy See; that Priests always represent faithfully the mind of their Bishops, and that all the people have to do is to follow their priests whithersoever they go, the

mischief of speaking thus absolutely becomes apparent at once. The very conception of an "*ecclesia docens*" and an "*ecclesia discens*" is broad and general and arose out of a practical necessity. To give this conception all the precision of a mathematical proposition; to make it a description of what the church aims at being and then to assume that it is a description of what the church is; makes the position of an ordinary layman practically impossible. There is no heresy into which the church would not have fallen, in one part of it or another, if this conception had been followed out rigidly and to the letter, nor does the theory of the church deny but, in fact, assumes, that a Bishop sometimes may misrepresent the mind of the church or a priest the mind of the Bishop. If this were denied, it would be easy enough to show that there has not been a century in the history of the church in which some Bishop or another has not been mistaken like Bossuet or heretical like the Arian Episcopates, and that there have been long periods in which the Laity were orthodox and the Clergy untrustworthy.

The most then, that theologians who have spoken thus of the "*ecclesia docens*" can be taken to mean is that, in undisturbed periods, the "*ecclesia docens*" is actively infallible and the "*ecclesia discens*" passively infallible.

And even this is not true, if it be taken to mean that a Bishop is practically never mistaken or that no learned layman is likely to be able to correct an ignorant priest; for the church has never

regarded it as a new and startling fact that a priest should be accused of heresy by a layman, or by a mass of the laity, but has taken it for granted that, human nature being what it is, such cases must sometimes occur.

Natural as it is, then, that ecclesiastics should come to regard themselves as alone infallible it is necessary to compare the actual fact with regard to the assumption upon which the church really acts with the ideal hypothesis set forth by certain theologians—for, *on this ideal hypothesis*, the representative character of the church, in her councils and in her priesthood, comes to be entirely excluded and forgotten—and authority is conceived as a purely despotic institution ruling from above in such a sense as to be not only unlike what it was at first, but unlike what it has been in quite recent periods of its history. On this hypothesis the state of France in one of its best periods, with a Jansenistic Priesthood and Gallican Episcopate, could not be accounted for, any more than the state of England with an Erastianizing Episcopate in the reign of Henry VIII. or the state of the church during its whole career in the world; for there has never been a time when an “inchoate schism” or a heresy like semi-Arianism was not beginning in various portions of its Episcopate or its Priesthood.

The infallibility of the “ordinary magisterium” of the church, might be taken broadly as a fact, if the church were in perfect working order; but the church on earth never has

been in perfect working order and we have no right to expect that on earth it ever will be. Indeed, we might contend that during the Apostolic times the church was more nearly in perfect working order than it is now, but that even then there were inchoate schisms; even then there were those in considerable position who went too far and had to be rebuked to the face; even then there were those who were not content with their already considerable powers but loved to have the pre-eminence; even then there were those who were cautioned against "lording it" over the flock. And if the kind of semi-military discipline, of which we now hear so much, be really the kind of power which the Christian religion was intended to institute—in what possible sense can those words be taken in which Christ contrasts the power of earthly rulers with the kind of power to be exercised by His disciples and commands "that it shall not be so among them?"

Difficulties an ancient religion must be expected to have; difficulties in reconciling its past with its present, difficulties in explaining texts or commands in its Sacred Books in such a manner as to reconcile them with the procedure of later times and a new condition of thought, but in the presence of such a difficulty as this an honest man would have no resource.

(4)

Practically, however, the church has never ceased to be a representative institution, for there

has never been a definition made or a dogma enunciated which did not owe its origin to traditions held among all Catholic peoples and taught with consent of the laity; nor has any teaching opposed to the people's sense of orthodoxy or catholicity ever found its way beyond the district in which it was first promulgated. The basis of infallibility ever remains in the mass of catholic peoples and ultimately depends on their consent.

The notion of infallibility is not a matter clearly revealed in the New Testament. It is a notion which arose from that deeper kind of expediency in which the church recognizes the voice of God. It is an inference from the words of Christ which could never have been drawn had not circumstances made such an inference inevitable; and now the inference has been drawn the precision with which we define the seat of it may be exaggerated.

For the inference came to be made on grounds something such as the following. Christ had said that when two or three were gathered together in His name there was He in the midst of them. He was said to have promised that His disciples should be led into all truth. And His dying prayer was taken as equivalent to a promise of unity to His church. Theoretically we now know how misleading this kind of inference is; but practically through the natural evolution of ideas and discipline and the survival of what was fittest it brought out a great truth.

When men began to differ on religious

subjects, on subjects of immediate importance in the teaching of Christian faith, they found that though, as individuals they prayed for light with equal piety and faith, as far as could be judged, they yet continued to differ.

The promise, then, of an answer to prayer *when two or three are gathered together*, was taken to mean that the full realization of the answer to prayer would not be made to the individual.

It was necessary to act as well as to pray, and unity was an end for which action was necessary as well as prayer.

What more natural than to suppose that the promise not made to the individual, was made to a collection of individuals? What more could be done, what other method could have been used, than that of calling together a council? What more inevitable than that representatives thus called should form a clerical body? These men would say that they had done what they could, and God, in return, might be expected to bless their endeavours; to lead them into all truth and to bring them into that unity for which Christ had prayed.

But if this was true of the smaller units—it seemed likely to be true also of the greater; and what would be gained by the “gathering together” of individuals might be expected to be gained by the gathering together of nations. And in this way the idea of a catholic or universal council, added to that of the collection of traditions throughout the Christian world, would bring the

element of progress in truth or development of doctrine into direct contact with the *preservation of truth* or the defence of orthodoxy. And hence a kind of infallibility in the Council would be conceived to have resulted from the assistance of God and as an answer to prayer.

That this was the manner in which men thought and argued may be inferred, to some extent, even from so early a work as the Acts of the Apostles and still more clearly from later writings; but it is enough for our present purpose to insist on its intrinsic probability.

If there is but a general truth in this conception of what happened, it is enough to show that this peculiar union of representation and authority of order and progress, of conservation and development, of tradition and the realization of truths, already held in words, but imperfectly investigated,—must have been a primary characteristic and an essential feature of the Catholic Church in its earlier ages and was derived from a kind of inference so natural as almost to seem inevitable. So that from the apparent refusal of God to answer the prayers of the individual for unity the true answer came. Here, as if by chance, Christians established a basis of union and progress for man, and on this union of representation, catholicity, tradition, development and continuity, the whole hope of religion, as an objective, social fact came to depend. On its representative character, therefore, the infallibility of the Church was historically built up. Nor is there any foundation in fact or in

doctrine for that kind of Traditionalism which makes authority intrinsically infallible and the rule of Pope or of Councils a rule simply from above, with no basis in the consent of the people.

Yet of this union of representation, catholicity, tradition, development and continuity the Roman Catholic Church, as it at present exists, is the only Body which can claim to be the heir. The tendency to fall into Traditionalism and to regard the teaching body as immediately inspired or alone capable of preserving tradition must ever be expected in a body which holds a tradition or which respects its teachers at all.

But whatever the defects of modern theology; whatever the strangeness of ancient interpretation; however unexpected or grotesque the character produced by renderings of Scripture peculiar to the simplicity of early ages; however extravagant the practices of particular saints of the desert; however deeply the church of the Middle Ages may be coloured by the character of the races which then submitted to her sway, however attenuated, vague and general the representative character of the priesthood may have become in the present—if there is any hope for man beyond the progress of science and the scientific temper, that hope is still to be found where alone a basis for hope is possible, —in the union of religious order and progress added to a continuity which has made no conscious break with the past.

The changes of the world; the changes within the church as well as without; the necessary move-

ment of human thought; the mere progress of events, still continue to throw the words of Christ into new surroundings; still experiment upon them; still turn them this way and that, till it be found in what sense they are most deeply true. The words said to have been spoken by Christ to Peter have found their practical interpretation in the dominion of the Popes and may, after they have ceased to be regarded as words of institution and promise, come to be regarded as words of prophecy. But, at any rate, by these words a fact has been created; a triumph of discipline and order has been gained. If, then, we regard the institution of marriage and so many other of the social and civilizing elements of Christianity, as Goethe regarded them—in the light of what he called culture triumphs of the Christian spirit and parts of our civilization which ought never to be abandoned, may we not regard the discipline, unity, and order of the church as in some sort triumphs of a similar nature, which we have no right to abandon till we have substituted for them powers as great and as widely respected? If there is crudity in the conception of the Papal power, is the experience of the use and the necessity of a centre of unity to count for nothing? And if the authority of the teaching Church is still taken in a sense too absolute, is there no practical modification in its historical basis and the present necessity of placing ultimate reliance upon the consent of the Laity?

(5)

The two conceptions of power from above and power based on representation are necessarily for a long time confused, and time alone can make their adjustment possible. Christ spoke of a kingdom of Heaven, a kingdom of God in which He was to reign—a kingdom which was to come in the clouds of Heaven apparently within the lifetime of those whom he addressed. As that great critic and historian the Abbé Loisy has shown, it is not necessary for the catholic apologist, and it is impossible for the historian and critic, to suppose that Christ clearly and fully foresaw what would take place. As historians and as critics we have no right to begin with assuming the existence of prophetic and supernatural powers in Christ; still less can an apologist begin with assuming one of the very points in dispute. Nor, perhaps, is it theologically exact to go so far in the direction of Docetism as to assume that Christ, though born as a real man, was a sort of man-in-the-abstract, not a Jew with a Jew's thoughts and aspirations modified by greater breadth of thought and largeness of conception, but a man full grown from the beginning without the necessity for learning and with a capacity of foreseeing all the ultimate results and inner meanings of the learning which existed. This would be heresy if pressed and fully described, for it would assume that Christ had not a really human soul or human mind, but something phantasmic, not dependent upon the senses in the ordinary way or needing the labour and diligence

of a man. If Christ had not the trials and difficulties of mental learning, obscurity and toil, as well as physical hunger and weariness, He would cease to be altogether our example or to suffer from some of the most peculiarly human of all our difficulties, and His great sacrifice, in living and dying for us, His great atonement of man with God, would be unavailing for the mind, the soul, the intellect of man. Persons, who have committed themselves to a mechanical conception of the mode in which Christ lived in the Beatific vision and have thereby caused a sort of annihilation of all the specially human qualities of His soul, are on the verge of a heresy the most completely destructive of the whole Christian idea which it is possible to name.

As theologians, then, and not only as critics or historians, we may conceive that Christ was speaking of the coming of the Kingdom in the immediate future in a literal sense. The Gospels, as we have them, in one place put in the mouth of Christ words to the effect that even He did not know the day and the hour when that Kingdom should come. Whether Christ spoke these words or not, it implies an opinion, on Christ's human nature and human knowledge, which no Christian is in a position to gainsay or contradict.

But here again the actual explanation of a great vision of the future came to be made by circumstances; and Christ, who commanded that men should everywhere "watch," "repent," and

“prepare for His Kingdom,” was in that very command already bringing that kingdom into being; as a man who should tell his workmen to begin preparing walls, buildings and streets for the founding of a great city ultimately to be called after his name, would afterwards quite truly and naturally be said, not merely to have been preparing for a city afterwards to be called by that name, but to have been actually then and there building that city so named.

The preparation for the kingdom, then, was in itself the coming of the kingdom, nor, perhaps is it altogether unworthy of notice, in this connection, that, in the process of time, the kingdom came to be called the city of God, though it is still described as coming down out of Heaven. And there is, in such a change of the direct meaning of Christ, surely nothing unnatural, nothing strained, nothing forced, when we consider that in words universally known among the first Christians—it was asked that God’s will might be done *on earth* as it was in Heaven, immediately after it had been asked that God’s kingdom might come. Of course these Christians still continued to look for a Second Coming—purely miraculous—when every eye should see Christ coming in the clouds of Heaven; but the first fulfilment of these words inevitably came to be applied to the founding and building up of the Church on earth and, here as in a former example, the treasure for which men had been bidden by their master to dig—was not found in a sense separable from their labour, in the earth or

in the Heavens, but as the immediate result and the inevitable outcome of that labour itself.

Some such interpretation of the pictorial words of religion is so general and so frequent an effect of thought and enquiry that it is startling, for the most part, only to those who have not thought and enquired; for the very notion of Heaven, as the result rather than the reward of righteousness the completed victory of grace corresponded to, not a prize or gift externally conferred; the notion of Hell as the state of one who has refused to subordinate his passions and his appetite to his will—and not as a punishment arbitrarily inflicted from without—these two notions have come, in every country and form of religion, to take the place of a purely pictorial Hell and Heaven in the minds of everyone who has thought and enquired at all. A return to the former conceptions would be impossible to the great mass of men as a return to childhood.

Here the Abbé Loisy's treatment of the Gospels may be regarded as an application of the best thought of Newman and especially of his theory of development to the whole history of religion in the light and by the aid of modern criticism and the modern spirit. His thought is not, indeed, in any sense, borrowed from Newman. It arose in the natural course of his reading from the study of Renan and the German schools of Biblical exegesis and criticism in that great, creative and scholarly intellect. But Newman's theory of development came to him as a confirmation and an independent witness to a fact; and

while Newman, who went much further in thought than he was able at once to go in writing, was hampered by the necessity of justifying his position to that somewhat narrow and limited audience which the Tractarian movement, with its romantic enthusiasms and mystical tendencies had created, the Abbé Loisy has been able to deal freely and massively with the whole subject—not confining himself to the history of the church, but applying the same method to the whole course of religious evolution in the New Testament, in the Old Testament and in the world at large.

(6.)

Now one of the points in which Newman's doctrine of Development commends itself to modern writers is that it is felt to apply and to be as necessary to belief in the authority of the Bible as to belief in the authority of the Church. In the Bible there is no mere progress in truth or a mere deepening of ideas; though there is such progress and such deepening when the matter is considered as a whole; but there is a development of aspects of truth and aspects of ideas. The writer of Ecclesiastes is not so great in ideas or in literary expressions as Isaiah; but a new aspect of things occurs to him which makes him, as Lessing has declared, a necessary link in the development of the idea of immortality. He for the first time sternly faces the fact that there is a like end to the brute and to the man, to the wicked and to the good. If the progress of ideas were not always from a

consciousness of a negative aspect of an idea to a consciousness of the first affirmative aspects of it; if, in order to get at such a notion as that of immortality, it were not first necessary thoroughly to realize *how terrible* the apparent fact is without it,—there could not properly be any place for such a Book as Ecclesiastes among the Sacred Writings. But it is this anxiety about the darkness which heralds for us the dawn; it is this pre-occupation with a question, though only in the negative aspect of it, which makes discussion inevitable; it is from this “rubbing of the hard flints of fact,” the least likely of all things to the eye to contain any fire, that the first bright sparks of spirit leap forth into the world.

On no other basis than that of some development of ideas and slow growth in morals can the gross cruelties in some parts of the Old Testament be accounted for; and even then, such a case as that in which Samuel, by the command of God, kills Agag in time of peace (to us an act of murder) would remain an insuperable difficulty did we hesitate to go the whole length of criticism and find only in the general spirit and underlying consistent law of advance in the Bible the authentic revelation of the Divine.

And so it is with the church. Infallible she is in the general law of her advance; sufficiently clear and direct in her infallibility to be a guide to the individual in all the ordinary circumstances of life, and for those who can follow the line of her advance the promise and indication of an ultimate infalli-

bility in the nature of man and the laws of his being; but infallible only in the great mass and general spirit of her life and teaching,—infallible only from the operation of principles immanent in her being as a whole; infallible only in the general course which she takes and which, in the name of the whole body, she bids the individuals in that body to take; but not infallible in the body of her ecclesiastics separated from the Laity, for even a council or a Pope are practically and by the admission of theologians, dependent on the ultimate consent of the whole body of the faithful.

For if it is (as it is) a theological axiom that the Pope, by incurring heresy, *ipso facto* ceases to be Pope, it is clear, from the nature of the case, that the whole of the church taken together is the sole possible judge of the fact.

So, also, if she is, in some sense, "the kingdom of God," is because, when her labour is regarded in its end, she is, at once from the nature of her organization and from the very fact of her preparing for it, in however crude a form, yet with the severest literalness, an institution of that character. Not as if the true idea of that kingdom were already realized; not as if the cruder conceptions of it had not to be tested and found wanting first before the deepest meaning which can be found for the words of Christ has, by continuous experiment, been discovered. But if the notion of a kingdom lies in the words of Christ at all, and if that Kingdom is rather to grow up on earth than to come down from Heaven, the

Church is the only institution in the world in which such a consummation could with logical consistency and by a natural process of development be realized.

So, again, she may be said to have in her keeping the scheme or system of God for the salvation of man; but not as if that system were not actually being realized, and that in a process exceedingly slow, by each man setting forth as clearly as he can the special truth peculiarly interesting to himself, the very variety of man's nature being a part of the realization of that system which can only be complete when the *Catholicism of the greatest human difference* is resolved into its highest expression and realized in the *catholicism of the deepest human unity*.

The scandals of the church like the scandals in the Bible; the errors in the teaching of the church like the errors in the teaching of the Bible—and, again, the retrogressions and periods of obscurantism in the history of the human race—can be corrected by the whole mass of those who look back upon them from the higher stage of progress gained and in the light of the scientific temper.

In questions such as these the clerical body is of necessity the conservative body in the church and the laity are the organ of the progressive spirit. Nor has it been denied by dogmatic apologists that in "kindness," for instance, this age has definitely advanced on the past, and that this increase in humanity is not owing to the direct teaching of the clergy, but to the general advance

of Christian civilization. The clerical body, it is to be hoped, may even yet learn how to assimilate from the present something of that general intellectual sympathy, of which they have been so signally destitute in the past. But here, at any rate, a development of the spirit of Christ has been made by the laity in the face of clerical opposition and protest.

In these matters, Catholics, Protestants and those who regard the human race as progressing, are at last on common ground. Protestants have scandals and errors to account for in an inspired Bible; Catholics have scandals and errors to account for in an infallible church; Positivists have retrogressions to account for in a progressive humanity—and all these are coming to account for these things on similar grounds.

It is not just either to Loisy or to Newman to say that they regard the later ages of the church as in every respect the best, because they consider that there has been a development of Christian ideas. It is expressly stated by Newman, that in one respect, the Primitive ages must for ever stand higher than the Mediæval and the modern, namely in this: that in those times there was a spontaneity and interior union of spirits which did not require explicit statement and dogmatic utterance. There was a vigour, an *élan*, a joyous swing of advance which can never be found in an equal degree when Christianity had spread over large masses of men, began to require definitions and suffered from “the

corruption " incidental to a " popular religion." But there was, nevertheless, no pause in that development of aspects of truth which we have found in the Old Dispensation and might expect also in the New. There was not the same onward rush and spontaneous vigour, but there was a continued experimentation in Christian thought and action; a continued application of Christian principles to new circumstances and to new facts; a continued realization, under new aspects, of the Christian idea. Much of this may have resulted in crude and incomplete interpretations of Christ's sayings, but it was an attempt to Christianize thought, where Christianity had never touched thought before; it was bringing a new light, the light of the Gospel, however imperfectly, to bear upon all aspects of life and all regions of speculation.

And thus even the spirit of persecution was but an exaggerated and hateful expression of what was nevertheless a necessary development of the idea of religious truth if ever it was to stand erect and give the law; if it was not to dwindle away into a legend or become a mere mystical sentiment or get pulverised into the dust and mist of Individualism or Latitudinarianism. It was the wild and fanatical protest of the religious populace against dallying with every form of religious thought, be it truth or error, which might grow out of private and irresponsible speculation. It was even a sign that religion was alive; for hateful as are those vices of religion—fanaticism and superstition—they

are, in the great masses, the almost inevitable defects of its qualities and when in great communities and among the ignorant the defects are not to be found, it is too often because the qualities (that is, religion itself) have perished likewise. Every conceivable effort should be made to destroy vices so disastrous and so hateful; "woe unto them through whom the scandals" of religion "come," but "it must be" that "scandals" peculiar to religion there should be; and, though there is in this fact no excuse or justification whatever for these vices, yet they must be regarded as what they are, not as what they are not—the results of conviction, of faith without love, of a zeal for the truth which has outrun the truth itself and attempted to make the spirit of evil labour on behalf of the spirit of good; not signs of the death of religious and lofty inspiration.

Richard Hutton has complained that Newman seems to turn the special vices of the religious spirit, its gloom, its superstition, that which gave plausibility to the description of it as "the enemy of the human race," into "notes" of the church. But a certain gloom, a certain melancholy, an over-intensity of thought, must ever characterize and become, in a certain sense, a "note" of any deep and great movement which absorbs, in its onward sweep, weak minds as well as great, narrow natures as well as broad, the violent as well as the strong. But in spite of all this; in spite of the waste and loss to the individual here and there, the great type was, nevertheless, in the forming,

and it must be our endeavour to preserve it, keeping it free from popular error and incidental corruption, where the nature of the error and the corruption are so plain and unmistakeable—and not from indignation against the evil refuse—to recognize the existence of the good.

It is absurd to pretend, then, as controversialists do, that, according to Newman's theory of development, the author of "The Glories of Mary" is in a superior position to the author of the Gospel according to St. John; that inquisitors and casuists had a deeper appreciation of Christianity and a closer hold on the Christian idea, than the apostles and the primitive Christians, or that the Christianity of later times is a finer thing than the Christianity of the earlier. Certain ideas have been made explicit and a certain experimentation has proved certain facts. History has proved to even so biassed a witness as Thomas Carlyle that, if it had not been for the Athanasian Creed and all the discussions so much scorned as discussions about a diphthong, Christianity would have sunk into a legend. But it may, nevertheless, be true, that only aspects of the Christian idea have so far been developed; that we have discovered only a small portion of the objective grounds of it; and that there is still a future for us in which, learning from the partial and cruder developments of the past both the life to which they witness and the incidental and popular errors in which they were imbedded (whose nature time and the scientific temper have revealed to us) the church may yet

realize the spirit of Christianity as it never has before and from small and tentative beginnings grow up, at last, to the measure of the fulness of the stature of Christ.

It is not by attempting to find the main idea of Christianity in that part of it which happens most to strike ourselves; it is not by scholarship, however profound, or philosophy, however subtle, that this consummation can be arrived at, though all such investigations may be utilized by those who think that the essence or whole nature of Christianity is not to be measured by such standards; but it is by throwing the Christian character or type into the world, by throwing a Christian community with the natural growth of its affections and aspiration into all the facts, catastrophes, and thoughts of time and circumstance, with all the natural, though it be sometimes the wayward, growth of its convictions, that the objective grounding of that which is deepest in Christianity will appear, the incidental error and superstition be eliminated and the main idea or full measure of Christianity attained.

Catholicism can utilize the Protestant spirit, but Protestantism cannot put to its use the Catholic Church. Catholics can make use of the criticism of those who are without the church and correct in the present the real evils which Protestants have discovered in the past. Undoubtedly we have all, in certain things, gone astray; we have all gone too much by the letter, too little by spirit, we have all judaized in our several ways—judaized in our

actions and Hebraized in our thoughts, and yet, for that very reason, not sufficiently realized the greatness of the spirit of the Hebrews.

But Protestantism has the fatal defect in its basis, and cannot claim to make an interpretation of Christianity on the principles of development or to have discovered for the first time its essence or what it really is, as long as it denounces all the past history of development as so much corruption; fails to see in the loyalty of Catholicism any of the rewards which loyalty brings and quarrels with itself as to what for the future, the main idea or essence of Christianity shall be considered to be. Such a religion not only cannot be a social religion;—it comes hopelessly hampered and obscured even to the individual, without continuity in the past or clear and steadfast hope for the future;—for who knows whether its representative mind in the future may not forsake Harnack to return to Strauss or go one step further than Renan?

But the Catholic Church in spite of its reliance on the past, not so confident as to set up “main ideas” of Christ or “essences” of Christianity, yet is confidently making for one goal and knows whence it is starting and in what direction it is to go. From having travelled so far in one direction and staked out the progress of its journey, it knows, what others do not know, when it is going onwards and how to avoid turning for ever round a single point in the great desert of endless speculation. It knows the direction in which it has come and therefore can infer a direction in which to go.

It may be wrong; but if it is wrong there is little chance for those who have never discovered any line of orientation at all, but consider that hope can only begin when all the steps have been retraced and the human race once more begins the journey it has already taken 2,000 years to make.

Mistakes the Church has made and modifications it must make in the mode of its action and the teaching of its creed—nor have the greater Catholics ever denied that Protestant speculation has been useful to it. For Protestantism itself rose from a necessity; rose in accordance with the deeper expediency; rose in answer to that kind of crisis in circumstance which the church recognizes as the voice of God—and made its protest against the crudity of that conception of a God's Kingdom which prevailed in the Catholic world. But for the crude conception of this Kingdom it substituted something so vague and so entirely individualistic that the whole social basis of religion was destroyed or begun to fade rapidly away. And as soon as a protest of this kind had arisen among the people—in a Catholic spirit, they were induced to follow leaders who betrayed them, cut off continuity, denounced the past, scorned the old Popish saints, cut the ground from under their feet by denouncing all former developments as innovations, all former principles of reform as little better than corruptions, and set forth their own ideas as the only true expression of Christianity since the days of Augustine, nay, since the days of St. Paul. By destroying the cruder conception of an external

Kingdom they destroyed the possibility of any general line of orientation or social expression of religious development. Authority and inquiry are equally necessary; but authority must have its ground and reason in the nature and necessity of things—or else it is usurpation; inquiry must have its basis and its ground in some objective consistency of direction or it wanders hopelessly around for ever. Like the Puritan Commonwealth in England, Protestantism broke continuity with the monarchical idea so that when the necessity for a monarch returned the monarchy was received in a form very little modified by the experience of disaster and was practically a despotism still.

But after all, to a high spiritual use the cruder conception of the Kingdom has been put by the Church, and within the harder husk of a growing organization a nobler conception has been realized.

For the Church holds out to man the hope of a base for authority and an orientation in inquiry, setting forth both sides of the inevitable dilemma of man's intellect as true and constantly affirming that they are resolved into their highest unity in the mind of God, and can be resolved into a higher unity on earth, repressing premature conclusions, but stimulating inquiry. By the consistency with which she has taken this line, for two thousand years affirming these opposites in slowly increasing accordance with the advance of the scientific temper—she has gained, on a basis of experience, the authority she claimed at first on directly supernatural grounds, gives a line of orientation to the

spirit of man and presents him with the only possible basis for belief in a general progress of the whole mass of humanity towards a definite object—that system of God which all the varieties of man's intellect exist but to realize, that goal of the full realization of all humanity's greatest ideas—which is held in the vague by all but attempted on a practical basis of world-wide order and endless progress by the Church alone.

Thus alone can the totality of man's being find an environment answering to its order in time and space; thus alone can he find a basis for that hope which is the very life of his life and central fire of his being. Thus alone can all the varieties of the individual tend not to the dissolution of society, but to its varied realization as a consistent whole, and its continued progress, under guides from every quarter, in a direction which is learnt from a comparison of the past and the present.

The Church, then, has created for man, in the sphere of religion, an authority based, not on an imaginary claim, but on an objective necessity of experience.

She has given to man the possibility of union and progress in the religious sphere.

She has given in the history of her growth a line of orientation whence it is possible to find the line of progress to be taken in the future without breaking with the past. She has shown by those errors which science has revealed, where the utmost effort of religion, the greatest spiritual experiment ever made by man, must inevitably fail. She has

kept the line between gnosticism and agnosticism, Pentheism and Transcendentalism, Freedom and Necessity, the One and the Many, with such success and consistency as to shew that there *is* a line, objectively formed, along which religion may travel with success and in which there may be progress for man.

Thus, if she has destroyed all the false hopes of men by her errors and made some think that the pursuit of truth is an illusion, she has established a true hope for man on grounds which appear ever more and more clearly objective, consistent and secure; on grounds which show the history of mankind to be continually reconciling the opposite expression of his greatest thought—Greek philosophy and Roman organization, the Old Testament and the New, Christ and the Synagogue, Alexandria and Antioch, Priest and Prophet, Letter and Spirit, Mystical meaning and Critical exactness, French lucidity and German depth, the ordered liberty of England, the flaming heart of Spain.

The Kingdom which was to come in the clouds was founded by Christ on earth, and the City of God which was to descend from heaven has been built by the children of men.

THE END.

224. Goethe & Burke

238- Theory of Development

252- Pasteur -

307- Infallibility

Date Due

D 17 '34		
F 8 '35		
Ap 27 '38		
MR 31 '60		
AP 14 '60		
AP 28 '60		
MY 12 '60		
MY 26 '60		
UE 2 '66		
MAY 15 1989		
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APR 21 1995		
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